Relevant documents: 8th and 11th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee
The proceedings were conducted in a Virtual Committee via video call.
My Lords, this Virtual Committee will now begin. I remind Members that these proceedings are subject to parliamentary privilege and what we say is available to the public both in Hansard and to those listening and watching.
I shall begin by setting out how these proceedings will work. This Virtual Committee will operate as far as possible like a Grand Committee. A participants’ list for today’s proceedings has been published. I also have lists of Members who have put their names to the amendments, or expressed an interest in speaking, in each group. I will call Members to speak in the order listed in my brief, which Members should have received. Members’ microphones will be muted by the broadcasters except when I call a Member to speak and whenever a Question is put, so interventions during speeches are not possible and uncalled speakers will not be heard.
During the debate on each group I will invite Members to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister. I will call Members to speak in order of request and will call the Minister to reply each time. Debate will take place on the lead amendment in each group only; the groupings are binding and it will not be possible to degroup an amendment for separate debate. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. Whenever I put the Question, all Members’ microphones will be opened until I give the result. Members should be aware that any sound made at that point may be broadcast. If a Member intends to say “Not content” to an amendment, it will greatly assist the Chair if they make this clear when speaking on the group. As in Grand Committee, it takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not content”, an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content”, a clause stands part.
I shall now put the Question that Clause 1 stand part of the Bill. All microphones will be open until I give the result.
Clause 1 agreed.
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 1. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put made that clear in debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee; this Committee cannot divide.
Clause 2: Implementation of other agreements on private international law
1: Clause 2, page 2, line 27, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“( ) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed at Lugano on 30th October 2007 (the “2007 Lugano Convention”), in the event that the United Kingdom becomes a party to the Convention in its own right.”
My Lords, the effect of the three amendments in this group—Amendments 1, 4 and 5—is that the power in Clause 2 which allows a Minister by regulations to change the law of the United Kingdom to reflect an international treaty on private international law that the country has entered into would be restricted to the Lugano convention only.
It is perhaps sensible if, in addressing the three amendments in this first group, I set out the context, in effect, of most of my amendments in Committee. Clause 1 introduces into the domestic law of the UK the content of three private international law treaties: one dealing with the abduction of children from one country to another; one dealing with the enforcement of child support and family maintenance orders; and one dealing with commercial agreements where a choice of court clause is specified in the agreement. The effect of bringing these three conventions into UK law is that the terms of those conventions become part of our domestic law and are what our courts then give effect to as part of the law. For example, the Hague abduction treaty means that where a couple bring up a child in one country, where there is custody with one parent, and that child is abducted by the other parent to another country—for example, the UK—then, according to that convention, the UK courts, as a matter of domestic law, should return the child to its normal place of residence and should refuse to do so only if there is fear for the child’s safety.
These private international law agreements change the law of the country as a result of agreements that the Executive have entered into. We on these Benches have no objection to those three treaties being brought into domestic law—this is a piece of primary legislation—but we have very considerable objections to Clause 2, and our primary position is that it should not stand part of the Bill. It allows the Government to change the law of the country by delegated legislation, even by changing primary legislation, to give effect to agreements that they have entered into in private international law.
Our objections are, in effect, threefold. First, as a matter of constitutional propriety, this is wrong. It is wrong that there should be such little accountability by Parliament in respect of potentially very significant changes in the law. In support of that principled constitutional objection, I have the support of the Constitution Committee, which is chaired by my noble friend Lady Taylor, the Delegated Powers Committee, which is chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the chair of the Treaties Sub-Committee, my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith. All see this as a matter of constitutional impropriety.
In the face of that unanimity of view about what is a constitutionally improper thing to do, what is the Government’s justification for doing this? I have scanned carefully the two speeches by the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland, Lord Keen of Elie, at Second Reading about why this move is justifiable. He gave no general explanation in either speech. He acknowledged in his opening speech that there might be an issue about the Lugano convention, which deals with the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between, among other things, members of the European Union. He said that we might end up in a situation where we want to join the Lugano convention, that we have to do it before the end of the transition period, and that we would negotiate it only at the very end of the period. He said that because of those exceptional circumstances there should be power to join the Lugano convention by delegated legislation.
For that reason—and that is the only example given —we have tabled, by way of probing amendments, Amendments 1, 4 and 5, which restrict the power to the Lugano Convention because of those special circumstances. There is a live debate about whether the UK should join the Lugano Convention, and in his speech at Second Reading the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, set out the shortcomings of the convention.
