Before the Minister moves that the first statutory instrument be considered, I remind noble Lords that in the case of each statutory instrument the Motion will be that the Committee do consider the statutory instrument in question. The Motion to approve the statutory instrument will be moved in the Chamber in the usual way. I add for the benefit of noble Lords that if there is a Division when we get on to the Pensions Bill, the Committee will adjourn for 10 minutes.

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Investigative Powers of Prosecutors in England, Wales and Northern Ireland: Code of Practice) Order 2008.

The noble Baroness said: The order was laid before the House on 18 June, with an Explanatory Memorandum and a draft code of practice. I hope that your Lordships have had the opportunity to study them. I take this opportunity to put on record my appreciation to the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, and, in his absence, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for their forbearance on the last occasion. By some inadvertence the Explanatory Memorandum was not available and we were not able to deal with the matter on that occasion. I apologise most wholeheartedly for that mistake.

The order brings into operation a code of practice governing the exercise by prosecutors of their investigative powers in relation to civil recovery and criminal confiscation investigations. The Proceeds of Crime Act, which came into force in 2003, created investigative powers to be used in tracing criminal assets. These are the powers to apply for and execute production orders, search and seizure warrants, customer information orders, account monitoring orders and disclosure orders. These investigative powers have been exercised in England, Wales and Northern Ireland by the Assets Recovery Agency and law enforcement agencies such as the police and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. In exercising the powers, these organisations have operated under a code of practice issued by the Home Secretary under Section 377 of the Proceeds of Crime Act.

The Serious Crime Act 2007 amended the Proceeds of Crime Act by merging the Assets Recovery Agency with the Serious Organised Crime Agency, with effect from 1 April. The Assets Recovery Agency’s investigative powers have been transferred to the Serious Organised Crime Agency and to a number of specified prosecuting authorities superintended by me—namely the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions and the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland.

The staff of the Serious Organised Crime Agency will continue to operate under the Home Secretary’s code of practice, which was recently amended to take account of the changes brought in by the Serious Crime Act and to maintain consistency with the codes of practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which have developed over the years. The Home Secretary’s amended code was the subject of public consultation ending in January, and was brought into effect by an order approved by both Houses on 1 April.

The staff of the prosecuting authorities will be bound by a code of practice issued by me, and it is that prosecutor’s code which is brought into operation by this order. My code is identical in all material respects to the Home Secretary’s amended code, so that different agencies exercising these powers will do so to the same standards and with the same safeguards. My code was put out to public consultation in March but no responses were received, presumably because any issues had already been addressed and resolved in the drafting of the Home Secretary’s amended code.

My code gives detailed guidance to the staff of the prosecuting authorities on the way in which they should apply for and execute the various investigative measures available to them in respect of civil recovery investigations. The code also gives guidance to prosecutors on their role in criminal confiscation investigations, namely in applying for disclosure orders on behalf of the law enforcement agencies.

The introductory part of the code provides an overview of the investigative powers and the provisions applicable to all of them. That includes general best practice for making applications for the various orders and warrants, and executing them. It also includes guidance on the procedures for the retention of documents and information. The code then provides some more detailed information on each of the investigative measures.

In summary, I am satisfied that the draft code sets out clearly the processes and safeguards required for the effective and fair operation of the investigative powers. Due to the nature of the draft order, I have spoken more to the draft code than to the order itself. The only further point on the order is that, in relation to Northern Ireland—I see the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, in his place—it is made by me in my capacity as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Investigative Powers of Prosecutors in England, Wales and Northern Ireland: Code of Practice) Order 2008. 23rd Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Baroness Scotland of Asthal.)

At the beginning of her speech, the noble and learned Baroness generously apologised for the inadvertent absence of the Explanatory Memorandum on the previous occasion. These things happen on the best run vessels, and I do not believe that any damage has been done to the national interest.

The order flows from the changes made to Part 8 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 by the Serious Crime Act 2007. We made it clear at the time of the passage of the then Bill that in principle we supported the changes, the most important of which has been to abolish the Assets Recovery Agency and transfer its civil recovery functions to the Serious Organised Crime Agency and the four main prosecuting authorities in England and Wales.

As the noble and learned Baroness explained, the order brings into operation a code of practice that provides guidance for prosecutors on their exercise of powers of investigation under the 2002 Act. As I understand it, the earlier code has been revised to take account of the changes introduced by the 2007 Act.

I have just two questions for the noble and learned Baroness. First, as she must know, concerns have been raised in Northern Ireland that SOCA’s priorities will be such that cases of intimidation and local protection rackets will be considered insufficiently substantial to attract its attention. Secondly, I would be most grateful if she could assure the Committee that the costs of recovering assets, as well as the amounts recovered, will be made public on a regular basis. The change that she has introduced should not be at the expense of transparency.

I, too, thank the noble and learned Baroness the Attorney-General for her explanation of the order. I apologise for the fact that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is unable to be here today; he was intrigued by the delay in receiving the code but was grateful to receive it when he did.

I accept that this is largely the same as the code of practice for SOCA, which was passed by both Houses earlier in the year. It is reassuring to know that the various agencies will exercise the powers of prosecution to the same standards and with the same safeguards.

The noble and learned Baroness mentioned that this code was put out to public consultation in March 2008 and that no responses were received. Can she tell us how long the consultation process was and why there were no responses during that period? Apart from that point, we welcome the order.

First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, for his kindness and consideration in not berating me for the slip. I am most grateful to him. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, for the same generosity of spirit. This Committee is graced by her presence.

Absolutely.

Without any disrespect to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, I am sure that none of us thinks that she is a poor substitution; she is a very fine substitute.

I am aware of the concerns raised about Northern Ireland. There has been no evidence in fact that any change has taken place. ARA in Northern Ireland has performed with considerable distinction and efficacy and it is intended that there should be no significant change in that. Every effort is being made to ensure that the efficacy of the procedure and the approach that was adopted before is continued. I know of nothing to indicate that there has been a diminution, although I am very happy to clarify that point.

On costs and the recovery of assets, I can reassure the noble Lord that there will be no lack of transparency. I, too, expect these figures to be disclosed in the normal way.

I believe that the consultation period was the same length as usual, but because the Home Secretary’s order and code had been so extensively consulted upon, with issues raised and resolved, we were not surprised that there was no response to our consultation. We did not take it amiss because it is identical in terms to the Home Secretary’s order.

It is right that we look at comprehensive safeguards and make sure the powers are exercised fairly and proportionately by, for example, making arrangements for a person interviewed under a disclosure order to have access to legal or financial advice and the support of an appropriate adult. That would deal with the sort of issues that were raised in relation to the Home Secretary’s previous code and were put right or amplified in the amended code.

I hope that Members of the Committee will find that this is now in good order; I invite them to approve the order in the terms set.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (Specified Organisations) Order 2008.

The noble Lord said: The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 provides that the Secretary of State must specify an organisation that is concerned in terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland, or in promoting or encouraging it, and that has not established or is not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire. In applying his judgment to the second limb of that test, the Secretary of State is obliged, in particular, to take into account whether an organisation is committed to the use now and in the future of only democratic and peaceful means to achieve its objectives, has ceased to be involved in any acts of violence or preparation for violence, is directing or promoting acts of violence by other organisations, and is co-operating fully with the decommissioning commission. The Secretary of State in coming to a judgment in the round will take into account briefings from the Security Service in consultation with the chief constable.

The following organisations are specified at the moment: the Continuity Irish Republican Army, the Loyalist Volunteer Force, the Orange Volunteers, the Real Irish Republican Army, the Red Hand Defenders, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Red Hand Commando. The Secretary of State must review this list from time to time. Changes of circumstances can require amendments to the list of specified organisations.

To that end, the Secretary of State keeps the status of all specified organisations and those purporting to be on a ceasefire under continuous review and takes advice from the Security Service and chief constable as to the robustness of all ceasefires. The consequence of this order is that certain prisoners may be eligible for early release under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. However, it has been confirmed that there are currently no prisoners who will benefit from the despecification of the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Red Hand Commando. The order before us today despecifies the Ulster Volunteer Force, generally referred to as the UVF, and the Red Hand Commando. The latter organisation is associated with the UVF and has been used as a “flag of convenience” for UVF activity in the past. The order also specifies Óglaigh na hEireann.

I will turn first to the specification of Óglaigh na hEireann. This is the first time this organisation has been included in a specification order. Óglaigh na hEireann was first identified by the Independent Monitoring Commission in its eighth report, published on 1 February 2006. The commission reported, at paragraph 3.5, a new dissident group, styling itself as Óglaigh na hEireann, that had splintered from the Continuity IRA. This is the organisation that we are specifying.

The actions of this organisation are an attempt to pretend that the progress of recent years never occurred. The people of Northern Ireland have no appetite for this form of violence and will not tolerate this attempt to undermine the progress communities have made politically, economically and in terms of the start of the healing of community divisions. This organisation clearly meets the terms for specification. The Independent Monitoring Commission has repeatedly said that the organisation,

“remains a continuing and serious threat”.

