My Lords, we welcome the increased potential for mobility, of both students and researchers, afforded by creating a European higher education area. The structure and international merit of the UK's higher education system is already reflected in the Bachelors/Masters/PhD cycle envisaged by Bologna. We are actively involved in influencing the debate. Key action areas currently include developing the diploma supplement and contributions to discussions on qualifications frameworks and quality assurance systems.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. Clearly, with events such as the Edinburgh seminar a couple of weeks ago, the Glasgow summit next May and the ministerial plenary session just after, not to mention the plans for a European research council, the pace is growing, as are the costs. She referred to the diploma supplement. Will the Government help universities with the additional costs to which they have already signed us up, such as the issue of a diploma supplement from next year?

More broadly, I wonder about the possibility of a culture clash between a British focus on outcomes and a continental fixation with inputs such as time of study. Now that 25 of the 40 Bologna countries are part of the EU, will the Government resist any pressures under which they may come from the European Commission towards a harmonisation that could interfere with the flexibilities of the UK system, such as our one-year Masters degree and quality control provisions?

My Lords, a focus on outcomes is absolutely critical. There is no conflict on the one-year Masters degree, which is something of which we are very proud. We continue to work with it, and there is no conflict with Bologna. There are no plans for a research council at present; the DTI is consulting on the subject, but no proposals have been put on the table. The diploma supplement is very much about additional information for students, which is important. We are talking to the universities, but I cannot make any commitments on funding. In general, it is to be welcomed that Bologna offers real opportunities for mobility.

My Lords, I invite the Minister to comment on the statement made by the president of Universities UK last night that:

"The UK Government, and most universities it must be said, have largely stood aside from the Bologna Process",

so far. Do the Government now plan to have a much more serious and sustained engagement in the negotiations as they warm up?

My Lords, I was sorry to miss the speech of the president of UUK last night, but I have a copy. We have not stood aside. Our contribution in Bologna, Berlin and Bergen next year will be critical. We are very committed to the process, working closely with UUK to ensure that we provide the energy and support that it needs.

My Lords, I do not recall the Minister answering the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Quirk, on whether the Government would strive to ensure that awards were based on outcomes rather than processes. Does she see scope within the framework of Bologna for recognition of an award such as a foundation degree, a distinct form of degree that serves to give standing to vocational awards throughout Europe?

My Lords, I said that there would be a focus on outcomes; I am sorry if the noble Lord did not hear me. The foundation degree is important, and we are the only country currently offering it. There is no conflict with Bologna, and we wish to see the foundation degree recognised fully for its contribution to lifelong learning.

My Lords, does my noble friend recognise that the one-year MA courses in this country are important for encouraging overseas students to take advantage of the British university system, and that it would be a mistake if we moved to the two-year MA system of some of our continental colleagues?

My Lords, we believe that our one-year Masters system is strong and rigorous and is highly valued by international students. We would not wish to see a two-year requirement for a European Masters degree as that would leave us out of step.

My Lords, can the Minister tell us the Government's policy on the further European integration of education?

My Lords, we see processes such as Bologna—where we have the opportunity to think about our higher education system and opportunities for mobility between researchers, teachers and students—as a good example of how best to develop the right kind of links in both a European economy and a global economy. Such opportunities are important also for schools.

My Lords, in expressing my support for the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Quirk, perhaps I can declare an interest as chief executive of Universities UK. As the Bologna process moves on, it is clear that the Government's involvement needs to be very much increased. Can my noble friend the Minister confirm the Government's support for the work of the UK-wide Europe unit and confirm that she will ensure that there is appropriate ministerial participation at Bologna summits; high-level official representation in Bologna forums; and practical support for the introduction of Bologna reforms in institutions?

My Lords, I can indeed offer my support to the work of the Europe unit—which I did not know about until yesterday, as I am not the Minister with responsibility for this policy area. However, I was delighted to hear of the work being done by Universities UK and the funding councils and the contribution that our senior officials are making to the committees involved. I can confirm ministerial involvement in the work that has gone beyond Bologna, for Bergen next year. We will continue to be in dialogue on the issues surrounding universities' involvement. However, I believe that the UK is already well placed.

My Lords, can the Minister assure us that there is no further likelihood of an additional level of quality assurance regulation being imposed as a result of this? If she cannot do so, can she assure us that she would resist such an imposition?

My Lords, although I can assure the noble Lord that we would resist such an imposition, there are no such plans. Quality assurance is being worked on in the sense of collaborative approaches across Europe, not with any view to an over-arching European quality assurance system.

My Lords, can the Minister tell us whether there is any problem in accommodating the MEng degree—Master of Engineering—which is commonly taken in the United Kingdom by engineering students?

My Lords, I know that concern has been expressed about the MEng degree. Nothing in the Bologna agreement or process should impinge on that in any way whatever.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I declare my interest as the Bishop to Her Majesty's Prisons.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government why they referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights the judgment of that court in Hirst v United Kingdom concerning a violation of Article 3, Protocol 1 of the European convention in the matter of the denial to all sentenced prisoners of the right to vote.

My Lords, it has been the view of successive governments, including this Government, that persons who have committed crimes serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence should forfeit the right to have a say in how the country is governed while they are detained. The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Hirst case challenges this position. We wish to ensure that the issues in relation to this important and long-standing policy are fully considered.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply, particularly for the fact that he has not sought to suggest that the present blanket disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners serves any useful purpose. Would it not be better now for the Government, given the unanimous ruling of the court, to proceed to the drafting of legislation that would allow the courts to impose a sentence of disenfranchisement as an additional penalty when they thought it appropriate? Would not such legislation mean that there were voters in our prisons and, therefore, that prospective and present Members of the other place would have an incentive to have considerable interest in what goes on there and support the Government's rehabilitation policies? Might not those rehabilitation policies be further advanced by the teaching of citizenship in relation to the right to vote?

My Lords, my answer is no to the first question and probably no to many of the subsequent ones. The central question concerned whether we should start drafting legislation. The answer to that is no, because we believe that we have an arguable case. We think that it is an important issue. It has been part of the tradition of this society for very many years. It has also been a policy that has been tested by the opinion of both Houses of Parliament as recently as 2000, under the Representation of the People Act, when we introduced a modification to allow prisoners held on remand to vote—but not wider than that. Therefore, we, along with many other member countries in the Council of Europe, think that we are right in our policy position.

My Lords, perhaps I may make a prediction, which is that the Government will now be humiliated by the Grand Chamber if they insist on taking this case before that court. As the right reverend Prelate has indicated, this was a unanimous decision. It included Sir Nicolas Bratza, the British judge; and it was a balanced judgment. The Minister has not yet told the House—I should be grateful if he would—why the Government disagree with the decision that legislation is disproportionate if it disqualifies 70,000 convicted prisoners of the right to vote, irrespective of sentence and irrespective of the nature and gravity of the offence. How can that demonstrate a proper sense of proportion?

My Lords, now is not the time to engage in the hearing that will go before the Grand Chamber. I shall refer to a specific issue. One of the central arguments given by the court was the recognition of a large measure of discretion for nation states in this respect. While recognising that, the judgment did not appear to apply that test to its own judgment. It did not in any way indicate the limits of the discretion that the court thought would be appropriate.

My Lords, does the Minister accept that the right to vote is fundamental to our democratic values? It is accepted that those who are convicted lose certain rights, but that has nothing to do with control and discipline in prisons. Therefore, it is important that those democratic rights are valued so far as concerns our inmates.

My Lords, it is in part because we believe that active participation in democracy is important in our society that the state takes the view, as have many previous governments, that people who, by their actions, have breached that contract should for the limited period that they are in prison lose that right. Of course, the nature of imprisonment is that a person loses a range of rights. That is an unfortunate but necessary part of the prison process.

My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that it is not in the nature of imprisonment that a prisoner should lose his rights because, otherwise, that principle would be applied to remand prisoners as well? Can he say which other western European countries adopt a blanket ban on prisoners' voting rights?

My Lords, it would take too long to give the full list but I shall write to the noble Lord. However, perhaps I can summarise it. Eighteen out of 51 Council of Europe countries have no restrictions; nine have a prohibition on all prisoners; some, like Ireland, while having no legal prohibition, offer no practical rights and therefore, in practice, prisoners are not able to vote; and others have a range of restrictions according to the severity of the sentence. I shall write with full details of all such countries.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that the Canadian Supreme Court decided that Canadian prisoners must retain their right to vote because that helps to train them in citizenship and it helps their social reintegration? Does the Minister see any merit in those arguments?

My Lords, we are aware of that debate and our position in this respect is quite clear, as is that of both Houses of Parliament. These are not simple issues. Nevertheless, for many years it has been part of our society's tradition that, when people are imprisoned, they lose a range of rights, one of which is the right to participate in elections.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State hopes to announce shortly our decisions on the report by my noble friend Lord Haskins. It will include how and when the decisions will be implemented.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that Answer and declare an interest as chairman of the Sussex Downs Conservation Board. If behind his reply is the fact that the Secretary of State is, as is widely thought, to announce her decisions on the Haskins report on 22 July, the last day on which Parliament meets, I consider that to be quite disgraceful.

The Government had 10 months in which to consider the recommendations of the noble Lord, Lord Haskins, and they gave them a warm welcome at the start. Does the Minister accept that at present no one in either the agricultural or environmental industries knows who is to be responsible for delivery in the years ahead? Is it to be the Countryside Agency, Defra or English Nature? Surely, if they believe in rural proofing, the Government have a duty to respond to the report quickly and not on the last day of the parliamentary Session.

My Lords, the noble Lord will be aware that over the decades governments have made Statements during the last days of any Session of Parliament. Such Statements have equal validity and carry equal accountability, and noble Lords have the ability to query Statements made at any time during the parliamentary Session. Therefore, I do not think that the word "disgraceful" is appropriate here. These are complex issues. We gave a clear and broad indication of how the delivery structure would be altered in the light of the recommendations from my noble friend Lord Haskins, and the details of that will be conveyed in a Statement shortly.

My Lords, will the Minister admit that one reason for the delay is the Chancellor's Comprehensive Spending Review? What impact will the CSR have on the implementation of the Haskins report, given that Defra is subject to cuts in the CSR? How are both the CSR and the Haskins report to be integrated into future government policy?

My Lords, Defra is not subject to cuts in the CSR. I thought that it was Liberal Democrat policy, and possibly Tory policy, to cut Defra's budget, but it is certainly not the Government's. The Government have provided additional resources to Defra but the implementation of the Haskins report was not delayed because of the CSR decisions. Through the efficiency arrangements, the CSR provides some additional implementation resources but that is not central to the timing of the decision. It has been a complex matter, involving both serious discussions with staff and very serious discussions with many stakeholders, the details of which will be revealed shortly.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the most important aspect is to put in place the correct framework for the long term and not to rush ahead with a short-term fix? Is not the best way to approach this matter to put delivery in the context of the rural strategy, reflecting all the changes that the agricultural industry is presently undergoing?

Indeed, my Lords. The announcement will be made in that broader context and will not simply be about the mechanisms. The other dimension to the issue, and the most complex, is the need to look at all the funding streams, as well as the machinery, so that we can rationalise and simplify for the benefit of all rural stakeholders the way in which government support rural industry, including agriculture.