My preference is that we delete Clause 2 altogether and that, if the Government of the day join an international convention that has effects on our domestic law, that should be approved only by primary legislation. It is said that private international law is a “narrow” and “specialist” topic. The complex rules surrounding it can be both narrow and technical, but they deal with hugely important issues that affect everybody, such as family life, consumer, personal injury and international trade issues. That the law is complex does not mean that the issues covered are not of real significance.
I invite noble Lords to consider whether they wish to restrict Clause 2 only to the Lugano Convention, but that is in the wider context of urging them not to allow the Government this wholly inappropriate power, never used previously and for which no proper justification has been given. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the observations so powerfully made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I too am concerned about the width of Clause 2. My concern arises from the discussions and conclusions of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, serving under the distinguished chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, the committee concluded that Clause 2 raises matters of considerable constitutional concern. The concern is that, with the exception of EU law—from which we are in the process of extracting ourselves—it is a fundamental principle of our constitution that international agreements can change the content of our domestic law only if and when they are given force by an Act of Parliament. The Constitution Committee saw no justification for the change that Clause 2 would introduce—that is, to confer on Ministers a power to achieve such a result by statutory instrument.
We recognise that many of the international agreements to which Clause 2 would apply are technical in nature and that their text cannot be changed after negotiations have concluded; nevertheless, we think there is no justification for allowing our law to be changed by statutory instrument without the need for full parliamentary debate. Clause 2 will allow not just for the implementation of the text of the international agreement but for “consequential, supplementary, incidental” provisions. It will allow Ministers to create new criminal offences by statutory instrument. These are matters requiring detailed scrutiny of a Bill through the various stages of the parliamentary process, during which amendments can be debated and, if necessary, divided on. Members of the Constitution Committee are concerned to maintain ministerial accountability to Parliament. This is not emergency legislation; it is a proposal for a permanent shift in power to the Executive.
The question raised by these amendments is whether there is a case for making an exception in relation to the Lugano Convention. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, indicated that his preference is for removing Clause 2 altogether, but there may be a case for Lugano as an exception. Lugano provides a large measure of certainty on which countries’ courts may hear a civil or commercial cross-border dispute and ensures that the resulting judgment can be recognised and enforced across borders. It is far from perfect, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, indicated during a powerful speech at Second Reading. However, it provides a large measure of certainty—though not complete certainty because, happily for lawyers, disputes arise. I declare an interest as a practising barrister. Last July, I argued a case in the Court of Appeal for four days on the meaning of two of the Lugano Convention provisions.
The United Kingdom cannot accede to Lugano at the end of the transition period without the agreement of the EU and the other signatory states: Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. My understanding is that, in the Bill, we cannot implement Lugano into domestic law for the period after the transition period. A delegated power may be needed in this case because there may be an urgent requirement to address the matter for commercial certainty. It seems that a delegated power to implement Lugano is much less objectionable than the current content of Clause 2 because Lugano has been part of our law for more than 10 years and serves a valuable function.
Finally, if the Minister wishes to proceed with Clause 2 in its current form—notwithstanding the objections that he has heard and will hear during the debate—I hope and expect that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, would want to test the opinion of the House on Report. I therefore ask the Minister for an assurance that there is no question of a Report stage on this Bill that includes Clause 2, at least in its current form, until arrangements can be made to ensure a vote by remote access for all Peers.
My Lords, I am sympathetic to the context set out so eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
At the outset, I seek clarification on a question similar to that put by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As the Deputy Speaker set out, it appears that we can debate only those amendments that form the first amendment of each group and that we are unable to have clause stand part debates. If my understanding is correct, does that mean that we cannot debate and subsequently vote on a clause stand part debate, as the thrust of Amendment 1 seemingly seeks the ability to do? It would be helpful to have that clarification.
As has been expressed so far, it appears that the purpose behind Clause 2 relates to the Lugano convention. Does it have implications for the Brussels II recast, if not also for the Brussels I recast convention? I entirely endorse the comments that have already been made about the importance of the Lugano convention, particularly to those in the UK who wish to obtain judgments and orders in the UK but also to those across the EU 27. This gives individual citizens and businesses the right to make concrete their desire to ensure that judgments obtained anywhere in Europe will remain readily enforceable in the UK and the EU 27. It facilitates trade and a level playing field and affects inward investment in the whole of Europe. It avoids competing jurisdictions, which I think we all want to avoid, and is central to protecting workers’ rights and consumer protection under insurance policies, which I hope we are all signed up to.