This organisation continues to be a risk to members of the security forces through their active targeting. The organisation is involved in serious criminal activity and organised crime. This will not be tolerated, and the Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force should be commended for its work in tackling the organised crime perpetrated by this and other organisations.

The most serious of the crimes attributable to Óglaigh na hEireann is the murder of Andrew Burns, a 27 year-old Strabane man who was abducted and taken across the border to County Donegal where he was shot twice. The IMC classed this as a paramilitary murder and attributed it to Óglaigh na hEireann. Óglaigh na hEireann, like other dissident republican groups who set themselves on this dangerous path, represents no one but itself. It has no cause, no mandate and nowhere to go but out of business. I pay tribute to the work of the PSNI and the security services in tackling that threat from those organisations professionally and consistently. Óglaigh na hEireann will not succeed on its dangerous path.

The order also despecifies the UVF and Red Hand Commando. Those two organisations were specified in 2005, following their violent feud with the Loyalist Volunteer Force, including serious and dangerous rioting at the Whiterock Parade. However, we must acknowledge the significant progress which has been made since those events. A reduction in activity and a change in direction by those organisations have been documented by the Independent Monitoring Commission in its reports. The most significant step is the 3 May 2007 statement, which announced an end to their terror campaign. The statement was that the:

“UVF/Red Hand Commando will assume a non-military, civilianised role”,

and that all ordnances would be “put beyond reach”. That announcement indicated a major turning point for those organisations. At that point, the Secretary of State committed to review the status of the organisation.

The IMC said in its most recent and 18th report, published on 1 May 2008, that the UVF was committed to the path set out in its statement of 3 May 2007. It is important that we acknowledge the progress made by the UVF and the Red Hand Commando, but the story should not end there. The issue of the organisations’ arsenal must be addressed even if it is beyond reach. The leadership must step up its engagement with the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. That process needs to result in the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons.

The Secretary of State said at the Mitchell conference that structures such as the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the IMC were,

“time limited, and will not be here forever”.

The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning represents a legal route to decommissioning. The protections that come with this route will not be around for ever if the commission is not there. While we recognise that such things do not happen overnight, our patience and that of the community is now nearing an end. None the less, the order recognises the progress made to date. The evidence from the IMC report is clear. We have weighed that carefully and concluded that the tests for despecification are met in the case of the UVF and the Red Hand Commando. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (Specified Organisations) Order 2008. 21st Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Lord Rooker.)

I thank the Minister for his explanation of the order. We have no difficulty in supporting the specification of Óglaigh na hEireann. The Minister recently taught me how to say that and I hope I have got it right. However, we disagree with the despecification of the UDA. It seems as though it is one law for some and another for others. As my honourable friend in the other place says not too infrequently, the UDA has not yet decommissioned even a water pistol. In this House and in the other place, we have been pressing for decommissioning from the loyalists and we have seen them decommission nothing. The Minister quoted from the Independent Monitoring Commission reports. Yes, I read the report of 13 May, but in the report of 1 May 2008 it is made quite clear:

“Overall, in the light of what we have said above, we think that the British Government should revisit the question of the despecification of the UVF”.

To me that says, “We do not think you are right to make this decision to despecify the UVF”.

That is where we stand. Are HMG going soft on decommissioning? I would find it surprising if they were, and I sincerely hope that they are not, but it looks a bit like it. This order certainly points in that direction. What is the Government’s position on decommissioning?

I would be grateful if the Minister could give me clear reasons for the UVF being despecified and allowed to hang on to its arsenal, particularly as some of its members are trying to acquire more ordnance, as I think it is known these days. It is interesting that my noble friend Lord Trimble was not so long ago of the same view personally—not as a party member—that this is not the right time to despecify the UVF.

Certainly, the UVF has made a major statement; certainly, it has moved to some extent in the direction of the real world in which we live; but it has not yet gone far enough. It is still a criminal and potentially terrorist organisation; it still has an organisation; it still has an arsenal of weapons. Why on earth have Her Majesty’s Government decided that they are good boys and girls and can be despecified without any decommissioning?

I do not support the order, but as it is a statutory instrument we in this House, unlike at the other end, cannot vote against it. My party voted against it in the other place.

I, too, thank the Minister for introducing the order. I share much of the scepticism of the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran. I understand, however, that it is necessary where possible to offer some form of encouragement to those paramilitary organisations that appear to be moving in the right direction. We could dispute as a matter of timing whether the UVF and the Red Hand Commando should at this point be no longer specified—that is a matter of judgment. There remains, too, the question of the decommissioning by the UVF. It has substantial arms, and it would be much more heartening if it was to agree to give them up.

It is important to emphasise that while we are made more aware by the press of some of the atrocities committed by republican paramilitaries, there remains on the loyalist side a considerable threat to the peace of Northern Ireland. We can only hope that continuing prosperity—fingers crossed—and the rebuilding of civic society in Northern Ireland will mean that such organisations no longer have any support from any sections of the community. However, while emphasising that it is not just on the republican side that these threats exist and that significant loyalist factions are also at work, we will with some reluctance—because of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran—support the order.

In welcoming this order, I recognise the constant need to review and refresh the groupings in Northern Ireland that require specification for the purpose of sentencing. I fully support the Northern Ireland Office in its efforts to bring about such provisions. However, I point out that until now no such legislative sanction has been available against Óglaigh na hEireann, despite initially being cited by the Independent Monitoring Commission in February 2006—some two and a half years ago. If further groups emerge—and I sincerely hope that they do not—that possess the structures, ideology and capability of a terrorist grouping and the Secretary of State receives assessments confirming that, I hope that it will not take two and a half years before their inclusion under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998.

I give a guarded welcome to the despecification of the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Red Hand Commando. We have to recognise the hard work and dedicated efforts by community leaders in Northern Ireland and the organisations themselves to bring about such a situation. What continuing support and assistance do the Government intend to give loyalist communities so that they can continue to stride away from the grip of the paramilitaries and ensure that those who were once consumed by the past never return to it?

I note that the Provisional IRA remains a non-specified organisation. What efforts has the Minister made to see the final withdrawal of the IRA’s Army Council? That is necessary so that further political progress can be made in Northern Ireland. Can the Minister give an assessment of the continued specification of the Loyalist Volunteer Force and other such groups which, although they masquerade as politically focused paramilitary movements, adorn themselves with such convenient shrouds simply to gain control and deference in their local community? They are nothing more than a facade for deeply damaging criminal empires. Indeed, in the 18th report of the Independent Monitoring Commission, the LVF was recognised as such. Is it not high time that they were treated as such?

Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this order and for the manner in which he introduced it. He made a convincing case. I have just one query, and it may not be possible for him to deal with it this afternoon. From our discussions today, and in the other place, it is clear that there are matters of considerable sensitivity here. An issue that was raised in the other place but not, so far as I am aware, fully responded to by the Government was, in the event of the devolution of policing and justice powers in Northern Ireland—the day for that seems to be drawing quite near—what happens to the Secretary of State’s power to specify an organisation? From our discussions, it can be seen that these are complicated and difficult matters. I am not clear—perhaps I should be—and I know others are not clear about what happens to the Secretary of State’s power in this matter. Will it become a devolved matter or will it remain with the Secretary of State?

I am grateful for the comments. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, the power will not be devolved. I regret if that was not made clear during the debate in the other place. If and when the devolution of criminal justice arises, this issue will not be devolved. It will remain with the Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office. I have made that clear on the record.

I am grateful for the muted support. I realise that there is general support. The last thing that the Government or I are saying is that these organisations are perfect. They are not. I was rightly asked why it had taken so long to specify Óglaigh na hEireann and was then criticised for despecifying the Ulster Volunteer Force, but the Ulster Volunteer Force’s statement of 3 May 2007, which I shall not read out, is, from its point of view, quite momentous. In many ways, it is along the lines of what came out from the IRA. It is clear from the last paragraph that it took the UVF three years to issue that statement; it was not an overnight job. I will put the final paragraph of the statement on the record:

“Finally we convey our appreciation for the honest forthright exchange with officers, NCOs and volunteers throughout the organisation over the past three years which has allowed us to assume with confidence the position we adopt today”.

I—

I am in the middle of a point; I shall be happy to give way to the noble Baroness in a moment. It took the UVF three years to get that far, so it was not an overnight job. In addition, following that, it has taken time for the Secretary of State to consider despecification. We have received reports on Óglaigh na hEireann, which identifies itself as a new organisation. Clearly, we have to ensure that it genuinely exists so that the Secretary of State can use his powers for specifying and so that we do not fall foul of judicial review and other matters. Therefore, it is not an overnight job either to despecify in the case of the UVF or to specify in the case of Óglaigh na hEireann. I gladly give way to the noble Baroness.

I am very grateful to the Minister. I think that the question concerned the UDA, or is he going on to answer that?