My Lords, if the Minister cannot agree with my noble friend that the handling of this matter has been disgraceful, will he not at least agree that the Government and his department have dragged their feet on it? The noble Lord, Lord Haskins, hoped that the report would be put before us in April, but we are now in July. I should like to know what is meant by "shortly". Will the Minister tell the House how farmers are supposed to deal with cross-compliance issues when no agency is already set up?

My Lords, with regard to the last point, I think that the noble Baroness completely misunderstands the issue. Neither the specialist agencies nor the Rural Payments Agency are affected by the change of structure that we are talking about in relation to cross-compliance, on which an announcement will also be made shortly. As to when "shortly" will be, I cannot say precisely, but the noble Lord, Lord Renton of Mount Harry, was not a million miles away from what noble Lords will find out definitively next week.

My Lords, can the Minister say whether Defra has got past the discussions-about-discussions stage and whether it is now taking part in practical discussions?

Yes, my Lords, we are in practical discussions. Clearly, setting up any institutional change within Whitehall also requires ongoing discussions, but they are ongoing discussions aimed at a result.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that local authorities are very well placed to deliver the social and economic side of many of the things that need to be delivered? I think that that point was accepted by the noble Lord, Lord Haskins. Does the Minister also accept that some local authorities in parts of the country where there are many small family farms and people who are particularly affected by CAP reform will need considerably more in the way of resource and government freedom to deliver than perhaps those in the eastern half of the country, which will have a far easier time of it?

My Lords, the report of my noble friend Lord Haskins suggests that local authorities and regional bodies should have a greater say and a greater role in delivering policies and guidance to rural business as a whole. However, I shall not be tempted, as the noble Baroness wishes, into suggesting a wholesale redistribution of resources between the east and west of the country, much as I might desire to do so. That is well beyond my remit.

My Lords, will next week's Statement include an indication of how much will need to be done through primary legislation and, if so, what the likely timescale will be?

My Lords, my noble friend really should not ask me a question on the timescale of primary legislation. He is the last person to demand that from the Front Bench. Certainly the full creation of an integrated agency would, at some point, require primary legislation, but much can be done in advance of that.

My Lords, perhaps I may make a final point to the noble Lord. I fully understand that, in his position, he is bound to defend the decision to make the announcement on the last day that Parliament sits. However, does he accept that at present it looks as though there will inevitably be confusion between the different agencies over the next three years when no one knows precisely who is doing what? This comes at a particularly bad time when the interim review of the common agricultural policy is being implemented, and that is causing enough confusion and doubt in the agricultural industry already.

My Lords, I think that the agricultural sector is probably clearer than the noble Lord implied on the direction of change in agricultural policy. Nevertheless there are still details which require clarification and much of that will be done over the next few days and the summer.

The Haskins reforms do not impact on the nature of the CAP reform. They deliver broader measures of support, and to some extent guidance and regulation, to the rural industry as a whole, whereas the CAP reform is primarily about how we support financially land management and farming within this country. Dramatic changes are involved and the agricultural sector is fairly clear about what they are. As I said, the full details will be dealt with separately. However, the decisions on the Haskins report will be announced shortly. I do not think that we will have several months—certainly not years—of uncertainty as to who does what. I hope that clarity will be an objective of the announcement.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether there is any evidence that city academy status will help regenerate failing inner-city schools.

My Lords, academies are addressing deep-seated and longstanding educational failure. It will take time for the new leadership, buildings and curriculum to turn things round. However, of the three academies with GCSE results in 2003, the number of 5A* to C grades rose in two to 21 per cent and 35 per cent respectively from 7 per cent and 25 per cent in 2002, and the other had results broadly comparable with its predecessor schools. Academies are also improving behaviour and attendance.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. Is she aware that in the evidence that he gave to the Select Committee last week, the Secretary of State admitted that with only 12 academies up and running, there was, in his own words, very little evidence to support the success or otherwise of such academies? Is she further aware that an evaluation is promised later this year on the 12 pilots that are up and running? Does she not agree that for a government who pride themselves on evidenced-based policy, it would have been sensible to await that evaluation before embarking on a £5 billion expansion programme of city academies?

My Lords, I believe that in my reply I agreed with the comments of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State. I gave the evidence to the noble Baroness as we have it. It is important that we have the PricewaterhouseCoopers review and evaluation, but children cannot wait. We have deliberately developed a policy of putting academies into areas of the country where we have the kind of deep-seated educational failure which means that what is offered to our children is simply not good enough. Here is a new mechanism which we believe could inspire greater leadership and better academic attainment and which is important for children now.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that Castle Vale School in Erdington, my former constituency in Birmingham, which a few years ago became a specialist performing arts college, is now one of the most successful schools among many successful schools in the City of Birmingham? That has been under the inspiring leadership of Mrs Janet Putman, who has been headteacher there for about 11 years and is now to retire. Will my noble friend join me in celebrating that success and agree that inspiring leadership and commitment among the management of any school, whatever is nailed to the front gate, is the key to success?

My Lords, I think that all noble Lords will join in the celebration of Mrs Putman's achievements with the school. Every survey that we or Ofsted have undertaken indicates that the quality and strength of leadership is one of the most critical factors in determining the success of a school. It is something to be celebrated and something that every school should have.

My Lords, in view of the withdrawal of the partnership initiatives which have been promised to Church secondary schools, what will the Government offer the Churches in support of their continuing commitment to serving the inner cities' educational needs?

My Lords, that is slightly wide of the Question before me. The relationship between Church of England and Church schools and the way in which the Government take forward education policy is a critical factor. I am happy to pursue that with the right reverend Prelate and with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth in his role as chairman of the Church of England Board of Education.

My Lords, I declare an interest as a Somerset county councillor, although I make it clear that Somerset has no failing schools. What is the rationale employed by the Government in enabling someone to take over, for a proportionately small sum of £2 million, a multimillion pound school building and a subsequent school running project, especially as it seems that it will be free from government control? What rationale are the Government following?

My Lords, that is not the most accurate description of the way the academies programme will work. I should be happy to give the noble Baroness a more lengthy description. This is about bringing in creative, entrepreneurial aspects to enable schools such as those I have indicated, which have had a succession of failure, to offer something different to help our children to succeed. There is a funding agreement—I have placed a copy in the Library of the House—to ensure that the Government play a key role in ensuring that such schools are run effectively and properly. The academies are inspected, and we have advisers working with them. We have very high aspirations and we expect them to achieve.

My Lords, have the Government received any representation on the effects of city academies on social deprivation in inner-city areas?

My Lords, I do not believe that we have had any representations. I shall write to the noble Baroness if I discover that we have. The academy programme is run in schools in areas of highest deprivation, and therefore provides a new asset for schools. The academies which are open and those which are about to open have received many applications from parents who wish their children to attend. We hope that the academies will succeed in providing a first-class education for our children.

My Lords, can the Minister confirm what I believe about city academies; that is, that the secret is not just setting free leadership but enabling the leadership of the school to set free the professionalism of staff in the school to run things in the way they want? I wonder whether the Minister is as sorry as I am that the Liberal Democrats are not keen on that.

My Lords, I understand all political views in your Lordships' House and I understand that people may feel nervous about something new in the system. However, we know that uniformity is not always the best approach for our children. We have some very good schools in our system and some excellent teachers. However, over the years some schools have consistently failed our students. We have to ensure that we bring to bear all of the best in our society to support them. The academy model is but one part of the toolkit available to the department to try to support children in all settings.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

What contingency plans they have for the continued provision of public services by a major private finance initiative contractor in the event that such contractor becomes insolvent.

My Lords, there are provisions included in PFI contracts that are specifically designed to safeguard the public sector against situations such as contractor insolvency. Where a private sector party cannot meet his obligations, it is the responsibility of other shareholders or credit providers to replace him. In the last resort, the Government have the right to terminate failing PFI contracts with substantial losses to the consortium concerned.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that if a major PFI contractor such as Jarvis were to go under, some combination of government and other public bodies would have to pick up the pieces; for example to secure the completion of student halls of residence currently under construction for the next academic year? Does that not demonstrate that in reality the Government continue to bear much of the risks of those contracts?

No, my Lords. If Jarvis or any other contractor were to fail in its obligations, it is, as I said in my Answer, the responsibility of the other members of the consortium to, as the noble Lord said, pick up the pieces. Of the schools contracts which Jarvis has, only one is Jarvis alone. That is for only three schools and is worth £19 million. All the others have at least Barclays behind them. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, will suggest that Barclays will not be able to take up the responsibilities which are imposed on it by the PFI contracts.

My Lords, are not most PFI contracts through special purpose companies, which, if properly managed, should isolate 90 per cent of the problem if the contractor becomes insolvent?

Yes, my Lords. But it is not 90 per cent; it is 100 per cent. The worst that could happen is that if one member of a consortium became insolvent, there could be delays before the other members of the consortium took up his obligations, which they must do and which is in their interests. The purpose is that all the shareholders in a special purpose vehicle, to which the noble Lord, Lord St John, refers, have the incentives to complete on time and to adequate quality built in upfront in the contract.

My Lords, given that the number of contractors involved in major PFI contracts is relatively small, do the Government have procedures for monitoring their financial health so as to be ahead of the game? If not, why not?

My Lords, value-for-money analyses are made. I see the point behind the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. It is true that in previous years we had a public sector comparator which was an assessment of the kind the noble Baroness seeks. But that was brought in rather late and therefore it was not the kind of evaluation for which she rightly asks. The value-for-money studies which are now carried out, and which continue to be carried out by the National Audit Office, give exactly the assurance the noble Baroness seeks.

My Lords, in view of the widespread public concern about the financial position of Jarvis plc, can the Minister tell us what, on a look-through basis, is the total exposure of the public sector to Jarvis plc contracts?

My Lords, it would not be appropriate for me to comment from the Dispatch Box on the finances of Jarvis Plc. On the issue of public exposure, my answers have made it clear that the exposure is of the other members of the consortiums, rather than of the public sector.

My Lords, is the Minister really satisfied that the refinancing of PFI deals, which is quite common, amply safeguards the public sector, and that it receives a fair share of the better refinancing, which is available when a scheme is completed?

Yes, my Lords. The financing of a private finance initiative contract is a matter of legitimate risk. They are about risk management and those who undertake such contracts undertake a risk. If they can then lessen their risk by refinancing, it is legitimate that they should take some part of the benefit of that. But the contracts that have been in place since 2002 ensure that the public sector takes 50 per cent of the benefit of any refinancing.

My Lords, how many PFI projects have been successfully completed and how many have failed? May I remind the Minister that the Government have done a good job because they have succeeded in what we would call "risk transfer"?

My Lords, I am grateful for the final remark of the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon. If I were to give the detailed answer to his question, I would keep the House for a very long time. The answers are available on the Treasury website.

My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. Moved, That it is expedient that a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons be appointed to consider and report on any draft mental health Bill presented to both Houses by a Minister of the Crown, and that the committee should report on the draft Bill by the end of March 2005.—(Baroness Amos.)

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Baroness would be so good as to explain why Clause 217, Schedule 11 and Clauses 218 to 222—

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Renton, is asking about the next business on the Order Paper.

On Question, Motion agreed to; and a message was ordered to be sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith.

My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Perhaps I can try and pre-empt the question of the noble Lord, Lord Renton. The Government are proposing this order for the sake of convenience. Since the Bill left the other place, and following discussions, we have announced considerable concessions such as the introduction of a tenancy deposit scheme. It will take time for parliamentary counsel to draft that provision. As the Bill will start its passage in this House next week but not finish its Committee stage until September or October, the Bill will have to be reordered. It is therefore convenient to consider the Bill in the proposed order and not to wait on parliamentary counsel to draft the provisions to which we have committed ourselves.