I have some short questions for my noble and learned friend in the context of Amendment 1 and the original Clause 2. What steps is he taking to enforce the terms that are similar to the Brussels II recast convention to give them effect? Have they been set in motion? What stage are we at with the EU 27 regarding matrimonial matters?
I understand, as set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that we are leaving agreement to join the Lugano convention until the 11th hour of the 11th day—literally right on the deadline of our leaving the European Union and terminating the transitional arrangements. Why are we leaving it so late in the day? Have soundings already been taken as to the likelihood of the EU and EFTA member states agreeing our application to join the Lugano convention, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord? On balance, I would say that Lugano was a good thing to join.
Do the original Clause 2 and the Bill as currently drafted intend to give effect to not just the Lugano convention but the Brussels II recast convention? Can my noble and learned friend confirm my understanding that we would not in any way be conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Union but only giving weight to the relevant decisions, as we are currently obliged to do under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and common law?
It may help the noble Baroness if I answer the procedural question she put at the beginning of her speech. It is possible for the Virtual Committee to debate every clause stand part question—indeed, each clause has to be stood part in this procedure—but it is not possible to vote on that at this stage. If that will be required at a later stage, voting can take place. I hope that she finds that helpful.
My Lords, as I understand it, the amendments in this group have two aims: to curb the overbroad power to implement relevant international agreements by regulation, and to signal in primary legislation that there is no objection to giving the force of law to the Lugano convention. I support the first, which is furthered by other groups of amendments, and am sympathetic to the second. However, for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Mance at Second Reading on the interrelationship between Lugano and the 2019 Hague Convention, there seems to be a question of whether we should sign up immediately to Lugano, even if the EU gives its consent, which is perhaps not a given. I would welcome the Minister’s considered comments on that.
It was good to hear the Minister say at Second Reading that the United Kingdom, should we become a party to Lugano, could drive for its amendment so as to incorporate into it the material improvements that as an EU member state we did so much to help deliver in the form of the recast Brussels regulation. Speaking as a practitioner—I declare an interest as a practising barrister—and as a former member of the EU Justice Sub-Committee, with some awareness in both capacities of the defects of the Lugano convention, I suggest that we not only could do so but should do so.
My Lords, the arguments put forward by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer seem utterly compelling and are supported not only by every speaker in this debate so far but also by the Constitution Committee, chaired, as he said, by my noble friend Lady Taylor.
My aim in speaking is not to contribute to the specific discussion on the amendment, though I think it is overwhelming, but to comment on the Virtual Proceedings, because understanding what happens in this Committee will be hugely important to how we take forward both the Virtual Proceedings and hybrid proceedings afterwards. I hope that I can be permitted to comment on what is happening, as I will at later stages of our discussions, because this will be so important to the Procedure Committee in deciding how to take forward our proceedings hereafter. Of course, the noble Lords and the officials doing that will read the record; it is important to have in Hansard what is happening at these key stages.
I want to make three points that have occurred to me already. First, it is not clear to people taking part in these proceedings who exactly is in the Committee. At the moment I can see only a handful of faces. After the Deputy Speaker calls people to speak, they suddenly appear from nowhere on my screen. It is very pleasant to see them appearing but it is not at all clear who will appear next. I cannot see the Minister at all; I assume that he is in the Committee, but that is not evident on the screen. My second key point is that is it a bit haphazard as to whether people can be followed, depending on the quality of audio and visual equipment.
Thirdly, I flag up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about Report. My understanding is that it will be possible to table amendments exactly as tabled in Committee on Report, because we cannot vote in Committee—a hugely important point. In the discussion in the Chamber last week about how Report would be handled, the Leader of the House and my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition gave an almost categorical undertaking that we would not have Report until we had a hybrid House, so that it is possible for Members to participate in the Chamber and we can have the usual cut and thrust that we have in the Chamber, particularly when we are dealing with legislation and technical points.
I simply make the point that, from my observation of proceedings so far, it is essential that Report takes place in the Chamber and we should not have Report for this highly important Bill until it is possible to have the hybrid proceedings in operation.
My Lords, I support the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. At Second Reading, I described this Bill as, by its own lights, a sensible measure, but said that its lights were rather dimmer than the halogen welcome given to it by the Explanatory Notes. I took some issue with Clause 2. The reality is that we are grasping in the half-light for whatever instruments we can find to replace the full toolkit of the Brussels regulations—including I and II, to which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, referred—which were in existence when we were members of the EU. This has been apparent ever since the House of Lords European Union Committee’s 17th Report of Session 2016-17, Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses?