I had not got that far; I was dealing with questions about the UVF. I shall come on to answer the specific questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, but he asked why we are despecifying the UVF. That is a fair point. On the one hand, the UVF took three years to make its statement of May last year, and the Secretary of State has considered that. On the other hand, I was asked why it has taken two years or more to specify Óglaigh na hEireann. My point is that these things do not happen overnight. There is a set of laws and procedures for the Secretary of State to follow. These things are not done on a whim or a hunch; they are done after careful consideration and after taking advice from the Security Service and the chief constable.

I congratulate the noble Lord on his pronunciation of the new republican bodies being listed, but some confusion arises because sometimes he refers to the UDF. I know that these initials are very confusing, but that is why my noble friend was somewhat confused. Perhaps Hansard would note that the Minister is referring to the UDA at this stage.

Let us be clear on this. I know that my voice is not perfect. I recently went on an overseas trip for the Government to save the whales in Chile and I caught a bug on the plane. So far, I have referred only to the UVF. I have not referred to any other organisation. I make it absolutely clear that I have been referring to the UVF, the Red Hand Commando and Óglaigh na hEireann, which I was trained to say a few days ago. I have not referred to any other organisation. I want to make that clear for noble Lords and for Hansard.

I turn to the detail of the questions. I shall not take too long on this but it is important because we are about to go into the Recess. The noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, asked why we were despecifying the UVF when it had not really decommissioned. That is absolutely clear. We took the decision to despecify the UVF and the Red Hand Commando after carefully considering the test laid down in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. As I said, that decision was reached in consultation with the Security Service and the chief constable. We strongly believe that the UVF has met the threshold for despecification. The May 2007 statement was a very positive step and we are satisfied that the UVF has made sufficient progress since then to enable despecification. I make it abundantly clear that we shall not hesitate to respecify if there is any change in the UVF’s activities. Decommissioning is one of the elements taken into account when considering despecification. However, it is not the only factor to be taken into account in making the decision in the round.

The UVF must go on to decommission, but we are satisfied that it has done enough to be despecified at this point. The list of specified organisations is kept under review and, if necessary, we will not hesitate to respecify any organisation. In its 18th report, the IMC recommended that the Government consider the issue of despecification, and the Secretary of State has done so and reached his decision. It did not recommend us not to despecify.

We are committed to decommissioning as a central part of the political process. We want the total and verifiable decommissioning of all paramilitary arms at the earliest possible moment, and an end to the old vestiges of paramilitarism. The UVF statement of May 2007 shows a strong desire by the leadership to address the issue of weapons. However, more must be done than putting all ordnance beyond reach, and the path laid down for decommissioning must be followed in due course. Normal society cannot have the long-term presence of institutions such as the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, as I have said. That is the legal route to decommissioning. If that organisation is not there, there is no legal route to decommissioning, and the full consequences of that must be apparent to the relevant organisations. Our patience is getting thin. The structures are time-limited and will not be there for ever, so they had best make haste to decommission while it is legal to do so.

It may be my English, but it seems clear that the commission said on 1 May:

“Overall, in the light of what we have said above, we think that the British Government should revisit the question of the despecification”,

not specification. It says “revisit”; I do not know when the Government first visited despecification. I understood that to mean that they should revisit their decision to despecify. If they had not made that decision prior to the report to despecify, then I have it wrong, I think.

I hope that I got it correct originally, because the decision on specification or despecification is not for the Independent Monitoring Commission, but for the Secretary of State. He has considered it in the round and reviewed all organisations, hence we have come along with a package of specified organisations, which I read out. If Parliament approves the order, two will come off and one will be added, but that is the Secretary of State’s decision, subsequently approved by Parliament, one assumes. I will not get into the semantics because I do not have the IMC report in front of me, but it asked him to revisit the matter. He looked at it in the round, which he is required to do; it is not just about the issue of decommissioning.

The noble Lord also asked me about attempts to procure weapons and involvement in organised crime. The IMC commented in the 18th report that it believed that individuals had attempted to procure weapons, but in our view that has not been as a result of any decision by the leadership to increase the UVF stocks. Indeed, the leadership has taken some action against offending members on the weapons issue. That is in line with the leadership’s statement of May 2007, the final paragraph of which I read out. The Government have to draw a distinction between the actions of individuals and the organisation as a whole, and we are satisfied that the actions were not on behalf of the organisation.

It is evident from the arrests in Lithuania in January that law enforcement agencies are working hard to combat the activity. As I said, the Organised Crime Task Force is working hard to detect, disrupt and dismantle criminal gangs involved in organised criminal activity. Key successes include over £35 million-worth of criminal assets being disrupted, seized and recovered or settled, over £4 million of illegal drugs being seized, and £1.6 million of counterfeit goods being seized over the past year. Cash-in-transit attacks in Northern Ireland fell by 56 per cent in 2007: there were 22 attacks compared with 51 in 2006.

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. and the Paternity and Adoption Leave (Amendment) Regulations 2008.

The noble Baroness said: The regulations before the Committee today make clear for employees and employers the terms and conditions to which an employee on additional maternity leave or additional adoption leave is entitled. Additional maternity or adoption leave is the second six months of the 52-week leave period. The regulations are necessary as a result of the amendments made to the Sex Discrimination Act in April this year, following the Equal Opportunities Commission 2007 case against the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

Those amendments mean that employers will no longer be able to treat employees taking additional maternity leave less favourably than those on ordinary maternity leave in respect of employment benefits. The regulations clarify that the non-pay contractual benefits that women have during ordinary maternity leave are explicitly extended to additional maternity leave and that right applies to adopters taking additional adoption leave as well. They ensure legal clarity and consistency with the amended Sex Discrimination Act.

The regulations will come into force in October this year, given our commitment to common commencement dates for new employment legislation, and will apply to parents where the expected week of childbirth or placement for adoption is on or after 5 October 2008. The Sex Discrimination Act amendment also applies to women whose expected week of confinement is 5 October 2008 onwards. The timing of the maternity and adoption regulations before us today therefore dovetails with that of the Sex Discrimination Act changes.

Examples of the type of contractual benefit covered include accrual of contractual annual leave and the provision of company cars and mobile phones. Of course, that would be the case only where an employee is already entitled to such benefits as part of their normal contract of employment for their ordinary maternity leave.

These amendments, taken with the Sex Discrimination Act changes, also require that the full 52 weeks of maternity and adoption leave now be counted when assessing how long an employee has been working for an employer. Employers will benefit from the removal of the risk of claims for sex discrimination if they provide only the terms and conditions as currently required. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. and the Paternity and Adoption Leave (Amendment) Regulations 2008. 25th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Baroness Vadera.)

I thank the Minister for whizzing through that. Regulations 4 to 7 of the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. and the Paternity and Adoption Leave (Amendment) Regulations 2008 amend the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 to extend the non-pay terms and conditions to which a woman is entitled during ordinary maternity leave—OML—to the period of additional maternity leave, in future known as AML. Regulations 8 to 10 of the amendment regulations 2008 amend the Paternity and Adoption Leave Regulations 2002 to extend the non-pay terms and conditions to which a woman is entitled during ordinary adoption leave to the period of additional adoption leave.

The regulations were debated in the other place yesterday. My honourable friend Mr Jonathan Djanogly gave a long, extended description of what they were all about. I want to avoid the Committee suffering that. He did it beautifully and received a lot of answers. However, a few questions were left, so perhaps the Minister would not mind if I ask one or two.

According to the DBERR impact assessment, the regulations will impose costs of more than £162 million, but will create zero financial benefit. Does the Minister believe that at a time of rapidly increasing economic competition it is right to lumber business with yet more regulations and costs? The British Chamber of Commerce estimates that government regulations have cost business in excess of £65 billion since 1998. There have been 14 new regulations every working day. Is this not just another one? It is often claimed that the bulk of the regulation under which United Kingdom business struggles is derived from Europe. Although the Government are well known for their zealous application of the European regulations, I do not think this is another one; I think these are regulations of their own creation. Perhaps the Minister will confirm that.

Many small businesses cannot afford to employ an extra member of staff. Therefore, how does the Minister believe that such businesses will be able to afford to maintain the benefits and privileges due to a member of staff on additional maternity leave and hire another member of staff to cover their job?

That is the end of the questions that I should like the Minister to answer now, if she can, with the help of her civil servants—or later, if she cannot at this stage. Every one of those questions relates to economics; obviously, I could have made a very long speech about regulations affecting maternity benefits and adoption law, but I do not think that she needs to hear me go through all that right now.

We really do not have any fundamental objections to this statutory instrument, but there is one question to which I would like a response. Why are not maternity and paternity leave combined to be parental leave? That would mean that women were no longer quite so stigmatised, with problems about employment and so on. Why is this not being considered? If it is being considered, when can we have an answer? The idea that one parent should choose which of them takes on responsibility would seem to be a logical extension of much of the Government’s rhetoric, if not policy. When will some consideration of this be given? Other than that, I do not really have much to add to the debate, but it would surely be a logical extension of what we have talked about to allow fathers to share more of the leave and childcare duties.