Moved, That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to which the Housing Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order:

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his explanation. However, taking clauses and schedules out of the order in which they appear in the Bill nearly always creates some confusion. It is much easier to take them in the order in which they appear in the Bill.

My Lords, it may be easier, but it is difficult to have proper scrutiny if the content of the clause is not in place when one reaches that point in the Bill. I pay tribute to the noble Lord's work on the conduct and proper design of legislation in the other place and his report of some 30 years ago, and I look forward to his contribution to our debates next week on the matters that we will have ready for debate. However, for good reasons which we have agreed across the House and with the other place, we will not be ready to deal with the concessions that we announced since the other place finished its consideration of the Bill.

My Lords, I should like to repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. The Statement is as follows:

"Lord Butler's report is comprehensive, thorough; and I thank the members of his committee and their staff for all their hard work in compiling it. We accept fully the report's conclusions.

"The report provides an invaluable analysis of the general threat in respect of WMD; of the potential acquisition of WMD by terrorists; and though it devotes much of its analysis to Iraq, it also goes into detail on the WMD threat posed by Iran, Libya, North Korea and AQ Khan. Some of the intelligence disclosed is made available for the first time and gives some insight into the reasons for the judgments I and other Ministers have been making. I hope the House will understand if I deal with it in some detail. "The hallmark of the report is its balanced judgments. The report specifically supports the conclusions of Lord Hutton's inquiry about the good faith of the intelligence services and the Government in compiling the September 2002 dossier. But it also makes specific findings that the dossier and the intelligence behind it should have been better presented, had more caveats attached to it, and been better validated.

"It reports doubts which have recently arisen on the 45 minute intelligence and says in any event it should have been included in the dossier in different terms; but it expressly supports the intelligence on Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Niger in respect of Iraq's nuclear ambitions.

"The report finds that there is little, if any, significant evidence of stockpiles of readily deployable weapons. But it also concludes that Saddam Hussein did indeed have: first,

'the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted';

secondly,

'in support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities';

and, thirdly,

'was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions'.

"Throughout the last 18 months, throughout the rage and ferment of the debate over Iraq, there have essentially been two questions. One is an issue of good faith, of integrity.

"This is now the fourth exhaustive inquiry that has dealt with this issue. This report, like the Hutton inquiry. like the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee before it and of the Foreign Affairs Committee before that, has found the same thing.

"No one lied. No one made up the intelligence. No one inserted things into the dossier against the advice of the intelligence services. Everyone genuinely tried to do their best in good faith for the country in circumstances of acute difficulty. That issue of good faith should now be at an end.

"But there is another issue. We expected, I expected, to find actual usable, chemical or biological weapons shortly after we entered Iraq. We even made significant contingency plans in respect of their use against our troops. UN Resolution 1441 in November 2002 was passed unanimously by the whole Security Council, including Syria, on the basis that Iraq was a WMD threat.

"Lord Butler says in his report:

'We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found'.

But I have to accept, as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the time of invasion Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy.

"The second issue is therefore this: even if we acted in perfectly good faith, is it now the case that, in the absence of stockpiles of weapons ready to deploy, the threat was misconceived and therefore the war was unjustified?

"I have searched my conscience, not in a spirit of obstinacy but in genuine reconsideration in the light of what we now know, in answer to that question. And my answer would be this: that the evidence of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction was indeed less certain and less well founded than was stated at the time. But I cannot go from there to the opposite extreme. On any basis, he retained complete strategic intent on weapons of mass destruction and significant capability. The only reason he ever let the inspectors back into Iraq was that he had 180,000 US and British troops on his doorstep. He had no intention of ever co-operating fully with the inspectors; and he was going to start up again the moment the troops and the inspectors departed or the sanctions eroded. I say further that had we backed down in respect of Saddam, we would never have taken the stand that we needed to take on weapons of mass destruction, never have got the progress, for example, on Libya that we achieved and we would have left Saddam in charge of Iraq, with every malign intent and capability still in place and every dictator with the same intent everywhere immeasurably emboldened.

"As I shall say later, for any mistakes made, as this report finds, in good faith I of course take full responsibility, but I cannot honestly say that I believe getting rid of Saddam was a mistake at all. Iraq, the region and the wider world is a better and safer place without Saddam.

"The report begins by an assessment of intelligence and its use in respect of countries other than Iraq. It points out that, in respect of Libya, the intelligence has largely turned out to be accurate, especially in respect of its nuclear weapons programmes; and those are now being dismantled. In respect of Iran, the report says that Iran is now engaged with the International Atomic Energy Authority, though there remain,

'clearly outstanding issues about Iran's activities'.

"About North Korea the report concludes that it,

'is now thought to be developing missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons as far away as continental US and Europe'.

The report goes on at paragraph 99:

'North Korea is a particular cause for concern because of its willingness to sell ballistic missiles to anyone prepared to pay in hard currency'.

The report also discloses the extent of the network of A Q Khan, the Pakistani former nuclear scientist. This network is now shut down, largely through US and UK intelligence work, Pakistani co-operation and the dialogue with Libya. "The report then reveals, for the first time, the development of the intelligence in respect of the new global terrorism that we face. In the early years, for example, in the Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of October 1994, the view was that the likelihood of terrorists acquiring or using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was, while theoretically possible, highly unlikely.

"However, as the name and activities of Osama bin Laden became better known, the JIC started to change its assessment. In November 1998, it said this:

'[UBL] has a long-standing interest in the potential terrorist use of CBR materials, and recent intelligence suggest his ideas about using toxic materials are maturing and being developed in more detail … There is also secret reporting that he may have obtained some chemical and biological material—and that he is interested in nuclear materials'.

And in June 1999:

'Most of UBL's planned attacks would use conventional terrorist weapons. But he continues to seek chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material and to develop a capability for its terrorist use'.

By mid-July 1999, this view hardened still further. Again, I quote:

'There have been important developments in [Islamist extremist] terrorism. It has become clear that Osama Bin Laden has been seeking chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials … The significance of his possession of CB materials is that, in contrast to other terrorists interested in CB, he wishes to target US, British and other interests worldwide'.

A series of further assessments to the same effect was issued in January 2000, again in August 2000, and in January 2001.

"To anyone who wants to know why I have become increasingly focused on the link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, I recommend reading this part of the report and the intelligence assessments received. It was against this background of what one witness to Lord Butler called the 'creeping tide of proliferation' that the events of September 11 2001 should be considered. As the report says, quite rightly, following September 11 the calculus of the threat changed.

"I said in this House on 14 September 2001:

"we know that the terrorists would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We have been warned by the events of 11 September. We should act on the warning'.

"I took the view then, and I stand by it now, that no Prime Minister faced with this evidence could responsibly afford to ignore it. After September 11 it was time to take an active, as opposed to reactive, position on the whole question of weapons of mass destruction. We had to close down the capability of the rogue states, usually highly repressive and unstable, to develop such weapons and the commercial networks such as those of A Q Khan helping them. Again, my clear view was that the country where we had to take a stand was Iraq.

"Iraq was the one country to have used WMD recently. It had developed WMD capability and concealed it. Action by UN inspectors and the International Atomic Energy Authority had by the mid to late 1990s reduced this threat significantly; but, as the Butler report shows at paragraphs 180 to 182, by the time the inspectors were effectively blocked in Iraq (at the end of 1998) the intelligence assessments were that some CW stocks remained hidden and that Iraq remained capable of a breakout chemical weapons capability within months, a biological weapons capability, also with probable stockpiles, and could have had ballistic missiles capability in breach of UN resolutions within a year. This, of course, was the reason for military action, taken without a UN resolution, in December 1998.

"Subsequent to that, the report shows that we continued to receive the JIC assessments on Iraq's WMD capability. For example, in respect of chemical and biological weapons, in April 2000 it said:

"Our picture is limited. It is likely that Iraq is continuing to develop its offensive chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) capabilities'.

"In May 2001, the JIC assessed, in respect of nuclear weapons:

'Our knowledge of developments in Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes since Desert Fox air operations in December 1998 is patchy. But intelligence gives grounds for concern and suggests that Iraq is becoming bolder in conducting activities prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 687. There is evidence of increased activity at Iraq's only remaining nuclear facility and a growing number of reports on possible nuclear related procurement'.

"In February 2002, the JIC said:

'Iraq … if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agent within days'.

"The report specifically endorses the March 2002 advice to Ministers, which states that though containment had been partially successful and intelligence was patchy, Iraq continues to develop WMD. It said:

'Iraq has up to 20 650km range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and, if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so'.

"The report goes on:

'We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme'.

"The point I would make is simply this. The dossier of September 2002 did not reach any startling or radical conclusion. It said, in effect, what had been said for several years based not just on intelligence, but on frequent UN and international reports. It was the same conclusion, indeed, that led us to military action in 1998; to maintain sanctions; and to demand the return of UN inspectors.

"We published the dossier in response to the enormous parliamentary and press clamour. It was not, as has been described, the case for war, but it was the case for enforcing the United Nations' will. In retrospect, it has achieved a fame it never achieved at the time. As the report states at paragraph 310:

'It is fair to say at the outset that the dossier attracted more attention after the war than it had done before it. When first published, it was regarded as cautious, and even dull. Some of the attention that it eventually received was the product of controversy over the Government's further dossier of February 2003'.

"It goes on to say:

'Some of it arose over subsequent allegations that the intelligence in the September dossier had knowingly been embellished, and hence over the good faith of the Government. Lord Hutton dismissed those allegations. We should record that we, too, have seen no evidence that would support any such allegations'.

"The report, at paragraph 333, states that in general the statements in the dossier reflected fairly the judgments of past JIC assessments. The report, however, goes on to say that, with hindsight, making public that the authorship of the dossier was by the JIC was a mistake. It meant that more weight was put on the intelligence than it could bear and put the JIC and its chairman in a difficult position.

"It recommends in future a clear delineation between government and JIC, perhaps by issuing two separate documents. I think that is wise, though I doubt it would have made much difference to the reception of the intelligence at the time. The report also enlarges on the criticisms of the ISC in respect of the greater use of caveats about intelligence both in the dossier and in my foreword, and we accept that entirely.

"The report also states that significant parts of the intelligence have now been found by SIS to be in doubt. The chief of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove, has told me that the SIS accepts all the conclusions and recommendations of Lord Butler's report that concern the service. The SIS will fully address the recommendations that Lord Butler has made about its procedures and about the need for the service properly to resource them. The service has played, and will continue to play, a vital role in countering worldwide the tide of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, its successes are evident in Lord Butler's report.

"I accept the report's conclusions in full. Any mistakes made should not be laid at the door of our intelligence and security community. They do a tremendous job for our country. I accept full personal responsibility for the way the issue was presented and therefore for any errors that were made. As the report indicates, there is no doubt that at the time it was genuinely believed by everyone that Saddam had both strategic intent in respect of WMD and actual weapons.