In some areas, such as divorce jurisdiction, there seems to be simply no substitute in sight. In others, Clause 1 identifies three limited instruments, each in its own right very sensible. The second, the Hague choice of court convention, would protect the exclusive choice of court clauses in favour of UK courts, which are so important to the United Kingdom’s financial and business markets. The protection would be increased if the UK also signed up to the 2019 Hague Convention, which my noble friend Lord Anderson referred to and the Explanatory Notes mention as a possibility.
The Explanatory Notes also highlight an evidently recent executive decision to sign up to the 2007 Lugano Convention. At present, that is a second-best convention that applies only to Norway, Iceland and Switzerland faute de mieux. What is proposed is to extend it to govern our relationship with EU states in place of the first-choice Brussels regulations regime. The Explanatory Notes do not mention that joining Lugano would deprive the UK of almost all the benefits otherwise expected from ratifying the Hague choice of court convention 2007, as well as any from ratifying the 2019 Hague Convention. That is because Lugano would trump these conventions as regards all EU states. The only other states that have ratified Lugano in the last 13 years of its existence are Mexico in 2007, Singapore in 2016 and Montenegro in 2018. Unless the Hague choice of court convention 2007 therefore applies against EU states, adherence to it has at present almost negligible value.
Secondly, Lugano is a much less satisfactory regime than either the Hague choice of court convention or the current Brussels regime. It lacks key aspects of the recast Brussels regime, as has already been mentioned. These date from the recast in 2012. For example, it does not protect arbitration satisfactorily but, most fundamentally, it has a strict lis pendens rule, according to which automatic priority is given to any court first seized within a European state, however inappropriate that court is to decide the question. This is particularly apt. It is misused to displace and disrupt agreed choice of court clauses pointing to other courts, such as the London courts. That is the so-called Italian torpedo, named after an Italian professor who, very frankly, gave it in the light of the use of the tactic by the commencement of proceedings in Italy to frustrate in particular intellectual property cases brought elsewhere in the EU.
Thirdly, there is no recognition in Lugano of any interests that third countries might have. For example, a New York exclusive choice of court clause is ignored, it appears, under Lugano. That is not the case under Brussels as recast. Finally, it lacks the key provision in the 2019 Hague Convention that entitles courts to refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment given in breach of any choice of court clause. It might be that one day Lugano will be reformed, as has been mentioned, but that has not happened in 13 years. If we join it, one must hope that that happens quickly.
In my Second Reading speech I saw the question of whether Lugano would trump the Hague Conventions of 2007 and 2019 as a matter of choice or sequencing, but subsequent research leads me to conclude that, as a matter of public international law, Lugano will always prevail, in whatever sequence the UK might choose to ratify these conventions. The inconsistency between them is therefore axiomatic: once you adhere to Lugano, it trumps the other conventions whenever you adhere.
It may be that all the implications of signing up to Lugano have been thought through, but it may not be. It is an important decision—the sort on which Parliament should have a direct, primary say. That is the basic objection, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has mentioned, to the whole of Clause 2. The objection has been persuasively reinforced by the reports mentioned, in particular the Constitution Committee’s report I referred to. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act does not answer the objection relating to Clause 2, the CRaG process being described by the Constitution Committee as “limited and flawed”.
The same objection also grounds the current batch of amendments, although they treat Lugano as an exception. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has discussed the reasons why Lugano might be regarded as an exception and they really amount to this: the end of the implementation period is now nigh, and, if Lugano is held to be a good thing, then t’were well t’were done quickly. As regards other measures, apart from Lugano, none is or can be identified as having anything like that urgency, and Clause 2 simply goes too far. Direct parliamentary legislation is possible and appropriate, especially, as has been pointed out, in the light of the various subsidiary provisions and the width of the discretion.
That is also how matters have proceeded in the past. International conventions are agreed and signed but have no domestic effect without domestic legislation. The domestic legislation normally needs putting into place before any ratification at international level. That is how matters proceeded with treaties generally before CRaG and would, apart from the Bill, doubtless proceed after CRaG—to take two examples, with the Carriage by Air Act 1961 and the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965. I could give noble Lords the sequence, but it would take too much time. Those are conventions with provisions going beyond private international law, an aspect to which I will revert. But that is not the present point.