I thank noble Lords for their contributions and questions. With respect to the question on impact assessment, there is a cost of £162 million, including the adoption. That is a cost that amounts to approximately £125 per firm employing people. We understand and, I believe, share a passion with the noble Baroness about better regulation. However, it would be interesting to note the benefits around the importance of the role that women play in the labour market. In encouraging women into the labour market, we face productivity challenges; we have high levels of employment and a tight labour market, and it is very important that women continue to participate in that.

The noble Baroness may be interested to know that, while women’s employment rights have increased, the evidence shows that their participation in the labour markets has also been increasing. Compared with 1971, when they made up 38 per cent of the workforce, women are now 45 per cent of the workforce. Female employment rates in 1971 were 42 per cent and are now 70 per cent. That is among the highest in the EU, although the maternity entitlement is also the longest. But of course there is a balance to be struck and a legitimate discussion to be had to ensure that we are not complacent or introducing rigidities into the labour market.

On the noble Baroness’s question on gold-plating, this amendment followed a case in the High Court, in which we were considered to have underimplemented and were therefore required to implement. I strongly refute the suggestion that we zealously gold-plate or overimplement regulations.

On affordability, the noble Baroness will be aware that small and medium enterprises are entitled to recover 104.5 per cent of statutory maternity pay from the state. In the terms of employment, if they choose to give further maternity pay, they will be considering their own affordability issues.

The noble Lord raised an interesting question, which also came up in another place in yesterday’s debate. The Minister responsible for employment essentially said that there was a legitimate debate to be had about flexibility in paternity leave. It is important to recognise that maternal leave is set out in this way because the health of the mother is a factor, particularly in the early period after her baby is born, but adoption leave can be taken by either parent because that is not relevant. There is a debate to be had about the flexibility of maternity leave after a certain time. We also have to consider predictability for employers and their legitimate interest in this. Therefore, in 2006 the Government extended notice periods to support businesses in this matter.

I hope that that answers the questions that I was asked. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Immigration (Supply of Information to the Secretary of State for Immigration Purposes) Order 2008.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Section 20 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 created a statutory gateway that enables the police, the Serious Organised Crime Agency and those accommodating UK Border Agency-supported asylum seekers to supply information to the Home Office for specified immigration purposes. Section 20 also provides an enabling power, subject to close scrutiny in this House and in the other place, to extend this list of bodies and the circumstances in which information may be shared.

Today, to improve further the sharing of information between government departments and the UK Border Agency, we are seeking to include the Secretary of State for Transport in respect of the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions in respect of social security information, and the chief constable of the British Transport Police in this gateway.

The order provides that certain information held by these departments and organisations may be supplied to the Secretary of State for the Home Department for use for immigration purposes as defined in Section 20(3) of the Act. It also extends the definition of immigration purposes to cover two additional UK Border Agency functions in relation to individuals in receipt of asylum support under Section 4 of the 1999 Act and those individuals who may have civil penalties imposed under Section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006.

There are currently no statutory powers for the Department for Work and Pensions, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency or the British Transport Police to supply information held in pursuance of their functions to the UK Border Agency for use for immigration purposes. These departments currently rely on common-law powers to share such information with the UK Border Agency to exercise immigration functions and to investigate criminal activity.

It is right that staff working in government departments should be clear as to the limits of their administrative powers under the law and the extent to which information-sharing with other departments is permitted. Given the increasing importance of information that these bodies supply for immigration functions and the increase in the volume of information the UK Border Agency requires, including via electronic format, we felt it prudent and timely to make an order setting out a clear legislative basis for the supply of this information.

This information will be used by the UK Border Agency to locate and remove immigration offenders, ensure compliance with existing immigration laws, including the checking of applications under the new points-based system, and prevent abuse of the asylum support benefit system. The UK Border Agency is forging closer partnerships with the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and the Department for Work and Pensions as part of its enforcement strategy Enforcing the Deal, which my right honourable friend the Home Secretary published on 19 June.

The order is crucial to enabling this work to proceed. It will allow the UK Border Agency to carry out more effective checks with the Department for Work and Pensions when applying the Immigration Rules that set down the criteria for entry and stay in this country. When a person is subject to a requirement that they do not claim benefits as a condition of entering and remaining here, the UK Border Agency will be able to check with the Department for Work and Pensions whether they have been truthful in their application.

The order will also enable us to take forward the review of migrants’ access to UK driving licences. Driving licences are used for many purposes, including demonstrating identity and address for the purpose of accessing many other services. As such, they can be prized for that purpose by illegal migrants wishing to live here unlawfully.

We want to work with the Department for Transport and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency to see how we can tighten up further the already stringent checks carried out on applicants by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. That includes strengthening the Driver Vehicle Licensing Agency’s legal power to share data with the UK Border Agency. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the British Transport Police are included for law enforcement purposes.

It is important to note that the power to supply information under Section 20 simply provides a statutory gateway under which information may be shared. The new power does not abrogate the need to comply with the important safeguards in the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998.

The Government take the protection of personal information very seriously. The departments involved have all reviewed the handling of personal data and implemented enhanced procedures following publication of the Cabinet Office interim report on the data-handling review in December 2007. They have continued to make improvements and are committed to implementing the Cabinet Office mandatory requirements, which were published in March and are referenced in the final report.

A number of initiatives have already been put in place to protect personal data within the Home Office, including the appointment of a senior information risk owner, and the issuing of new guidelines on taking information out of secure areas, including restricting the use of non-encrypted laptops and removable media. Any information shared under this new power and under existing powers will be shared securely in line with the recommendations of the Cabinet Office review. That is what the order seeks to achieve and I commend it to the Committee. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Immigration (Supply of Information to the Secretary of State for Immigration Purposes) Order 2008. 24th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Lord West of Spithead.)

I am most grateful to the Minister for his comprehensive explanation of the measure. The Official Opposition do not object in principle to the Secretary of State being given as much information as is legally held that might help in ensuring our immigration laws are upheld and enforced. It is clear that the information which can be supplied by the wider spread of the network of the DWP, the DVLA, the MCA and the British Transport Police can in certain circumstances add to the effectiveness of the UK Border Agency, which must surely be a cause for all-party support.

I am grateful to the Minister for amplifying particularly the question of driving licences, which he rightly recognises as one of the key identification documents. The Minister in the other place yesterday gave some idea of the numbers and the progress being made. If he can give any further details of that, it would be helpful to the Committee.

My other point has been gone over many times during the past year. It is clear that the transfer of data between holding authorities is not without its hazards, as has been painfully shown. Once data leave a department, which will have its own security in place—I am obliged to the Minister for confirming that those procedures are being tightened up—they must by the very circumstances of the migration be potentially less secure. Your Lordships will be aware that the Information Commissioner has been highly critical in his latest reports of two departments in particular. The Cabinet Secretary was yesterday asked some fairly direct questions by the committee and gave assurances which the Minister has echoed today. I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation and his assurance that the problem is being addressed with the greatest urgency.

I totally agree with the noble Viscount. The problem is security in transferring the information. We do not object to the order or to the use of the information specified in it but, in view of the history on this matter, we think that your Lordships should be doubly careful to scrutinise the methods by which the transfer of information is to be achieved. The Minister mentioned that it would comply fully with the recommendations in the Cabinet Office review of December 2007. He also referred to the appointment of a senior information risk owner, which I must say was news to me, but very welcome. I should like to know what the exact functions of this official are and whether reports will be made to Parliament on his assessment of the risks involved, particularly in the transfer of information. I am also grateful for the Minister’s assurances that all the powers in this order will be exercised in full compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act. Presumably, under the Data Protection Act there will be oversight of the procedures involved.

The note on the order says that there were no specific consultations on it, and I wonder why that was. Surely, particularly on the risks involved in the transfer of information from one department to another, competent technical advice would have been available from, for example, the professional computer bodies. I noted what the Minister said about the use of non-encrypted laptops, which in the past have been the occasion for the disappearance and theft of information on a large scale. Can he assure us that no information of the kind dealt with in the order will be on unencrypted laptops? I should have thought that where a transfer of information took place between, for example, the Department for Transport, the DVLA and the Home Office, it would be done electronically over a secure link and that that would be the only possible method by which this kind of information could be transmitted from one department to another. If there are exceptions to that and information is put on to a disk or a CD or used on a laptop, I think we should know about that. We should also know what safeguards will be considered by the senior information risk owner to ensure that the information does not go astray.

I thank noble Lords for their support for this measure. Both noble Lords raised the issue of data protection. They are absolutely right: this is a hugely important area, which we take very seriously. There is an element of closing stable doors in some of the things that are going on at the moment, which is not very clever. Looking back over 10 or 15 years or so, I am afraid that people have not been as clever at looking after data as they should have been. We absolutely needed to tighten things up in this area and that has been done. We are taking the right measures. This is an area where people need constant education to ensure that they know the right things to do, and that has to go on all the time because it is very easy to slip back into bad habits. We are very clear about ensuring that that is done. As I said, the new power does not abrogate the need to comply with all the important safeguards in relation to data protection and the Human Rights Act. That is a very important part of it.