"I make this further point. On the sparse, generalised and highly fragmented intelligence about Al'Qaeda prior to September 11, it is now widely said that policy-makers should have foreseen the attacks that materialised on September 11 2001 in New York. I only ask: had we ignored the specific intelligence about the threat from Iraq, backed up by a long history of international confrontation over it, and that threat later materialised, how would we then have been judged? "I know some will disagree with that. There are those who were opposed to the war, remain so now and will forever be in that position. I only hope that now, after two detailed parliamentary committee reports, a judicial inquiry more exhaustive than any has ever been in examining an allegation of impropriety against government, and now this voluminous report, people will not disrespect the other's point of view, but will accept that those who agree and those who disagree about the war in Iraq hold their views not because they are warmongers on the one hand, or closet supporters of Saddam on the other, but because of a genuine difference of judgment as to the right thing to have done.

"There was no conspiracy. There was no impropriety. The essential judgment and truth, as usual, does not lie in extremes. We all of us acknowledge Saddam was evil and his regime depraved. Whether or not actual stockpiles of weapons are found, there was not and is not any doubt that Saddam used weapons of mass destruction and retained every strategic intent to carry on developing them. The judgment is this: would it have been better or more practical to have contained him through continuing sanctions and weapons inspections; or was that inevitably going to be at some point a policy that failed? Was removing Saddam a diversion from pursuing the global terrorist threat, or part of it?

"I can honestly say that I have never had to make a harder judgment. But in the end, my judgment was that after September 11 we could no longer run the risk; that instead of waiting for the potential threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to come together, we had to get out and get after it. One part was removing the training ground of Al'Qaeda in Afghanistan. The other was taking a stand on WMD; and the place to take that stand was in respect of Iraq, whose regime was the only one ever to have used weapons of mass destruction and was subject to 12 years of UN resolutions and weapons inspections that turned out to be unsatisfactory.

"Though in neither case was the nature of the regime the reason for conflict, it was decisive for me in the judgment as to the balance of risk for action or inaction. Both countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, now face an uncertain struggle for the future, but both at least now have a future. The one country in which you will find an overwhelming majority in favour of the removal of Saddam is Iraq.

"I am proud and remain proud; was proud and remain proud of this country and the part it played, especially our magnificent Armed Forces, in removing two vile dictatorships and giving people who were oppressed, almost enslaved, the prospect of democracy and liberty. This report will not end the arguments about the war, but in its balance and common sense it should at least help to set them in a more rational light; and for that we should be grateful".

My Lords, first, on behalf of the whole House, I thank the noble Baroness the Leader of the House for repeating the Statement.

It is a long Statement, and much of it deals with various generalities, as well, of course, as the outstanding performance of our troops and the justification for war. We agreed with the justification for the war, and we still agree with it. I reiterate our support for removing Saddam. However, the issue before us is not the war but the conduct of government and whether proper use was made of intelligence. I shall not respond to the rhetorical bulk of the Statement. Much of it smacked of the idea that the end justified the means. That is never a safe doctrine for a parliamentary democracy. The tragedy is that, although the Government had a good case for war, the way in which it was argued—as exposed, once again, in this outstanding report, which has found serious flaws in intelligence and its uses—has weakened that good case and damaged the credibility of the Prime Minister in the country.

I said that it was an outstanding report, and I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, and his committee for their work.

The report demonstrates unequivocally—the Prime Minister has accepted this—that the Prime Minister went, in his certainties, far beyond what the intelligence would bear. I shall give one example. On 21 August 2002, the JIC said:

"We have little intelligence … and know little about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons work since late 1998".

On 9 September 2002, it said, "Intelligence remains limited". That is what the JIC told the Prime Minister. However, in his foreword to the September dossier, the Prime Minister said:

"I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current".

He also said that,

"the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt … that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons".

Can the noble Baroness explain the contrast? What led the Prime Minister so to alter the emphasis? Was he told to write that, or were they his own words, written in full knowledge of the caveats and conditions surrounding the intelligence?

The conclusion reached by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, is stark:

"it was a serious weakness that the JIC's warnings on the limitations of intelligence underlying its judgments were not made sufficiently clear".

Does the noble Baroness agree with that conclusion? The noble Lord suggested at his press conference this afternoon that the Government wanted the dossier as a document to back up their evolving policy. That put the JIC under what the noble Lord called "strain". He said that the 45-minute claim should not have been included in the dossier without qualifications. Can the noble Baroness tell the House who took the decision that it should be highlighted by the Prime Minister in that way? We were told time and again that the dossier attracted little attention. It is strange, then, that I am the only one who recalls the splashed headlines and the diagrams showing the great ballistic threat.

The Prime Minister has said that he did not know until later that Iraq did not have ballistic weapons. He said that he acted in good faith over the 45-minute claim. But he was preparing our forces for war. Why did he not know that the adversaries that they were being sent against did not have the capability that he had told the country they had? Did he not ask?

Like many others, I am concerned about the picture of government presented in the report and about the informal nature of this Government. There were meetings without papers and meetings without minutes or recorded conclusions. The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said that he had found no evidence of the Government planning to exaggerate the case for war. In such a context, is it possible that there may have been meetings and conversations of which no record was kept?

I turn finally to the role of the Attorney-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who is in his place today. The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, makes it clear that he did not examine the legal aspects of the noble and learned Lord's advice. How many opinions did the noble and learned Lord give? That matter remains obscure, even after the Butler report. Paragraph 374 says that, before Resolution 1441 was adopted, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General said:

"on the basis of the information he had seen, there would be no justification for the use of force against Iraq on grounds of self-defence against an imminent threat".

Later, we are told that the noble and learned Lord had a meeting with the Prime Minister's chief of staff and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Huyton, about his view of the legal position. They asked him to provide a further assessment. According to paragraph 379, he said that, in the absence of a second UN resolution, the Prime Minister must be satisfied that Iraq failed to take the final opportunity to comply with Resolution 1441.

We read of a further meeting with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who was not, at that time, Lord Chancellor, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Huyton, on 13 March and then a formal request from the Attorney-General's office for the Prime Minister to say that it was unequivocally his view that Iraq had committed further breaches. On 15 March, No. 10 Downing Street replied:

"It is indeed the Prime Minister's unequivocal view that Iraq is in further material breach of its material obligations".

In other words, it appears that the Prime Minister himself certified the legal case for war.

The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, did not examine in detail the legal aspects of the case. Is there any reason, given the partial light thrown on this by the Butler report, why the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General should not come to the House tomorrow and explain the full background of the paragraphs? In particular, can the noble Baroness tell the House whether the intelligence evidence played any part in the Attorney-General changing the advice that he gave to the Government between January and March? If the noble Baroness cannot answer that today, perhaps she would help to persuade the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General to offer some clarification to the House tomorrow. I know that the whole House would find that most interesting and welcome.

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness the Leader of the House for repeating the Statement made in another place by the Prime Minister. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, on a detailed and careful report. However, I must add, with regret, that once again, as with the Hutton inquiry, the terms of the remit given to the noble Lord's inquiry were so tightly drawn that the key questions that the House would like answered could not be answered by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, if he stayed within his remit. The key questions remain. Who made the decision to propose to Parliament that we should go to war? Who decided that shaky intelligence should be strengthened and firmed up, with all the conditions and qualifications left behind? Those are the key questions, and the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, was precluded from answering them, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hutton, was before him.

First, I must draw the attention of the House to the remarkable change in the Prime Minister's stance between November 2000 and the autumn of 2002, a mere two years later. On 1 November 2000, the Prime Minister said:

"We believe that the sanctions regime has effectively contained Saddam Hussein in the last 10 years".—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/2000; col. 511W.]

A year and a half later—24 September 2002—the Prime Minister said:

"The policy of containment is not working".—[Official Report, Commons, 24/9/02; col. 3.]

Between those two dates, two major things occurred: there was a report by UNMOVIC, the inspectors in Iraq, and a report by Hans Blix, both confirming that the threat had become less and not more.

Paragraph 427 of the Butler report states:

"The Government's conclusion in the spring of 2002 that stronger action (although not necessarily military action) needed to be taken to enforce Iraqi disarmament was not based on any new development in the current intelligence picture on Iraq".

First, what happened between autumn 2000 and autumn 2002? There was no change in Iraq's threat to the world or any change in the policy of containment. But, quite simply, there was a meeting between the Prime Minister and President Bush, of which we have not been told and of which we know little; either when it occurred or what occurred during it. Surely, that meeting must have had some influence on the quite remarkable change in the position not just of the Government but the whole of the government machine. Secondly, would Parliament have taken us to war in March 2003 if it had known that the intelligence was based on uncertain sources; if it had known that that intelligence was assessed in a very doubtful way; if it had known that some of those statements made on behalf of the Government were exaggerated and that qualifications and modifications had been removed? It is clear from paragraph 555 and other parts of the Butler report that those qualifications had gone.

Would Parliament have agreed to take us to war if it had known, as the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, pointed out, that the Attorney-General produced new and revised advice on 17 March following an unequivocal assurance from the Prime Minister that Iraq was in material breach of Resolution 1441? Would Parliament have taken us to war if it had seen the assessments made by no less a body than the Joint Intelligence Committee? There was assessment after assessment between October 2002 and March 2003 indicating that Iraq was not a serious and current threat. There were reports that were never published, never shown to MPs and never shown to Parliament as a whole; reports that very clearly undermine the case for war.

Finally, we turn to the question of who is responsible—that illusive question that the inquiry conducted by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, was unable to address. Who is responsible? Was it the virtual government of Mr Jonathan Powell and Mr Alastair Campbell? Was it the intelligence community? Was it perhaps the elected politicians in Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, who are meant to be responsible for the major policy decisions?

We still have not been told. To me it is a tragedy that we will now wait yet again on the Senate of the United States to show the clear line of accountability between how that decision to go to war was taken and how, thousands of lives and much destruction later, we have still not seriously addressed the question.

My Lords, first, perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that I am aware that they did not have access to the report until 12.30 p.m. Some of what is being said today is, in my view, partial. A complete reading of the document demonstrates that the report is comprehensive, balanced and thorough. Some of the views that have been expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, are not borne out by a thorough reading of the report. I would recommend to all Members of this House that they read the report from beginning to end.

With respect to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, in relation to the intelligence material and what had changed, the noble Baroness is well aware of what changed. The context in which we discussed those issues changed fundamentally after September 11. The Statement makes that absolutely clear. Indeed, a reading of the report and, in particular, the intelligence material in relation to that period makes that absolutely clear, as does the knowledge that terrorists were doing everything that they could to get hold of WMD. Again, that is factually borne out by the report.

The report and the Statement have tried absolutely clearly to put the discussions and decisions that were made in relation to Iraq in their proper context. That is something of which we should all be aware and something that we should all remember to do.

With respect to the issue of the legal basis for the war, I think that my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General has answered the questions that were asked of him in relation to that. I hope that in again asking those questions the integrity of my noble and learned friend was not being called into question.

To help the House, perhaps I may repeat where we stand. In the report, it is made very clear that the advice of my noble and learned friend was not based on WMD-related intelligence. I would direct noble Lords to paragraph 379 of the report. My noble and learned friend confirmed in this House, including on 21 March when he explained his view to the House, that it was his independent view that military action was justified.

The Butler report confirms, as my noble and learned friend has always maintained, that his advice, which the noble Lord's review saw, was based on the interpretation of relevant Security Council resolutions and negotiating history in the United Nations and, I repeat, not on WMD-related intelligence. So the lawfulness of the conflict is not undermined by the failure to find WMD or by any reassessment of the intelligence. It could not be clearer.