The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 provides an example that follows that sequence and relates exclusively to private international law, which gives effect to the Brussels regime at the moment. The UK, after lengthy negotiations, signed a convention—the original Brussels convention—dated 9 October 1978, which provided for its accession to the convention regime. The Act giving domestic effect to that decision was dated 13 July 1982, and the UK ratified the convention only one to two years later. In the ordinary course, domestic legislation of a primary nature would precede ratification at an international level.
The Explanatory Notes mention two other measures: the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. Those are confined measures with nothing like the width of delegated power in Clause 2. They are confined to recognition and enforcement of judgments, first in Her Majesty’s overseas jurisdictions and, secondly, in similar courts in other foreign countries. They do not cover jurisdiction or co-operation or have anything like the width of the present Clause 2
In summary, leaving aside Lugano, it is implausible for the Government to suggest that either speed or reputational risk requires, for the first time in history, so unlimited—not only in width but in time, as there is no sunset clause—a delegated legislative power to implement any such future private international law measure agreed at the international level. Such measures normally take years to agree, and often years thereafter to ratify and implement domestically, and no one holds that against any particular country.
The international scene is in fact littered with conventions that have achieved little or no ratification or domestic implementation. The 2019 Hague Convention itself, to which the Explanatory Notes refer, dated 2 July 2019, as yet has only two signatories, Uruguay and Ukraine. Not even alphabetical consistency has been sufficient to persuade the UK to yet add its signature, and ratification and domestic implementation lie well ahead.
I therefore suggest that the Government should think again about the desirability of dealing with important, even if technical matters, in the manner proposed indefinitely by Clause 2. In the present context in particular, that means in respect of any measure going beyond Lugano.
My Lords, I have added my name to the objection to Clause 2 standing part of the Bill, to be moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for all the reasons that he gave, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others. That will be addressed in more detail in group 6, later today.
As has been said, this amendment is a limited version of the removal of Clause 2, permitting the Lugano convention to be implemented. Indeed, the Lugano convention was cited at Second Reading by the Minister as a reason for taking this power to implement international conventions by regulation. He confirmed at Second Reading the Government’s intention to implement the Lugano convention.
In the Government’s response to the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the Minister claimed that the urgency of implementing Lugano is such that it could not be done in time for the end of the transition period. He is supported in that by the briefing of the Bar Council for this Committee stage, which wants to see the convention implemented as part of domestic law before the end of the transition period. Indeed, it mounts a powerful argument for that. However, I am not convinced.
For my part, I would prefer to see Clause 2 removed in its entirety, because there should be no reason why the Government cannot lay primary legislation before the House before implementing Lugano. Even given the difficulties of Virtual Proceedings and the hybrid Parliament, provided that we could vote, it could be done. That would be the correct way to do it, and it would allow for proper and informed debate on the Lugano convention, which, at the moment, we are to be denied.
At Second Reading, as he has today, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, stressed the importance of the English choice of jurisdiction clauses in commercial contracts of many types to the status of London as a legal centre and to the status and recognition of English commercial law, which contributes not just to London lawyers but to London’s centrality to the global commercial system. The recognition and enforcement of English jurisdiction clauses is under threat as a result of our leaving the European Union and losing the protection of the 2012 Brussels recast regulation.
As the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, the problem—along with other problems with the Lugano convention, to which he has drawn attention, both at Second Reading and today—is that that convention does not replicate Brussels recast, in a number of ways. He has drawn attention to the “Italian torpedo”, whereby a choice of court clause can be overridden by subsequent litigation commenced in defiance of an English jurisdiction clause. He has also drawn attention to the advantage of the 2019 Hague Convention, coupled with the 2019 choice of court convention, to which we could sign up. The particular relevant advantage is that, under the 2019 convention, courts may refuse to recognise a judgment given in a contracting state if that judgment breaches a choice of court clause. If we sign up to Lugano as it stands then, even if we later signed up to the 2019 Hague Convention, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, pointed out, Lugano would trump that protection.
All things considered, there is clearly a difficult balance to be drawn between getting the immediate advantages of Lugano with its provisions on jurisdiction recognition and enforcement, and sacrificing the very important English choice of jurisdiction clauses. The very fact that there is a difficult balance to be struck is an argument for primary legislation. Giving the Government the power to make that decision without proper public debate, widespread consultation and full parliamentary consideration is dangerous. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that Lugano by itself is less objectionable than Clause 2 in its unlimited generality, but the fact that the clause, even as amended, deprives us of an opportunity for debate, is an example of why it is so pernicious.