The noble Lord asked a specific question about the sharing of data. The DVLA shared information on 1,172 cases in 2007-08—effectively over the past financial year—for the purposes of verifying immigration status. Of those, 489 were fraudulent applications, and that shows the value of this sort of check. The scale of the problem and the fact that it is becoming more widespread means that we need this measure. We need to put things on a more formal basis so that those in administration and others understand where they stand, what the rules are and what has to apply.

The senior information risk officer will report to Parliament, but I will have to write with more detail on this. It is a move in the right direction and will add to existing safeguards.

I am not sure exactly what the specific consultations were. Perhaps I can get back to the noble Lord in writing on that point.

I think we are all agreed that data protection is very important. These data are crucial in countering fraud, crime and illegal immigration. We have to look after them properly as we have to use them and hold them. This is an issue not only for government but also for private firms that are increasingly holding all sorts of data. This is a very important issue, and I am glad that it was raised.

The information will be shared securely and will generally be passed online. If it were not, I would be very surprised, but I will make certain and let the noble Lord know in writing if it is not on an encrypted laptop. There may be occasions when it is not possible to send it online, which I imagine is when that will happen, but I will check the position and get back to the noble Lord in writing.

I cannot imagine any case in which it would be impossible to send the data over the internet on an encrypted link as opposed to passing them physically via a laptop, CD or some other hard medium. I am not asking for a reply now but I should be grateful if the noble Lord could drop me a line. The exceptions to that rule should be minimised and, if possible, there should be a rule that no data are passed in hard form if that can be avoided.

I agree that generally it would be very unusual to do that. I do not think that we would put any of these data on disks. Indeed, with a number of the systems we are looking at, it is not possible to take a disk out because that is such a bad way of doing things as they are so easily lost, moved or stolen. I will certainly get back to the noble Lord in writing.

I misread something earlier and will get back to the noble Lord in writing regarding the senior information officer, as it is not clear that he will report to Parliament.

As I have said, all information under the new power will be shared securely in line with all the recommendations of the Cabinet Office review. I commend the order to the Committee.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Civil Penalty Code of Practice) Order 2008.

The noble Lord said: I shall take the two measures together. The UK Borders Act 2007 introduced powers for the Secretary of State to make regulations to issue identity cards to foreign nationals who are subject to immigration control. The order and the regulations will enable the UK Border Agency to do that. They are intended to enable the introduction of the first identity cards to be issued to foreign nationals, subject to immigration control, who are staying in the United Kingdom for more than six months.

The first identity cards will be issued from 25 November 2008 to those who are granted limited leave to remain as certain types of students and those who are granted limited leave to remain as spouses, civil partners or unmarried couples under the Immigration Rules. The cards will confirm the holder’s immigration status and entitlements to work and to access public funds in the United Kingdom. The identity card will provide foreign nationals who are subject to immigration control with a secure and reliable immigration document. To achieve this, we need to make regulations under the biometric registration powers contained in the UK Borders Act 2007, allowing the UK Border Agency to enrol biometric features. These will be a photograph and 10 fingerprints. Taking the person’s fingerprints will enable us to fix a person to a single identity and make it possible to verify that identity against centrally held records. At present, around 50 different documents are issued to foreign nationals granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; I have to say that I was rather surprised by that. This makes it difficult for employers and service providers to check whether a person is entitled to work in the UK before they give them a job or allow them to access public funds.

Identity cards are designed to make it easier for foreign nationals to demonstrate that they are entitled to live and work in the UK. We consider this essential as part of our efforts to tackle illegal working and immigration fraud. In addition, these regulations will be the way that the UK complies with a new European regulation, EC 380/2008, which requires the residence permits that grant leave to remain to be in the form of a card containing the biometric features of the holder.

The identity cards will be credit-card sized and will contain the holder’s unique biometric features, including a photograph and two fingerprints. On the face of the card will be the holder’s photograph and his biographical information, including his name, immigration status, nationality, date and place of birth, and gender. This information will also be stored in a secure embedded microchip, along with the two fingerprints. I have a copy of such a card here, which noble Lords can look at afterwards. I do not think that it is for any specific person. No, it is not.

In April this year, noble Lords kindly approved the Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Pilot) Regulations 2008, which enabled the UK Border Agency to test the biometric enrolment processes and technologies by registering the fingerprints and photographs of a small group of foreign nationals applying for leave to remain. The pilot started on 28 April and since that date noble Lords may be interested to learn that we have enrolled more than 7,500 biometric records and had around 2,000 responses to our applicant survey, with the vast majority of responses being positive.

The pilot enrolment processes and technologies are operating smoothly. Given our experiences with the pilot so far, we expect the technologies and our processes to continue to deliver our business needs when we start to issue identity cards from the end of November 2008. Identity cards are being rolled out incrementally, starting with applicants granted limited leave to remain in certain types of student categories and as spouses, civil partners or unmarried couples under the Immigration Rules. We selected these two categories based on risk and efficiency.

Those who are required to register their biometric identifiers will be able to enrol them at any one of the network of offices around the UK. From November 2008, there will be at least six enrolment venues sited across the country, including locations in Birmingham, Cardiff, Croydon, Glasgow, Liverpool and Sheffield. An additional centre will come on line in the following months in Northern Ireland.

Foreign nationals whose applications are successful will be issued with an identity card that will serve as their document granting them leave. We will not place any vignettes, stickers or stamps within the applicant’s passport.

I shall briefly set out to your Lordships the main differences between these regulations and the pilot regulations. These regulations will apply to foreign nationals in the specified student or family categories making an application from anywhere in the UK, unlike the pilot, which applied only to those making “in person” applications at the Croydon Public Enquiry Office or, if applying for leave by post, those living within a London postcode address. Obligations will be placed on identity card holders to notify the Secretary of State when their circumstances change and to apply for a replacement card in situations when it is cancelled.

We need to define the circumstances when we will require the identity cards for foreign nationals to be used. These regulations impose requirements on holders of the identity cards to provide their cards as part of an immigration process or procedure, where the holder attends a centre to take the “Life in the UK” test and to provide them to an employer. We are also introducing two additional sanctions, which were excluded from the biometric registration pilot. These are a power to curtail or cancel leave and a power to issue a civil penalty notice against persons who fail to comply with the requirements included in these regulations. The bulk of the regulations were developed from the earlier biometric registration pilot regulations. I am happy to answer specific questions about them if Members of the Committee wish to discuss such issues.

The order will bring into force the draft code of practice concerning the sanctions for non-compliance with the biometric registration regulations, which was laid before Parliament on 11 June 2008. The code sets out how the sanctions, which the Secretary of State may impose, will be applied to those who fail to comply with requirements of the biometric registration regulations. An early version of the draft code was published in February 2008 and we consulted the public about its contents. The version before the Committee reflects many of the helpful comments made as part of the consultation process.

We intend the code to work in the following way. Where a person fails to comply with a biometric registration requirement, a sanction may be imposed. There are two categories of requirements, previously known as primary and secondary requirements, which, following the consultation exercise, are now termed application and maintenance requirements. The application requirements relate to the need for foreign nationals to apply for an identity card. Failure to comply with these requirements will attract a more severe sanction than failing to comply with a maintenance requirement, as we regard the requirement for foreign nationals to apply for an identity card as a fundamental step towards protecting our border. The maintenance requirements mainly apply to those who have an identity card and need to keep their records up to date, or they concern the production of the card, essentially for immigration purposes and verification that the person producing the card is the rightful holder. Where a foreign national has existing leave and fails to comply with a requirement, we will normally issue a civil penalty notice to ensure compliance with the requirements rather than curtail or cancel the person’s leave.

As with the biometric registration pilot regulations, where a person is applying for leave and is required to apply for an identity card, we will normally disregard or refuse their immigration application unless they comply with the requirement. However, any decision to refuse, curtail or cancel leave is subject to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and international conventions, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Turning specifically to the civil penalty regime, copies of the sanctions table were circulated to Committee Members and we have more here. It sets out the levels of financial penalties that may be imposed. At present, the maximum is £1,000, with the starting level at £250 or £125, depending on whether the non-compliance is an application or maintenance requirement. These amounts may be increased where the person continues to fail, or subsequently fails, to comply with requirements made under the regulations up to the maximum statutory penalty allowed. As with other civil penalty regimes operated by the UK Border Agency, a person issued with a civil penalty notice will have a right to object to the Secretary of State and to appeal to the courts against the notice. The result of an objection or an appeal may lead to the penalty notice being cancelled, the amount increased or decreased, or the decision being maintained.

I am pleased to have brought these regulations and order before the Committee today. We believe that they will be a useful tool in tackling illegal migration and other identity and immigration abuses. We consider that they will support those who are staying in the UK legally and will form part of our wider national identity scheme. These regulations and the order are the first to enable the rollout of identity cards. When we intend to broaden the categories of foreign nationals who are required to apply for an identity card, we will return to Parliament and seek further approval. That is what the regulations and order seek to achieve. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Civil Penalty Code of Practice) Order 2008. 22nd Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Lord West of Spithead.)