A question was also raised with respect to the use that was made of the dossier. When noble Lords look at the report in detail, I invite them to read the footnote on page 127 where the inquiry team makes it clear that it,

"wrote to some 60 Editors of national and regional print and broadcast media to ask them if they had been briefed by representatives of the Government about the dossier immediately prior to its publication or whether, post-publication, they were guided to report particular aspects, such as the '45 minute' story. All of those who replied said that they had not been guided to particular parts of the dossier prior to its publication … Some Editors noted that the '45 minute' story attracted attention because it was of itself an eyecatching item in a document containing much that was either not new or rather technical in nature".

Perhaps I may say to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that on 26 September 2002, in the Western Morning News, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats in another place, said:

"There is no killer fact in the dossier. It is more a confirmation of what we already knew".

Again, before the dossier was published, on 23 March 2002 the shadow Foreign Secretary said:

"The Iraqi threat is indisputable. Horrific weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a despot who will use them or give them to others to use in every part of the world. Our shared objective is the destruction of these weapons before they can be used. The means of achieving it must be effective and enduring. We cannot rule any option out".

In conclusion, with regard to the comments which have been made about the nature of government, the so-called informality of the Government, and the fact that meetings are held which are not minuted, we all know that if you are to have effective government, you need to operate in a variety of different ways. Those noble Lords opposite who may remember a time when they were in government might recall occasions when it was necessary to hold informal meetings before they then had formal meetings.

I say this to the House: the Butler report makes it absolutely clear that the Cabinet discussed these issues on 24 occasions. As noble Lords know, the Cabinet is always minuted.

My Lords, this is a sorry occasion. Reverting to the last reply given by the noble Baroness the Leader of the House, I am among those who have been in government and served in a Cabinet for a considerable time. I can say that the strictures—which they are, albeit in restrained terms—made in the Butler report at paragraphs 6.06 to 6.11, although not exclusively there, on the way that this administration conducts the procedures and processes of government is something that did not apply to any administration in which I have served.

I ask the noble Baroness whether she is aware that this is a serious matter. Throughout the over-long Statement of the Prime Minister, repeated by the noble Baroness, there was no acknowledgment of that whatever. When is this very important issue going to be addressed, and how?

My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord did not hear everything I said in the Statement, where it was made absolutely clear that we accept the report and the recommendations made in it. Perhaps I may also say to the noble Lord that at his press conference this morning the noble Lord, Lord Butler, was asked a specific question about the style of government. I watched it. The noble Lord said that the overall effect of the way the Government operated in no way made them any less efficient. Noble Lords should read what is in the report and listen to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Butler.

My Lords—

My Lords—

My Lords, there is plenty of time for everyone to speak.

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Can my noble friend confirm that the only substantive criticism of the dossier made in the report is that it failed adequately to emphasise, for the benefit of those who did not already know, that intelligence by its very nature is incomplete and frequently tentative? Can she further confirm that this is the first occasion ever on which a government have made public information from the JIC? Would it not be surprising if this first attempt at transparency did not give rise to some lessons?

My Lords, my noble and learned friend is absolutely right. Perhaps I may say in relation to his final point about transparency that, having watched governments operate over many years, no government have sought to be as transparent and as open with their people as this Government have sought to be.

My Lords, I have not yet had the opportunity to read the Butler report in full, but as a former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and as a Member of this House who has strongly questioned and still questions the case for going to war in Iraq, I should like to make a few brief points.

First, it is quite clear from what I have read of the Butler report that the process of assessing and publicising intelligence in the case of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and therefore of the imminence of an Iraqi threat, was flawed.

Secondly, the role and involvement of political advisers and No. 10 press officers in the process of intelligence assessment and in producing the flawed dossier was unwise and led to pressure, perhaps unconscious pressure or strain, on the intelligence services to support the case for war. I am surprised that neither the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hutton, nor, so far as I know, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has drawn particular attention to Mr Jonathan Powell's e-mail, in which he is reported to have complained that the first draft of the dossier was inadequate to support the Government's case for going to war.

Thirdly, this House was repeatedly assured by Ministers that no decisions to go to war had been taken. Indeed, I was assured privately by a Minister, within weeks of military action, that we would not go to war without a second United Nations resolution. But it has long been clear from Bob Woodward's books, as I have reminded this House several times, that a decision had been taken by senior members of the United States Administration as early as four years ago, if not earlier, that an early and imminent invasion of Iraq was desirable and necessary, and that the events of September 11 in the following year were used improperly and dishonestly as a justification for going to war.

Little attempt has been made either by the United States Government or by the British Government to correct the widespread belief in the United States that Saddam Hussein was behind the attack on the twin towers. I share the regret expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, that the Attorney-General's confidential advice has still not been published, when a great deal of information has been revealed which in my day would have been—

My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Wright, could frame a question.

My Lords, I beg the pardon of the House. I do not deny that Iraq may now be a better place without Saddam, but let us not forget that the removal of Saddam was never given by Her Majesty's Government as the justification for war. On the contrary, we were told again and again that it was not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to change other people's governments. Is that still the policy of Her Majesty's Government?

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wright, is correct. What the report does is to flag up places where the process is flawed. In his press report, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, spoke of the 45 minutes claim, saying that it was an uncharacteristically poor piece of assessment. The report makes it absolutely clear that there are some flaws in the process, that these need to be addressed urgently and that there is a great deal of learning to be done within that. The report goes into a great deal of detail. The four case studies used at the beginning of the report—in particular in relation to Iran, AQ Khan, Libya and North Korea—establish the context in which this work was being developed.

I cannot accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wright, as regards pressure being put on the intelligence community or on the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Butler report is absolutely clear on that point.

Turning to the issue of the second UN resolution, at the time I was myself a Minister at the Foreign Office. We worked assiduously to get a second UN resolution, but it was absolutely clear that a resolution which contained within it any kind of ultimatum with respect to the length of time that was going to be available to Iraq would not pass. That was the point at which our strategy needed to be revised.

My Lords, will my noble friend the Leader of the House join me in welcoming this very comprehensive and good report from the noble Lord, Lord Butler? In particular, will she join me in welcoming the fact that there was nothing in respect of this report which calls into question the legality of the war?

I draw attention to the fact that in paragraph 379 the report recognises that the Attorney-General's advice was,

"based on the legal interpretation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and negotiating history in the United Nations, and not on WMD-related intelligence".

If the violation of 16 Chapter 7 UN resolutions is not legal justification for military action, I do not know what is.

Does my noble friend agree that, although the report found deficiencies in the validation process of some Iraqi intelligence, the fact that it concluded that the four case studies made of Libya, Iran, North Korea and AQ Khan were all success stories for the SIS demonstrates that the doubts cast on the overall efficiency and performance of the SIS are misplaced? Certainly that is not the opinion of the report.

My Lords, my noble friend is right. The report points clearly to the four success stories used as case studies. My noble friend is also right to point the House in the direction of recognising the professionalism and good work of our intelligence services.

Let me remind the House of UN Security Council Resolution 1441. It decided that,

"Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13".

That resolution was passed unanimously by the Security Council.

My noble friend Lady Ramsay is quite right to say that the report in no way calls into question the legality of the war. Paragraph 379 sets out absolutely clearly the basis on which my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General gave advice.

My Lords, if I am right about what the Minister said, the Prime Minister is quoted as saying,

"For my mistakes, I take full responsibility".

In a case such as this, where a considerable amount of damage has been done to our credibility as a country in terms of truth telling and the public accountability of our institutions, it is quite important to have those words in the report. There clearly is more to be learnt; I hope that in due course we shall have answers to some of the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams.

However, at a fundamental level, it is most important that the House should hear unequivocal answers to major questions about the order in which events took place; just where people changed their minds and just where the Prime Minister was responding to invitations, not only from within our own intelligence services but from other parts of the world, to change his mind. I think it is always helpful if people can be persuaded to say whether they are going to change their minds. Can the Minister tell the House just when any of these changes of mind took place?

My Lords, as has been said by myself and my noble friend Lady Symons on many occasions when answering questions on Iraq, we are well aware that there are differing points of view about the war. It has been made absolutely clear in the Statement that we need to respect the fact that people come to this issue from different positions. We have now had four reports and everyone is looking for something to answer the questions that they have in their minds which they feel have not been answered by the Hutton report, by the Butler report, by the ISC report or by the report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.

It is clear from all four reports that there are lessons that the Government need to learn and take on board but, as regards the questions that have been raised about the integrity and honesty of the Government in respect of the case that we made to go to war in Iraq, it is absolutely clear that the Prime Minister and the Government acted with integrity. The Butler report and the Hutton report make that absolutely clear and the question was not raised in the parliamentary committee reports. When will the House and those who did not agree with the action that was taken accept that fact?

My Lords, does the Leader of the House accept that, while we do not necessarily question integrity, we do question judgment? There is now an excellent report from the noble Lord, Lord Butler, which shows that containment in March 2003 was operating satisfactorily; Iraq was not at that time a threat to the United Kingdom, its citizens or even to the region. And yet we sent everything we had—

My Lords, I really do feel—

Order!

My Lords, we sent 43,000 of our soldiers, sailors and airmen to kill or be killed into—

My Lords—

Order!

My Lords, noble Lords do intervene. I feel strongly about this issue.

My Lords, as the House will know, it is absolutely in order to make a brief comment, followed by a question or a number of questions. I am sure that we shall be as brief as we can be.

My Lords, we sent 43,000 troops to kill or be killed and yet the report makes it clear that we did not look again at the intelligence when Hans Blix was in the country and able to give us up-to-date information. Does the Minister think that we should have reassessed the intelligence before the eleventh hour in March 2003?

My Lords, the noble Lord will be aware that the JIC makes reassessments of its intelligence all the time. That is the way in which it operates. As to the wider question raised by the noble Lord, I draw his attention to paragraph 474 on page 116 of the report, which refers to the validation of the intelligence. The report states:

"we have reached the conclusion that prior to the war the Iraqi regime … Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted … In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development … Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions".

That is the conclusion of the Butler report on the validation of intelligence.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that paragraph 584 of this excellent report deserves careful consideration? It states that,

"much of what was reliably known about Iraq's unconventional weapons programmes in the mid- and late-1990s was obtained through the reports of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

That paragraph goes on to say that the work of those agencies has perhaps been underestimated in the past and that due weight should be given to it in future. More support should be given to them with the support of our intelligence agencies. Does not my noble friend agree that that paragraph gives ground for considerable reflection on just how seriously we took the work of Hans Blix and the UN inspectors at the time or how far, rather, we chose to push it to one side because of our own priorities in government?

My Lords, I agree with one part of my noble friend's comment, but not with the other. I entirely agree with him about the importance of the UN mechanisms. The Government have always upheld them. However, I must tell my noble friend, with respect to the judgment made about containment, that it was at the time and remains our firm view—indeed, in the light of the paragraph from the Butler report that I cited about the validation of intelligence, it is clear—that containment was not working. Concern was being expressed not just by our Government or by that of the United States but by others around the world about what Saddam Hussein intended to do. In that respect, I do not agree with my noble friend.

My Lords, does not the noble Baroness recognise that her plea for the matter now to be closed will simply not be recognised by the general public, especially because of the limited, restricted terms of reference, to which the noble Lord, Lord Butler, properly stuck? I did not hear a clear answer to my noble friend's question from the Front Bench about whether the Attorney-General would come to make a statement on the matter. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, made clear that he had not pursued that matter; the committee did not consider the question of the legality of the war. Likewise, the role of government was likewise more circumscribed in the terms of reference.

Even given his limited terms of reference, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, found that there were serious failings for which there was collective responsibility. Who takes collective responsibility in this Government?

My Lords, first, I think that the noble Lord, Lord King, cannot have heard what I said. I in no way said that the issue is closed. I said that those who had not been in favour of action—indeed, even some of those who had been in favour of action—wanted any number of inquiries to address the particular points that they considered relevant, which they did not consider had been answered in the reports. The reports have collectively made it absolutely clear that in no sense did the Government act in bad faith. So those who are looking for some kind of ammunition will not find it. I did not say that the case is closed. I said that there have been four reports on the issue and that at some point we have to agree, when considering what has been said collectively through the reports, that the questions raised have been addressed.

I think that we have addressed the specific point about my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General. My noble and learned friend made a written Statement. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs elaborated on that Statement in another place, and that was repeated in this House. There will not be a further Statement from my noble and learned friend.

My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons amendments be now considered.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 28A to Lords Amendment No. 28. I shall speak also to Lords Amendment No. 62 and Commons Amendment No. 62A thereto, which cover substantially the same ground, as well as Amendments Nos. 28AA, 28BA and 62B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart.

When I refer to the High Court, I am also referring to the High Court of Northern Ireland and the Court of Session in Scotland.

We are at that stage of our parliamentary process where we are hopefully approaching the end of consideration of the Bill. Let no one allege that the Government have not listened and reflected on what the House has said. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor gave serious reflection to the arguments made in the House about the judicial review ouster and came back with an alternative which, in broad measure, the House has welcomed. Secondly, we previously considered the issue of legal aid success fees. I gave the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, my undertaking that, within the terms in which he had put the issue to me, I would take the issue away and seek to address it in another place. I hope that he will find that we have done so.

The noble Lord will also know from Commons consideration that we also considered the issue of lay members, which we did not rejoice about, but we also listened to the House in that respect. So the House has been listened to, but we have not been persuaded by the House about this measure. New Section 103A in Amendment No. 28 allows a party to the appeal before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal to seek a review of the tribunal's decision in the High Court, on the grounds that the tribunal may have made an error of law. The High Court may order the tribunal to reconsider the case. As those who have been following the Bill closely will know, there is also an interim process, a filter process—because there may be a large volume of such applications to the tribunal—whereby, if the transitional process in Amendment No. 62 is in place, the review will first be considered by a senior judge in the tribunal. He may also make an order for reconsideration of the case. If he chooses not to, the applicant may opt in for the case to be considered by the High Court anyway.

Amendments Nos. 28A, 28B and 62A restore the Government's intention that five-day time limits should apply to that process, both for the initial application, and the opting in, if the transitional filter process is in place—in the circumstances I just described.

The Bill originally contained an ouster of the jurisdiction of the higher courts. Having listened to opinions, we brought forward the new policy in Amendment No. 28. Under the new policy, the decisions of the single-tier tribunal are now subject to review in the High Court. We agree that it is important that the High Court has such oversight, but we cannot allow that to compromise our legitimate aims of speed and efficiency. Therefore, it is vital that limits are placed on the review to prevent applicants without meritorious cases using the process to cause delay and expense. One of those limits is the new system of legal aid for reviews, to which we shall return later, and another is the limit on the time in which an application can be made.

The Government are confident that five days is more than enough for an applicant to consult their legal representative, for the representative to prepare the application and for the application to be lodged. Similarly, five days is also entirely sufficient for the simple procedure of opting to have a review application considered by the High Court under the transitional provisions.

For the avoidance of doubt, five days means five working days—weekends and bank holidays are excluded. That does not need to be spelt out in the Bill, although new Section 103A(4)(a) points to the fact that that effect is already achieved by rules. I should also point out that after the decision is promulgated by the tribunal, two days are allowed for the determination to reach the representative through the post before the five days starts. Therefore, we are talking about five full days for the representative to work on the application.

The time limits in Amendments Nos. 28A and 28B apply when a party to the appeal wants to challenge the decision of the asylum and immigration tribunal. The applicant will therefore have already presented his case to the Immigration and Nationality Directorate and before an independent tribunal before reaching that stage. The grounds of appeal will already have been covered at the appeal and in the tribunal's statement of reasons. Furthermore, that review is not a rehearing, but is focused solely on errors of law made by the tribunal. Given that the legal representative will, in most cases, already be familiar with the case, the preparation for it should not prove onerous.

In order to test the assertion, and to test the realism of what we are putting before the House, we have asked the Legal Services Commission to look at the current statutory review process under Section 101 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Based on this, we have looked at what, in practice, have been the submissions made by lawyers as part of the statutory review process. I have inspected some of those cases and solicitors have not always been—how shall I put it?—very fulsome in terms of the cases they have put forward. We would expect them to do around six hours' work on a review application, including reading through the papers, interviewing the client, taking instructions and, if necessary, briefing counsel. Counsel is not always briefed in such cases; if counsel is involved, he could be expected to take between two and five hours to draft the application. We are therefore talking about six hours for the solicitor and up to five hours for counsel. That is very achievable in five working days.

Of course, there will always be exceptions. We have made it clear from the outset that we would not want to see this lead to injustice. Therefore, Section 103A(4)(b) explicitly allows the High Court to accept out-of-time applications,

"where it thinks that the application could not reasonably practicably have been made within that period".

This will deal with all the exceptional circumstances—for example, if the usual legal representative of the applicant was unwell and unable to complete the application in time, or if specialist evidence needed to be collated to present a full review application. This will work by the applicant applying out of time and the High Court exercising its discretion to allow the out-of-time application.

Put at its simplest, we are confident that five days is adequate in the majority of cases. The legislation explicitly allows the High Court judge, who will clearly be charged with upholding the interests of justice, to grant further time when the case is put to him and he considers that that case could not reasonably practicably have been made within that period. The legislation could not be clearer or, we believe, fairer.

It would be even more absurd to allow more than five days for "opting in" under the transitional filter process. I do not want to bore the House with the detail, but this is essentially when a case has been considered by a senior judge in the AIT on a review application and has been found not to be valid. At that point, the applicant still has the further right to lodge a case to the High Court, but this will require little more than a fax or a letter to be sent to the High Court, indicating that the applicant wishes his case to be considered again, following consideration by a judge in the tribunal. That could be done in half an hour, so five days is somewhat generous. Why does all this matter? As I have set out on previous discussions on the Bill, it is important that we have a process that is no slower than necessary in the interests of justice. It is important that we send a message that this review process is for obvious errors of law, and not to allow legal representatives to trawl through obscure legal arguments and technicalities. And we will send that message clearly if we make sure that the opportunities for causing delay are minimised.

For these reasons, and not out of any stubbornness or obduracy—I hope that noble Lords will agree that we have exhibited neither characteristic in this House on the Bill—we do not think that there is any justifiable reason for resisting the views of the other place twice that five days is perfectly sufficient for either of these circumstances and, moreover, that that five-day period is protected by the direct discretion given to a High Court judge to grant more time when he thinks it was not reasonably practicable to put in an appeal in that case. What more, fairly, should be done? I ask the House not to resist the Commons amendment in this respect.

Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 28A to Lords Amendment No. 28.—(Lord Filkin.)

rose to move Amendment No. 28AA, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 28A to Lords Amendment No. 28, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 28AA, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 28BA and 62B. These are intended to maintain the extension of time for making an application for reconsideration under the new Section 103A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 from five to 10 working days—that is, two weeks after receipt of the notice of decision.

4.45 p.m.

Five days is, frankly, a ridiculously short period of time. The applicant's lawyer will have to read the decision carefully; he or she will have to consider the legal issues involved in the decision; he or she may well have to consult the client, which is likely to involve arranging a meeting at which an interpreter must be present; he or she may have to consult counsel; and he or she will have to draft the application, a document requiring great care as it is the sole basis on which a judge of the appropriate court will decide the application. There is no chance to supplement that document at an oral hearing as there will be no oral hearing. It will also be necessary to get the application to the appropriate court before it closes for business on the last available day.

If the lawyer in question had little else to do, a five-day period might well be enough. But a competent immigration lawyer—and it is the objective of the Government, as it is of everyone else, to ensure that these cases are handled by competent lawyers—will be handling other cases, perhaps many others, at the same time. He or she will not know in advance when the decision will be released by the tribunal. If it arrives when the lawyer is appearing in court, the lawyer cannot possibly drop everything else. The lawyer may have to hand over the case to a colleague in the same firm or organisation who is not familiar with it; or it may be impossible for the lawyer to find someone else and the applicant may have to find a new lawyer.

The noble Lord, Lord Filkin, said on Report when our amendment was accepted:

"The reason why we believe that the timetable is practical is that the grounds for appeal will already have been covered at the appeal before the tribunal".—[Official Report, 7/6/04; col. 19.]

I might rephrase that as, "It means you can draft your application in advance". That, frankly, is absurd. One ground for the application—and it is only one of many possible grounds—might be that the tribunal member in question failed to take into account evidence he should have taken into account. That comes within the description of an error of law. But how can you possibly know in advance that the member of the tribunal will have failed to take into account a particular piece of evidence? To make that application, you then have to say what the evidence was, show that it was not taken into account and why it might have made a difference it if had been. All those things will take a substantial amount of time.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights said in its 13th report of the current Session in paragraph 1.77:

"We consider the five day time limit to be far too short for the right of access to the High Court and beyond to be practically effective".

In the debate on 7 June, our amendment was supported by speakers from all Benches, including the noble Lords, Lord Clinton-Davis and Lord Plant of Highfield, from the Government Benches, and it was opposed by no one other than the Minister.

In the debate in the House of Commons on Monday of this week, the Government's amendment to restore the five-day time limit was described by Robert Marshall-Andrews as,

"a miserable, snivelling little amendment that has no valid reason behind it. It is entirely meretricious, and it smacks of petulance".—[Official Report, Commons, 12/7/04; col. 1177.]

I could not have put it better myself.

I am afraid that I simply cannot understand why the Government, totally without justification and with hardly any benefit to increasing the speed of the proceedings, continue to insist on this five-day limit. I beg to move.

Moved, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 28A to Lords Amendment No. 28, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".—(Lord Goodhart.)

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in his amendment. It seems to me nonsense to turn down a proposal to extend the time very briefly, when what is likely to result is a lot of out-of-time cases before the courts. How much time will that take and how much will it cost the taxpayer?

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, was right in saying that there has been a considerable amount of beneficial flexibility as the Bill has moved through your Lordships' House and another place. The issue of time has been, in my submission, the one exception to that.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, that the time limits should be demanding. In Committee, we ourselves tabled an amendment suggesting a limit of seven days; but it is our view that setting a limit of five days goes too far.

There are many circumstances in immigration appeals in which it is necessary to switch from a legal adviser who has a general practice in immigration law to an adviser who deals with very special issues. It would be extremely difficult to make such a switch within as tight a timetable as five days.

Moreover, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said, although appeals can only be on the basis of an error of law, there are many occasions when, to make out an appeal on an error of law, a legal adviser has to study in considerable detail the factual structure of the case to determine whether a perverse decision was reached with respect to the evidence.

We must not forget, either, that, on occasions, the consequences of a wrong decision for an applicant are very serious if he is returned to a country that is determined to incarcerate him for a long period or to put him to death. We must remember that those applicants often do not speak any English.