Once again, I am most grateful to the Minister for his clear statement on the background to the order. He will know that, contrary to statements made by the Prime Minister and, I am sorry to say, in Labour Party leaflets distributed in the Crewe and Nantwich by-election, Her Majesty’s Opposition support, in principle, the issuing of biometric information documents to foreign nationals. We take the view that these documents can sensibly be used as one weapon in helping to secure our borders.

Judging from their recent statements, the Liberal Democrats appear not to want to collect biometric data from anyone at all, and I shall be interested to hear the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, on this matter. While the Government want, in due course, to collect these data from everyone, we in the Official Opposition take what is in our view the sensible middle ground: that the data should be collected when they contribute to the integrity and security of our border and the nation.

I know that the Conservative Party has a different approach to this matter because it supports the identity cards that we are now discussing and is opposed to the use of the national identity card. That seems to me wholly incongruous and inconsistent, as I shall seek to explain.

These orders bring into force identity cards for all foreign nationals, making them a precursor to the comprehensive national identity card scheme, which the Government plan later for everyone legally resident in the UK and which is now being rolled out in accordance with the National Identity Scheme Delivery Plan, published in March. In fact, the BIDs will be designated as ID cards under Section 4 of the Identity Cards Act 2006, as foreshadowed in the Explanatory Memorandum. No doubt the Government calculated that very few people would object to this proposal, as the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments did not draw attention to it and the consultation on the code of practice attracted very few responses—just a dozen, I think.

The pilot regulations, which these regulations supersede, also aroused very little debate, and no one is likely to quarrel with the objective of making it more difficult for unlawful migrants to enter or remain in the UK. So far as I am aware, even the NO2ID campaign, the leading opponents of identity cards, has had nothing to say about their application to people with limited leave to remain, yet would it not seem discriminatory to argue that biometric ID cards are all well and good for migrants but not for the native population? When this scheme is in full operation, there is a danger, as Liberty pointed out when we dealt with the parent Act, that it will be predominantly BME people who are required to produce the BID to satisfy immigration officers that they are legitimately residing in the UK.

Already, in the periodic drives to pick up suspected illegal entrants, far greater numbers are questioned than are subsequently arrested and deported. The cards might encourage the UKBA to undertake more fishing expeditions in which they inevitably pick up a majority of lawful BME residents, undermining the confidence of those people in our claim to be a racially equal society. The survey conducted as part of the impact assessment showed a perception that the cards would lead to the targeting of people from the subcontinent and Africa and states,

“potentially causing an adverse impact on community relations”.

On the other hand, it could be that as institutions of higher education and employers are required to check the validity of a student’s or worker’s leave to remain, the UKBA would have less reason to examine the migrants directly, but would rely on the sponsors, who, as the Minister explained, face civil penalties if they fail to make the prescribed checks.

We note that the intention is to introduce the cards for foreign nationals incrementally, starting with students, their spouses and their dependants, amounting to some 163,000 decisions a year in this order. As we understand it, within three years, all who apply successfully for an extension of leave to remain will receive a card, and the Minister will perhaps be able to let us have that number too.

Could he also tell us what the procedure will be if no decision on an application for extension of leave to remain has been made by the date on which a person's existing leave expires, and how many people that would have applied to if the scheme had been in operation in 2007? While the application is under consideration, and the identity card shows that a person’s existing leave to remain has expired, as it would by reference to the information it gives under Regulation 15(1)(h) of the biometric registration regulations, the holder would be in danger of being picked up as an overstayer whenever he produced it to a UKBA official.

That is only one of the traps for the unwary migrant in these proposals. Under Section 16 of the UK Borders Act 2007, the Secretary of State has power to order any person, with limited leave to remain, to reside at a given address. If that person moves and for any reason fails to notify the Secretary of State, as he is required to do under Regulation 18(d), the Secretary of State may cancel his leave to remain, and he may be removed or, if the Secretary of State is in a good mood, he might simply face a civil penalty.

Will foreign nationals now be legally obliged to inform the Secretary of State every time they change circumstances, as the Minister implied in his introduction, even if they would still be qualified to enter or remain under the paragraph of the rules under which they were given leave to enter or remain? For instance, would the students who are to be covered under this order have to notify the Secretary of State every time they change from one faculty to another or from one college to another? The Minister said that we need to define very closely the changes in circumstances that need to be notified to the Secretary of State. I examined the Explanatory Memorandum closely, and I was none the wiser on the questions I have just put to the Minister. When the BIDs are extended to workers admitted under the points-based system, what are the implications for employers who unwittingly take on or continue to employ a foreign worker with limited leave to remain who has failed to notify the UKBA of a change in his circumstances? How will the UKBA inform migrants, universities, employers and others who may have new duties of what they have to do and what information they have to provide?

Let me give one example of the sort of difficulty that may arise. If it had not been for the recent case of GO and others v the Secretary of State, in which the Court of Appeal ruled that a student could change from one course to another without invalidating her leave to remain, switching courses might have amounted to a change in circumstances falling within Regulation 18(d) requiring the student to notify the Secretary of State. May I assume that as a result of that case, the student who changes his course does not have an obligation to notify the Secretary of State of that fact?

Under Regulation 7, children under the age of 18 are to provide fingerprints and facial photographs. With no lower limit on the age given in the order, the only condition is that a responsible adult, such as the parent or guardian, must be present when the biometric information is being obtained. In the Explanatory Memorandum on the code of practice, there are three paragraphs referring to compliance with EU regulations on a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals, to be phased in over two to three years from the agreement of technical standards. The impact assessment states that one of the benefits is that the cards are interoperable with those in place across the whole of the European Union. Surely this has to mean that the technical standards have already been agreed, so that they can be applied to the documents covered by this order. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us an assurance on that point.

We have opted in to agreements on residence permits in the EU, but not on visas, where the European Parliament adopted a report on 10 July dealing with the collection of biometric data from applicants for Schengen visas. Although we are not in the Schengen system, the rules for collection and storage of biometric information for visas obviously should be aligned with those for residence permits, even if they are dealt with under different provisions of European legislation. My noble friend Lady Ludford is the European Parliament rapporteur on the biometric visa system, and she tells me that they have been unable to reach agreement with the Council on the fingerprinting and photographing of children under the age of 16. The Council wants biometric data to be taken from children over five, while the European Parliament is saying that 12 should be the minimum age.

Meanwhile, as was mentioned by the Minister, the Council has already provided, in Regulation 380/2008, that for residence permits, children are to be fingerprinted from at least six onwards and even younger at the discretion of member states. In our case, the impact assessment seems to imply, on page 13, that up to the age of six, children's biometrics will be confined to a digitalised photograph, although the order itself allows both photographs and fingerprints to be taken from babies. Would the Minister please clarify the Government's intentions on age? Whatever age is chosen as the minimum, do they envisage that, for children, the biometrics will last throughout their lives or will they have to renew them periodically, and if so how often? Is the renewal of children’s biometrics built into the estimated £187.6 million present value costs of the scheme over the first 10 years given on page 14 of the impact assessment?

My noble friend Mr Tom Brake got no answer in another place to his question about the calculated savings from the whole scheme of £29.8 million over 10 years because the Minister, Meg Hillier, said that she had already explained that figure, when all that she had actually said was that it was “based on economic evidence”. It would be useful if the Minister could give us a bit more information about how this saving was calculated than the Commons managed to extract from Ms Hillier when they discussed this matter. If the Minister wishes to place the information in the Library of the House rather than going into it in detail this afternoon, that will be perfectly acceptable.

In the impact assessment, we are told about the enrolment pilot, to which the Minister also referred, being conducted on spouses, civil partners and students applying for extensions of their leave to remain to pressure-test the enrolment processes and technology. We noted that the time needed to take fingerprints was less than expected, and we would like to know whether it enables the UKBA to verify or to amend the paper calculation of the operational costs. What was the practice on recording the applicants' children's biometrics in the pilot, and although only a vignette was issued to the applicants, and not the card now provided for in these regulations, will the people who have been through the pilot—the Minister mentioned 7,500 people—now receive cards using the biometrics already obtained?

Although we are not in Schengen, is it the Government’s intention to comply with European decisions on the biometric visa system? If so, or if our own visa system is to impose similar requirements, will everybody entering the UK legitimately from outside the EEA area have had their biometrics taken already? Will there be arrangements to transfer the electronic images of fingerprints and facial images taken for the purposes of granting the visa in the country of origin to the UKBA so that they can be incorporated in the BID so that new biometrics do not have to be taken once the migrant reaches the United Kingdom?

Finally, in Committee on the then UK Borders Bill, we suggested that an independent monitor be appointed to oversee the rollout and particularly to ensure compliance with discrimination legislation. The Information Commissioner will have the responsibility of ensuring that the personal biometric information collected from the millions of persons granted limited leave to remain is collected, stored, transferred and processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act and used only for the purposes specified by Parliament. That is a huge addition to his responsibilities. However, in view of the concerns expressed by Liberty, ILPA and others and the need to ensure that we are in step with the rest of the EU, as well as the very significant cost uncertainties arising, the appointment of an independent monitor is a necessary and prudent safeguard.