In all those circumstances, it is our view that the limit of five days ought to be considered again by the Government and extended. We on these Benches will support the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in his amendment.

My Lords, in the early 1970s, it was my privilege to be the president of the National Industrial Relations Court. I claimed, rightly, that it was the fastest court in the West, which produced the reasonable comment from Michael Foot that I was "trigger happy". I mention that merely to show that I am not one who supports sluggardliness in court proceedings. It is terribly important to keep things moving. But—and this is an important but—it is no good fixing one's timetable at a point when there then must be numerous applications for extensions of time. That itself involves a waste of time.

The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, rightly pointed out that people who are any good at any specialty in the law tend to be very fully employed. That is why they become experts and why they are so employed. That being so, I could not help thinking that the Minister believed that lawyers were concerned only with one case at a time. It would appear that he believes that they can pick up a case on a Monday and study it, not in a desultory manner but giving 11 hours to it, which is nearly two days, then have nothing else to do for the rest of the week. It is not like that. It may be that someone with a true specialty has only one case at a time and that case lasts for a couple of months—but that is very different. It is not the area that we are discussing. The Minister then talks about lawyers trawling through the law and seeking obscure technicalities. People do not do that, or certainly not in a field with which they are familiar. They know what the points are; without reference to any particular case, they know what they are looking for, and they look for it. They certainly will not try to find fancy points— unless, of course, they are satisfied that there is some real injustice occurring that is way outside the ordinary experience. Then they will look to see whether there is any way in which they can safeguard the true and real interests—not bogus interests—of their clients. I do not find that reprehensible at all, although there seems to be an assumption that it is.

I cannot understand what real difference there is between 10 days and five days. Looking at the whole period in which the proceedings are governed, I do not know quite what they are, but I am sure that an extra five days represents a very small increase in the time available. I am also tempted to wonder whether anyone has found out whether the judges can cope with that period. It is one of the features of judicial life and managing courts that there is a degree of ebb and flow. If one has no time to balance things out, one becomes either a bit slap-happy or inefficient.

I strongly support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, from a practitioner's point of view—meaning the point of view of a judicial practitioner.

My Lords, I, too, support the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. The Government's approach is a recipe for half-baked cases. It means that people will be rushed in producing what should be a very important document, or they will be obliged to apply to the court to exercise its discretion—something which will add considerable delay. We are arguing about five days, which does not justify our spending more than a few seconds on this meritless opposition.

My Lords, there is the further point, in support of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, that we all know that unfortunately many asylum seekers fall into the hands of unscrupulous lawyers who take on too many cases and have very little hope of delivering what they should deliver.

My Lords, I shall speak briefly, because this may be one of those occasions on which whatever one says, one is not certain of having a willing hearing.

Why go slower than necessary? That is, essentially, the Government's question. I have set out why we believe that five days is an adequate period of time. Therefore, yet again it appears that the House is always looking for reasons to make the process slower and more complex than is desirable.

My Lords, your Lordships' House might find the Minister's argument more convincing if he had taken seriously the amendments that we tabled at an earlier stage, introducing time limits to the beginning and the end of the asylum procedure—in other words, between the asylum application and the initial consideration by the Home Office; then, after the appeal process was over, between that point and the time of deportation. If the Government were prepared to entertain time limits at those stages, which cause far greater delay than the delays within the appeal procedure, your Lordships' House might find the Minister's argument more convincing.

My Lords, I shall make my own judgment on how the Government wish to put their case forward, but I am always grateful for the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland.

The essence of what we have said throughout this debate is that the Government must prevent unnecessary delay at every single part of the process. It is not a question of saying that we should bear down only on the initial consideration, although the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, is right in saying that we should. We have made great progress on that in recent years and the process is vastly shorter and of higher quality than it was. But that is no reason whatever for saying, "What does another week matter? Let's have another week added on to the process for the avoidance of doubt". I remind the House that keeping a family on state support while a lengthy appeal process goes through costs several hundred pounds a week. The state should willingly support that expenditure if it is necessary but we should not get drawn into it if it is not.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, was clear in his argument that lawyers are busy people—many people are busy people—and that they are not just waiting for cases to come over the hill to be addressed. That is true, but, as I sought to indicate, on the best estimate we have been able to identify, we are talking about approximately one day's work by a lawyer. In the process that we are talking about, five days are provided for doing that one day's work and if there are reasonable grounds why that is not possible they can go to court and be granted more.

It also matters because the system is prone to abuse. I make no apology for coming back to that. We know that 50 per cent of all people who are refused by the adjudicator then appeal. The noble Lord, Lord Newton, who is in his place, will know that one gets nothing like those statistics in any other part of the tribunal system. The reason why is obvious: it runs the case long and reduces the time period when the individual might be removed from the country if he is found not to have a meritorious case.

I draw the attention of the House to the judgment by Mr Justice Collins, whose judgments have not always been met with rejoicing by the Government. He gave a clear example just last week of a case that had been run right through the process by the Refugee Legal Centre. It cost £60,000 and in his judgment Mr Justice Collins said that he found in it absolutely no merit whatever. We should not be party to supporting a system that runs cases long when there is no justification for doing so.

It is not proper for me to go into detail but, of course, the department has consulted the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice on this process. I am certain that he has a view that he does not want the High Court swamped with unmeritorious cases. We would be a foolish Government, particularly in the light of our recent experiences, if we had not consulted properly.

I shall say no more. We think that five days are perfectly adequate for this process. I do not think that we are going to have a meeting of minds on this matter so no doubt the House will decide the issue.

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, can he give us a reference to the judgment by Mr Justice Collins? The only recent case that I can recall in which a figure of £60,000 was involved was that of Jacqueline Konan who sued the Government for being unlawfully detained and was awarded damages of £60,000 by Mr Justice Collins.

My Lords, I looked for the details in my voluminous pack before I rose to speak but I could not put my finger on them. I shall write to the noble Lord with the answer very rapidly indeed.

My Lords, I am grateful for the support that our amendment has received from other parts of the House. It has a great deal of logic and good common sense behind it. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 28B. I have spoken to this amendment with Amendment No. 28A.

rose to move, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 28C and 28D to Lords Amendment No. 28 and do propose Amendment No. 28DA as a consequential amendment to Lords Amendment No. 57:

Page 39, leave out lines 30 to 41 and insert—

"may make provision about reconsideration of a decision pursuant to an order under section 103A(1) (which may, in particular, include provision about the action that may be taken on reconsideration and about the matters and evidence to which the Tribunal may have regard);

shall provide that a party to an appeal is to be treated as having received notice of the Tribunal's decision, unless the contrary is shown, at such time as may be specified in, or determined in accordance with, the rules;

may make provision about proceedings under paragraph 30 of Schedule 2 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (transitional filter of applications for reconsideration from High Court to Tribunal);"

28DA Line 10, at end insert "(and may, in particular, make provision of a kind that may be made by rules of court under section 103A(5)(b))"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 28C and 28D are minor amendments. They introduce an additional flexibility to the procedure for review. In the majority of cases, the High Court judge will simply look at the applicant's papers in order to decide whether or not there may have been an error of law. However, in some circumstances it may be appropriate for other submissions to be considered. These amendments allow flexibility to make provision for this through rules of court. An example of when it might be helpful for the respondent to file submissions involves fast-track cases. Where speed is key, allowing a respondent's submissions would enable the reconsideration to take place more quickly. I should clarify that in both cases, we are talking about a process whereby a High Court judge is considering whether to allow the case to be heard on a point of law and to be returned to the AIT for this purpose. It is not itself a hearing.

Amendment No. 28DA is consequential on Amendments Nos. 28C and 28D and introduces a similar flexibility for the review while the filter is in place. For an initial period, the review application will first be considered by the tribunal. This amendment means that the procedure rules for the AIT can similarly allow the tribunal to consider additional papers. I therefore urge noble Lords to agree to Amendments Nos. 28C, 28D and 28DA. I beg to move.

Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 28C and 28D to Lords Amendment No. 28 and do propose Amendment No. 28DA as a consequential amendment to Lords Amendment No. 57.—(Lord Filkin.)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 28E to Lords Amendment No. 28.

This amendment brings us to the issue of lay members, which we discussed at a previous stage, when the House made clear its wish that lay members should be retained within the new asylum and immigration tribunal. The House argued that there was merit in them being there as a resource to the tribunal in certain cases.

As noble Lords will be aware, the Government did not believe that that was in principle desirable for reasons that I set out earlier. However, the Government have concluded, as can be seen from proceedings in another place, that we will not seek to insist on the removal of lay members from the tribunal; we have listened to the House in that respect. On the other hand, an amendment that was linked to it—as least by implication or consequentially—was that all tribunal panels should be three-member panels. We will consider that amendment later. In essence, in this process we are saying that we are content not to seek to remove lay members from the AIT. In a sense, our view is that it is important that the president of the tribunal has the discretion to deploy the judicial resources—including lay members—as he or she thinks fit. That is very much in tune with our discussions on these issues.

There are specific amendments on these issues essentially because draftsmen have felt that for the avoidance of doubt or better drafting processes, they needed to be brought forward in a slightly different form. Their thrust, purpose or outcome is four-square with what I believe the House wanted when it pressed this matter at previous stages. With that prelude I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 42, 43, 44 and 61 and Commons Amendments Nos. 61A to 61C thereto, which are part of the same group.

We are prepared to accept the will of the House that there should be a role for lay members in the new tribunal. This was expressed in the original Amendments Nos. 42, 43, 44 and 61. However, the drafting had unintended consequences, and so parliamentary counsel has produced Amendments Nos. 61A to 61C and 28E in lieu. They have the same effect.

One notable difference is that the drafting of Amendment No. 61A as opposed to Amendment No. 42 allows for the appointment as legally qualified members of the tribunal of people who do not satisfy the letter of the requirements in sub-paragraphs 2(a) to (c) of Schedule 1, but who none the less are suitably qualified, perhaps from academic legal experience or judicial experience gained in another jurisdiction.

I should, of course, be clear that we are accepting lay members, but we are not prepared to accept the amendment we shall come to later—Amendment No. 46—that requires all cases to be heard by panels of three members.

I hope, therefore, that these amendments will prove uncontroversial. I ask the House to agree to Amendments Nos. 28E, 61A, 61B and 61C. I beg to move.

Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 28E to Lords Amendment No. 28.—(Lord Filkin.)

My Lords, I rise simply to thank the Minister for responding so thoughtfully to the amendments that we tabled to include lay members in the new tribunal system.

The Minister is right in saying that, strictly speaking, the issues raised by Amendment No. 46A fall outside the group, but, nevertheless, I think it appropriate for me to say something about that matter now. I promise not to repeat myself when the Minister rises to introduce the line of amendments beginning with Amendment No. 46 later on. I should like to suggest, respectfully, that Amendment No. 46A, if not quite meeting the principle of three-member tribunals that we sought on Report, is nevertheless a good compromise. It gives the president of the tribunal the discretion, where appropriate, in cases which raise issues of legal or factual complexity, to have tribunals of more than one member while recognising that issues of cost cannot be entirely ignored when one is managing any form of public service. The Immigration Service is no different from any other public service in that respect. I recognise that the requirement of three-member tribunals in all circumstances could be too demanding a standard to meet. The drafting that the Minister has achieved, if I may say so, is in my view masterly. I should like to thank him very much indeed for the way in which he has responded to this issue.