I did not expect, after my reference to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that we would get anything but his usual detailed and courteous explanation of why we should see the error of our ways. For that the Committee can be grateful, but I must emphasise that there are fundamental differences between our parties on this one. Our position, as I set out earlier, is that we support these measures for this limited objective. When we come to deal with the matter of ID cards later, we will have a very robust attitude, but for the moment we support the Government on these measures.

I thank noble Lords for the useful input. I thank the noble Viscount for his support on this measure. I am sure that we will have a much longer debate on the more general question of ID cards, which is still to come.

It is important to say that we regard the integrity and security of our border and nation extremely seriously. In general terms, what has come over from the pilot study and from all our consultation is that the people whom we have talked to, including students and spouses, have welcomed this and found it very useful. I mentioned there being 50 different forms; this is something that has utility for them.

On whether this covers EU nationals, no, it does not. EU nationals are completely separate. They are not part of this equation. The noble Lord made a point about this being something that would affect only BMEs and that there were real dangers of this causing major problems. These people cannot be stopped by the police and asked to present their identity card; that is not how these things work. They will use them when they do specific things, make claims for specific things and that sort of thing. There is absolutely nothing within this to say that people have to carry these things round and that the police can stop them and say, “Show me your identity card”. The fear that we will cause a division in society is just not real. I do not believe that that will be the case at all.

As a practical precaution, immigrants are likely to carry the card around because if somebody asks for it and they cannot produce it they will have to turn up at a police station, which will cause them a lot of additional problems. So most people will carry the card around with them.

They may carry it because they feel that it is useful to have, but the police cannot stop someone and ask to see his identity card. They are not allowed to do that; that is not part of what we are proposing.

I did not say that. If somebody is stopped for any other purpose and he has a black or dark face, he will be asked to produce the card to show that he is legitimately in the United Kingdom.

I do not believe that that is the case. That is not how the police would behave. They are not allowed to ask for that. When they stop and search, they cannot ask somebody to provide even his name and address, let alone an ID card. It is more an apparent than a real concern.

The noble Lord raised a number of questions regarding children. We anticipate that it would usually be the child’s parent who accompanied him in these circumstances. If that were not possible, someone over the age of 18, who we would expect to have a connection with the child, may take responsibility. It may be someone from the school or the place where the person was studying.

We are committed to keeping children safe. There is no doubt that by their having a clear identity we are able to keep them much safer. It is children who have no clear identity, or multiple identities, who are trafficked across borders. An accurate identity makes them safer.

As regards biometrics for young children, children aged six years and under will be required to provide only a facial image, which is similar to the requirement for those who are physically incapable of providing fingerprints. On updating biometrics as children become older, current regulations stipulate that a child’s card will expire after five years at the latest. After that, another application will have to be made because dramatic changes take place when children are at that age.

The noble Lord asked whether those who applied under the pilot will receive a card. The answer is no. Those who apply under the pilot are issued with a vignette and we will not now send them a card. Those who apply for leave in these categories after November will be issued with a card.

I am conscious that a large number of questions were asked. I am afraid that I might miss some of them in my reply. We will certainly check in Hansard and make sure that we reply to them in writing.

I asked my team how much the cards will cost. The best figure that I have is that it will probably cost us more than £10 million overall over 10 years, the rest being covered by people buying the cards. Part of the cost is the setting-up of the scheme. Once we run on from the 10 years, it will be self-financing. That is just pure cash, but the benefits of the cards are huge. A whole raft of gains makes them worth that amount of money over that period. If that figure is not accurate, I will write to noble Lords.

I know that a number of other points were raised. Unless noble Lords wish me to answer something in particular now, I hope that they will forgive me if I check Hansard and write to them on the specifics.

This is a very sensible move. I am glad that it has been accepted as so by most people. There will be a bigger debate on the ID cards. It is right that there should be some penalty if people do not obey the new law and that they be held if they are meant to have an ID card. I commend the order to the Committee.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Immigration (Biometric Registration) Regulations 2008. 22nd report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Lord West of Spithead.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2008.

The noble Lord said: The Criminal Justice Act 1988 introduced an order-making power to ban the manufacture, sale and importation of specified offensive weapons. Currently, the offensive weapons order prohibits 18 weapons, including sword sticks, knuckle-dusters, disguised knives and batons. On 6 April 2008, samurai swords were banned by adding swords with a curved blade of 50 centimetres or more to the offensive weapons order to address concerns of public safety. In the parliamentary debate on this ban, which was held on 18 March 2008, I gave an undertaking to listen to representations of groups with concerns that their legitimate activities had been affected by the ban. That was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham. The amendment order we are discussing today acts on that undertaking.

Collectors had expressed their concerns to Vernon Coaker, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Crime Reduction, that the ban had unfairly impacted on valuable curved military swords from the First and Second World Wars. He was also lobbied by makers of high-quality swords who told him that they sell handcrafted curved swords, worth £1,000 to £8,000, for export. The Government’s intention was not to disadvantage craftsmanship, nor was it to stop the trade in swords of historical and cultural significance. The intention was to ban the cheap, readily available samurai swords used in violent crime, including murders.

I understand that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State met collectors and manufacturers in April 2008 and he asked officials to work with them to explore ways of protecting their legitimate use of curved swords without impacting adversely on the overall effectiveness of the ban. The amendment order we are discussing today contains some small amendments, agreeable to stakeholders, which address their concerns without impacting on the effectiveness of the ban.

The amendments are minor in detail but significant in effect. They focus on broadening the current defence to any curved sword made before 1954 rather than just those made in Japan, and to any curved sword made after 1954 according to traditional methods of making swords by hand—again, not just those made in Japan according to traditional methods. For thoroughness we are also amending the order to allow swords for use in religious ceremonies. While we have had minimal lobbying on this point, I understand from the Department for Communities and Local Government that curved swords are an integral part of Sikh wedding ceremonies and we have no wish to hinder such activities.

On whether the new defences would cover swords used in folk dancing and sword dancing, I cannot offer a definitive view on whether the swords used in any one particular activity would be banned under the new legislation. Groups who think that they may be affected should seek advice. I should emphasise, however, that the ban applies only to swords with curved blades and not swords with straight blades which, perhaps, are more likely to be used in such dances.

Ministers have also been asked if there are any plans to add a specific defence for swords used in belly dancing. I found that rather surprising. I thought snakes were used in belly dancing. There are no such plans, but Section 43 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 introduced a defence for those supplying offensive weapons for TV, theatrical performances and film productions. This measure provides those companies and individuals who sell and hire offensive weapons for film, television and theatre productions with a defence from prosecution. That came into force on 6 April 2008 and I suggest that individuals contact the trade union for artists and performers, Equity, for advice on whether they would be covered by this defence. Even if the sale of swords used in folk, sword and belly dancing were banned, possession would not be affected and individuals should still be able to use their current swords in those activities, as before.

The changes are in line with the Government fulfilling their undertaking, provided during the parliamentary debates on the original order, to listen to representations from groups who consider that their legitimate use of swords has been unfairly impacted upon. The amendments would not weaken the ban, nor adversely impact on the intention behind the ban to target the cheaply available replica samurai swords used in violent crime. The Association of Chief Police Officers supports these amendments. As such, I commend the order to the Committee. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2008. 21st report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Lord West of Spithead.)

In the tragic environment in which we live, with its large incidence of knife crime, committed so often with short blades from the kitchen drawer, we might be forgiven for feeling that we were taking part in a fringe performance. However, we must support the Government in seeking to apply common sense to specialised uses which would otherwise be caught by the legislation. I congratulate the Minister and his colleagues on listening to the various representations. I join my noble friend Lady Hanham in thanking him for that. There are two specialised uses on which my honourable friend James Brokenshire did not get a totally satisfactory answer. I refer to historical re-enactment groups and martial arts. Is there a defence for both of those? Otherwise, we support the order.

It does not seem long since we welcomed the previous order on 6 April. We understood why the Government were going to introduce that provision. The fact that they have listened to the various groups and made some further exceptions is useful, but my questions relate to whether the various widening of the exceptions will mean that the defences are widened in the case of people using swords for offensive purposes. Obviously, in widening the group substantially, the Government are widening the supply of the weapons that are likely to be lent, given away or sold.

My questions relate to the Gurkha kukri knife, which has very important ceremonial qualities. Will this be exempt? Will they count the ceremonial athame for followers of hermetic magic and paganism? Freemasons traditionally carry swords as part of their regalia; I have no idea whether they are curved or not, but would they be exempt if they were? Presumably they would because they are ceremonial. But when people die, for example, those swords go to the antique or the collectors markets. What happens to them then? Is that a defence if you have bought one of them?

The Minister made the point that it was a defence if the weapon was made by hand, but what is the definition of that? Can it be made in a factory and simply finished by hand? Furthermore, having mulled this over, I wonder why the provision refers to blades of 50 centimetres and over; are blades of 49 centimetres any less likely to be deadly?

I associate myself with the comments of those who have said that these provisions, while worthy, merely touch the tip of the problem, including the comments from the Front Bench about knife crime and knives from the kitchen drawer. I am sure that that is something that we will debate in future.

The noble Viscount and the noble Baroness have got to the nub of the matter. One problem is to capture all the sorts of knives that one would like, which is just so difficult. There is such an availability of knives, including kitchen knives. The noble Viscount is absolutely right that they are more often used than ceremonial weapons. But the police were particularly concerned about these copies of samurai swords which had been used for a number of violent incidents. They were not the original swords made by the Japanese, which are so expensive and are made in a traditional style; apart from anything else, you know straight away from the cost. But the police were really concerned about these imitation samurai swords, which is why we went down this route. In the past few days, noble Lords may have seen people talking on television about knife crime, and there were pictures of three youths showing off with exactly those swords. They are extremely dangerous. So this is the right thing to do, but we have to ensure that other people are not captured by the provisions.

Enactment societies will be protected. The Sealed Knot society will be protected, for example, and so will the Gurkha kukris. The only swords that are over that length are used largely for ceremonials, particularly when an ox is ceremonially killed, for instance.

I do not know the answer to the Freemason question and I shall get back to noble Lords in writing. We are not meant to know what happens in freemasonry, are we? Noble Lords clearly have knowledge about that. I do not know the answer to that question, but with traditionally made swords one can tell the difference. This provision is not aimed at them.

We are in a very difficult area; there are much broader issues than simply removing knives, which are behind all these proposals. We will debate all these issues; they have been discussed for many months, but they have come to a head in the past week or so. Many other things impact on this; it is extremely difficult to capture all of them, but we have to change how people behave and act. That is the only real way in which to end these problems. But this small step is necessary. I hope that these changes make sense and will protect people who have a valid reason for having these weapons and are not the sort of people who go out and cause problems. I commend the order to the Committee.

Can we have clarification on martial arts?

I am informed by my team that martial arts are protected. I commend this order to the Committee.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (Designation of Participating Countries) (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2008.

The noble Lord said: The Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 streamlined and modernised the United Kingdom’s mutual legal assistance relations with the rest of the world when it came into force on 26 April 2004. Today, in an effort further to improve international co-operation and in order to comply with our international obligations, we are seeking to designate the United States of America under various sections of that Act.

One of the advantages of the new arrangements is that they will improve our ability to achieve justice for British victims of serious crime. The order reflects the fact that on 25 June 2003 an agreement on mutual legal assistance between the United States of America and the European Union was concluded. As a result of the provisions of this agreement, it was necessary for the United Kingdom to amend its bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States.

The terms of the amended bilateral treaty make provision for the parties to make and execute requests for assistance in locating bank accounts and to provide banking information relating to criminal investigations. This is in similar terms to European agreements aimed at tackling serious international crime, in particular, economic crime and money laundering. The domestic powers to make and receive such requests are found in Chapter 4 of Part 1 of the Act.

Designation of the United States of America under Section 51(2)(b) of the Act for the purpose of Sections 32, 35, 43, 44 and 45 will allow requests for such orders to be executed in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and for such requests to be made to the United States of America by certain judicial and prosecuting authorities in the United Kingdom. Designation under Sections 35 and 44 of the Act—account monitoring orders—is not required under the strict terms of the agreement. However it is felt that such designation would be sensible, especially given that the Secretary of State retains a discretion whether to issue directions under Section 35.

Likewise, no express provision has been made to limit the designations to terrorist and money laundering cases, as is permissible under the agreement, because the Home Secretary retains a discretion whether to issue a direction under Section 35. It would be open to the Home Secretary to refuse to make such a direction where the request was made in a non-terrorist or money laundering case. In relation to outgoing requests, there is no such discretion. It will be up to the United States to decide whether to refuse a request to it on the basis that it was outwith the treaty.

The amended treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States of America will provide both Governments with a sound framework for future co-operation. We are clear that we will not allow criminals to escape justice simply because the evidence required is located overseas, and we are committed to assisting our international partners in doing the same. That is what the order seeks to achieve and I commend it to the Committee. I beg to move.

Moved, That, the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (Designation of Participating Countries) (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 22nd Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.—(Lord West of Spithead.)

I am most grateful to the Minister. We accept that this is a technical amendment, which is necessary in order to designate the United States of America a participating country. However, I should like one or two reassurances from the Minister.

I have two quotes, and if the Minister feels that it is easier to reply in writing, I shall quite understand. The first is from a newspaper report:

“One source at the department”,

of Homeland Security in America,

“said that as a result of the deal, the U.S. was likely to ask for full details on everyone visiting from Europe”.

The second quote is from Barry Steinhardt, a lawyer at the American Civil Liberties Union:

“The US is essentially asking the rest of the world to conform to our”—

that is, the United States’s—

“very limited notion of what’s private”.

He goes on to say that,

“it provides for wide access of data which are supposed to be protected under EU law”.

Those are emotive statements, especially in the light of the recent debates over the Lisbon treaty and of concern over what appears—certainly in the eyes of the public—to be the very one-sided procedure for extradition. I think that the House, and indeed the public, will be seeking reassurances on these matters, which I hope the Minister will be able to give. As I said, if that is by way of a letter, that will be perfectly acceptable to us.

My other question concerns the cost to the private sector of the order. I think that it has been put at between £1.5 billion and £2.5 billion over the next 10 years. I shall be grateful if the Minister can give us further information on that.

I think that the Committee is somewhat scarred by the experience of the very unilateral nature of the extradition agreement with the United States. There is certainly still a perception that the US is not a very equal partner in bilateral treaties, in that it takes what it wants but gives very little or nothing in return. It was in that vein that in a debate on 6 December 2007 the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, described a bilateral assistance deal with the US as unilateral. In that spirit, I have several questions for the Minister. What are the rights of access to data held or the rights of correction and deletion? Are they included? Are the rights expressly guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU data protection directive?

At the time the EU’s agreement was made, Statewatch concluded that there were no effective data protection provisions worth speaking of and that there was nothing to ensure that the considerable body of EU data protection legislation was respected. What right of access is available for people to find out what data about them have been shared and stored, and what guarantees are in place to ensure the proper protection of those data? How many parties are they shared with once they arrive in the United States, and does the deal include any protocol for the deletion of data supplied to the US authorities at any time in the future, or are they simply kept indefinitely?

The Minister mentioned that the Secretary of State would have within his discretion the power to refuse a request. Can he give any examples of when he would be likely to refuse such a request? The Minister said on 6 December, in the debate to which I referred, that it is very unusual that this matter has come to light and that it is something that we cannot talk about in detail because it involves criminal action. He then went on to talk about the volume of requests, which I think was 5,000 to the UK each year. I wonder what volume of requests we make to the United States. What is the balance of requests made and received? Can he give any idea of the balance of requests that are likely to be granted?

I thank noble Lords for those points. The noble Viscount is right that this is a technical amendment. It is much more constrained than the noble Baroness thinks. It is important to remember that once this designation order comes into force—there are a number of countries in Europe where it will also be coming into force—it will allow orders to be sought only where they relate to a person who is the subject of a US investigation into a criminal offence. It will not cover every citizen coming to the UK. It is much more constrained. The information we are talking about is very precise: a bank account number and details or the name of the person holding that bank account. The order covers a specific area that is being looked at.

The large amounts of data being asked for do not relate to this order as it is not in force as yet. We do not think there will be that many requests under this order, but we think it is right because once they have signed it off, we will have an agreement covering every country in the EU. The EU and the US have now signed up, so clearly we need to be part of that. We think the order makes sense because if we are conducting a criminal investigation against a person, it is important to be able to get information about his bank account, if it is held somewhere else.

This order is much more restricted than the noble Baroness thinks. I know her concern about the amount of data that can be pulled out and used. This order is much more technical and specific. Her fears and concerns are unfounded in this case. They often are in the other cases, but in this case they certainly are, because the order is much more focused.

The noble Baroness asked if I could think of an example of requests that the Secretary of State could refuse. I find it difficult to think of an example because the order is so narrow. It would be strange if a request for data about some details about the bank accounts of someone being investigated was refused. I cannot easily think of a specific case where that would occur. However, it is right that the protection is there just in case there is an occasion to stop the sort of thing that the noble Baroness has fears about. If I have not answered all the questions that were asked, I will get back in writing on them when I have looked at Hansard.

I thank the Minister for his reassurances. We on these Benches appreciate the need to tackle globalised crime in a globalised world. However, if the criminal investigation finds that the person is innocent, are his data deleted?

I do not know the details on that, but I will get back to the noble Baroness in writing.

I should say something about the totality of requests on all sorts of things, and we are talking about 4,000 or so requests from the US, but they are not in this tiny area where nothing has happened yet. I would see the number as very small indeed. I commend the order to the Committee.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

The Committee adjourned at 6.04 pm.