My Lords, it is very welcome that the Government have responded to some of the concerns that were expressed at earlier stages of the Bill. I entirely accept the Minister's claim that this has been a listening exercise and that on the whole, with certain unfortunate exceptions, Ministers have been responsive to the views that were expressed in your Lordships' House.

I wish to ask the noble Lord only one question about the particular form in which these amendments are couched. As regards Amendment No. 61A, who will exercise this opinion when the Lord Chancellor is no longer sitting on the Woolsack? That event is not far distant in time and I should have thought we might have anticipated it in the drafting.

My Lords, I wonder where the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, was yesterday when your Lordships' House voted on this matter.

My Lords, I was listening upstairs.

My Lords, I am delighted to accept the inference of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that on this matter we are talking about "when" not "if", as I am sure is the case. The answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, is that those responsibilities will be picked up by whatever successor authority the House so decides, but clearly the Government's intention is that it is picked up by the relevant Secretary of State, as we discussed in our many fulsome debates yesterday.

rose to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 28F and 28G to Lords Amendment No. 28, and do propose Amendment No. 28H as a consequential amendment to Lords Amendment No. 28: 28H

Leave out from beginning of line 111 to beginning of line 114 and insert— "(1) On the application of an appellant under section 103A,"

said: My Lords, this is one of the most complex, interesting and potentially controversial issues that we have discussed on this Bill. At Lords Third Reading, I set out the problem we are trying to address with the proposals for a new legal aid scheme, and more broadly the move to a single tier tribunal. I sought to set out the issues that set the coloration to that: namely, that legal aid costs had quadrupled since 1998–99; that the average cost of an individual pursuing an appeal to the end of the process is some £4,000; and that these are unjustifiable amounts when only one in 10 of cases results in a different outcome.

I also signalled that the appeal process, if run to the full, could easily run to 62 weeks or more from beginning to end. I set that in the context that while undoubtedly genuine asylum claimants come to our shores, and it is our responsibility as a state to look at their cases fairly, we are also aware that a massive amount of trafficking of people goes on, as I instanced in the relevant debate.

As it stands, the system leads to delay and expense. There is concern that a slow process and an uncertain ability to bring it rapidly to a conclusion and to return people from whence they came feeds the traffickers' business and makes it easier for them to get people to pay remarkably high sums of money to be brought here.

In introducing a new system we have to ensure that the exploitation does not continue. The new legal aid arrangements are central to achieving that. They will stop weak applications from flooding the High Court which leads to the cycle of delay, while ensuring at the same time that the interests of justice are met.

The new scheme that we are bringing forward, which is different from the one that we discussed at Third Reading—again, we listened to the arguments put forward on this matter—will be a system of retrospective funding. We are not removing legal aid for the review and reconsideration but we are clear that lawyers have to take a part in making judgments about whether cases are meritorious. While lawyers will not know until the end of the process, when the judge makes his order, whether they will receive legal aid, good lawyers already make such judgments. The system that we are constructing will try to ensure that all lawyers make the kind of judgments that a good lawyer does in such circumstances.

However, in introducing a scheme involving retrospective funding, we recognise that the focus of the scheme should be on merit and not just success. At Third Reading I therefore agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, on this point—we tested each other across the Dispatch Box to make sure there was no misunderstanding and we managed to reduce most if not all of the misunderstanding—when he signalled that he would like to see a system based on a "robust merits test". There appeared, therefore, to be no issue of principle between us on that; it was a matter of how one applied that.

This has always been the Government's intention. It became apparent at Third Reading that perhaps there were different ways of achieving that objective from the one that we had advanced to the House which clearly caused unhappiness on the part of some noble Lords. I do not think that "unhappiness" is too sharp a word. Therefore, I hope that the amendments which we brought forward in another place are seen as very much four-square with what I signalled in broad terms at Third Reading.

Amendment No. 28F removes the provision for variable fees to be paid dependent on the result of the reconsideration. Amendment No. 28G links the award of legal aid more explicitly to an applicant's prospects of success at the time the application was made; that is, whether the case had significant merit such that the lawyer was right to pursue it in a system based on merit. In a system based on merit that is fair. This test does not ask lawyers to pre-empt the decision of the tribunal; it simply asks them carefully to assess whether a case has merit. If the judgment they have made is sound, which is reasonable to expect, legal aid will be paid.

We were brought to that conclusion by thoughtfulness by counsel that the best way of ensuring justice was that the tribunal should decide whether legal aid should be paid, not in a sense simply by what happened at the end, but by looking at the case as it was at the time that the lawyer had to make the judgment at the beginning of the process. That seemed a very fair point, so that hindsight is not applied to the decision but that it can be said that, when the lawyer had to make the decision, the question was whether the case had merit.

5.30 p.m.

The amendments meet many of the concerns raised. I recognise that they did not respond to all of the noble Lord's concerns, which is why, following discussion, the Government proposed Amendment No. 28H. It enables the High Court to award legal aid for the review application even if no reconsideration order or Court of Appeal referral has been made.

It is important to be clear exactly what Amendment No. 28H means. It remains our intention that the High Court's power to award legal aid will be used only in exceptional cases. In the majority of cases, the tribunal will be best placed to make the decision on funding at the reconsideration. At that stage, the tribunal will possess the relevant information to decide whether, when the review application was made, the lawyer was right to have pursued the case. By comparison, the High Court will simply consider, on the papers, whether there may have been an error of law—in other words, whether the case should be looked at further.

Although we accept that there may be circumstances where it is appropriate for the High Court to award legal aid for a review application, even if an order for reconsideration or a referral is not made, regulations will be made to prescribe tightly when that power can be exercised. An example of when the power might be used is when a reference to the Court of Appeal is made. Another might be when a review application which has good prospects of success is rendered unsuccessful following a lead decision of a case, which had not been decided at the time the application was made. We are committed to a system based on merit. Payment will not be conditional on success but, if we are to weed out the weak applications, we have to incentivise the system in the way in which we have done. Having listened to the House, we believe that we have a system that achieves what those in most if not all parts of the House feel are, for good reason, the objectives of government policy. I therefore urge the House to agree to Amendments Nos. 28F, 28G and 28H.

Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 28F and 28G to Lords Amendment No. 28, and do propose Amendment No. 28H as a consequential amendment to Lords Amendment No. 28.—(Lord Filkin.)

My Lords, again, I am most grateful to the Minister for his explanation of the amendments. As the noble Lord said, we did not vote on our amendments to remove the conditional fee system at Third Reading on the basis of certain undertakings that he gave. He has met those undertakings in full for which I am extremely grateful. As this is the last group of amendments on which I shall speak, I thank him very much for his cooperation throughout the whole process.

My Lords, although I regret that the Government did not accept our important arguments on giving legal aid on a somewhat wider basis than is now proposed, the amendments are, at any rate, some improvement on the previous position. In the circumstances, given that there would be no prospect of our succeeding on any further vote on the matter, we do not oppose the amendment.

My Lords, having indicated that I very much shared the concerns underlying the exchanges that took place last week, I want to record that I think that the Minister's response is extremely positive and welcome. I express my thanks to him for that.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do not insist on its Amendments Nos. 42 to 44 to which the Commons have disagreed and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 61A to 61C in lieu thereof. I spoke to the amendments with Amendment No. 28E.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do not insist on its Amendment No. 46 to which the Commons have disagreed and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 46A to the words so restored to the Bill.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do not insist on its Amendment No. 61, to which the Commons have disagreed. I spoke to the amendment with Amendment No. 28E.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 62A to Lords Amendment No. 62. I spoke to the amendment with Amendment No. 28A. Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 62A to Lords Amendment No. 62.—(Lord Filkin.)

My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to acquaint the House that they, having been informed of the purport of the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Bill, have consented to place their Prerogative and Interest, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.

moved Amendment No. 1:

said: My Lords, it is quite clear what I am after in Amendments Nos. 1 and 2. We have debated the topic. I did not move the equivalent amendment on Report for various reasons, which those of us who attended the debate will understand. However, I would like some reassurance on the matter from the Minister. I have written to him; he knows what I am looking for. I beg to move.

My Lords, I had an interesting discussion with the noble Lord a few weeks ago about the issues underlying the amendments, and he has since written to me about them. He made the point that, where the regulator uses his powers to appoint a director or a manager to a CIC, it would be helpful if the regulator could obtain the consent of the CIC's existing directors to his action. That would reduce the risk of the regulator acting in a heavy-handed way, and of the appointment leading to tensions within the management team.

We would all agree that it would be desirable to get the consent of the CIC's directors to an appointment, and that the regulator should aim to do it where possible. However, it will not always be realistic to expect to obtain the board's agreement. As the noble Lord and I have discussed, an appointment under either of the powers will be made only where the CIC in question is in breach of at least one of the default conditions set out in Clause 39, and the regulator thinks that the power must be exercised to maintain confidence in CICs. The situation will therefore be quite serious. In such a position, we would of course expect the regulator to be in dialogue with the CIC concerned. He will surely need to talk to the directors of the CIC to find out what is going on, and what needs to be done to fix it. If he has not done so, he will not be able to provide good reasons for taking action, and will, quite rightly, be challenged. But there can be no certainty that the board of the CIC will co-operate with him, let alone that it will agree with the regulator's decision. For instance, the regulator may decide to appoint a director or a manager to a CIC because he considers that the existing directors are not capable without assistance of remedying the problem. In some cases, one can easily imagine that the existing directors might not agree. In other cases, the board might be so split that no agreement was possible.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, appreciates those points. I expect that is why his amendments require the regulator to,

"take all reasonable steps to ensure"

the consent of the board, rather than to require their consent in all cases. However, I do not think that this additional measure is necessary. That is because the regulator is already required by the general principles of administrative law not to behave unreasonably. He is also subject to the specific constraints in the Bill, to act in accordance with good regulatory practice and to use his supervisory powers only where necessary. This means that where the regulator acted improperly or unreasonably in making an appointment, he would be subject to challenge.

If the appointment of a manager or director by the regulator is unnecessary, or inappropriate, the regulator would be in breach of his duty in Clause 39 to use his powers only to the extent necessary; and the CIC would be able to appeal to the appeal officer. The Government brought forward amendments at Report stage to require the regulator to give reasons for his decisions and to allow the appeal officer to consider appeals on matters of law as well as fact.

Overall, the Bill together with existing administrative law already place significant constraints on the way in which the regulator may use his power. As I have said in previous debates, our aim is that the regulator should have a light but proportionate touch and we think that the current provisions of the Bill achieve that. I hope that in the light of that explanation the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, will be reassured and will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that statement. I do, indeed, feel reassured and, as this is where we wind up, I should say that for my part, in Part 2 of the Bill, we started with almost a sketch and have finished with a Bill that will achieve what the Government desire and will be comprehensible, usable and welcome. I offer my thanks to the Bill team and to the Minister for their courtesy. I hope that CICs become a success. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.

This is an important and highly technical Bill and I am grateful to noble Lords on all sides of the House for taking part in the debates. The Government have listened carefully to all the points made. By my reckoning, nearly half of the government amendments tabled on Report were wholly or partly in response to points raised by noble Lords in Grand Committee. I believe, therefore, that we can all take satisfaction in having scrutinised and improved the Bill before sending it to the other House.

Perhaps I may also take this opportunity to thank the Bill team who have done a magnificent job, both in maintaining the clear purposes of the Bill, while at the same time being flexible in responding to thoughtful criticisms of practical details.

Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Sainsbury of Turville.)