Before closing, I would ask the Minister to indicate to us where we are on our application to join Lugano, where we are on securing the necessary consent of the European Union to our joining Lugano, and where we are on European Union states joining Lugano. These can be added to the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, because it seems to me that it would be very difficult indeed to agree to this amendment without going down the route advocated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and removing Clause 2 altogether, until we have clear answers to these questions from the Minister justifying the urgency as well as justification to support the decision taken in principle to join Lugano.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. I shall of course speak to each of the amendments, Amendments 1, 4 and 5. When taken together, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, observed, they have the effect of restricting the power to implement international private law agreements contained in Clause 2 in the 2007 Lugano Convention. But they not only limit the power of the United Kingdom to implement private international law agreements in this way, they also restrict our ability to mirror any such arrangements as between the United Kingdom’s different legal jurisdictions, and indeed as between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.
Of course we accept, as we have previously, that the most pressing need for the power is in relation to the Lugano convention itself. Our application to rejoin the convention as an independent contracting party was made on 8 April—
We appear to have lost the noble and learned Lord the Minister. Is he still with us?
I think that I am coming back. I apologise, but something happened on the computer.
We have made the application and it is hoped that, subject to agreement, we will be able to rejoin the Lugano convention from the end of the transition period.
I will pause to notice some of the observations made by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with reference to Brussels Ia and IIa restated. My noble friend asked in a number of ways what steps we are taking with regard to what she termed the Brussels convention and what progress is being made on that matter. I think we have to remind ourselves that Brussels Ia and IIa do not form an international convention; they are internal instruments of the EU to which you may be a party only if you are a member of the EU. We of course have the transition period during which we enjoy the benefits of Brussels Ia and IIa until the end of the year, but there is no basis on which we can be members of Brussels, as was suggested, after the end of the transition period. That is why we are concerned to apply for membership of Lugano.
With regard to a number of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, of course I readily acknowledge that Lugano is not as well developed in a number of respects as the Brussels Ia and IIa restated provisions. We are well aware of that. We would hope to advance Lugano once we are a member, but we have to acknowledge that it is not on a par with Brussels Ia and IIa.
However, Lugano is not the only potential use of the power in Clause 2. For instance, Amendment 1 would prevent us joining two other private international law agreements on which the Government are currently considering their position. They are the Singapore convention on mediation and the Hague judgments convention of 2019. I will return to the latter in a moment because it has been mentioned before.
With regard to the Singapore convention, I have shared with noble Lords a copy of an exemplar statutory instrument to demonstrate the sorts of agreements that we may wish to implement under the Clause 2 power. While the final decision on joining that convention is still to be taken, I invite noble Lords to look at that exemplar statutory instrument when considering the ways this power might be used. The instrument contains what are, essentially, technical implementing regulations for a treaty agreed at the level of international law. The choice for this House and the other place at the point of implementation is about not the specific provisions of an agreement, but whether to approve the United Kingdom’s implementation of the whole agreement in domestic law.
Beyond those two examples of private international law agreements which already exist, and which the UK is considering joining, we are actively engaged in work through the Hague conference to develop rules on jurisdiction in international civil and commercial cases. The global arena of private international law is constantly developing. We have been active in it in the past, and hope and intend to take a leading role in the future.
Restricting the scope of the Clause 2 power in the way envisaged by this amendment would, I suggest, prevent the United Kingdom implementing any future agreements in a timely manner. That would in turn delay the benefit of those agreements to citizens and businesses. I regard that as an unsatisfactory position, given that in many cases there is considerable advantage to be gained from such international co-operation in the area of private international law. It would also mean that primary legislation will be needed to insert into a schedule to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 the text of the United Kingdom’s declarations and reservations in relation to the 2005 Hague Convention and the 2007 Hague Convention, in the absence of which the terms of the United Kingdom’s accession to those agreements will be far less accessible to users.
I also point out that it will mean that the definition of “relevant international agreement”, as used in subsections (2) and (3), and presently defined in subsection (7) by cross-reference back to subsection (1), will be unclear. That term is also used in Schedule 6 and defined by cross-reference back to Clause 2. In addition, the way that Amendment 1 has been drafted would not in practice allow us to make implementing regulations in advance of becoming a contracting party but only after joining. In that respect, I venture that it is defectively drafted because, essentially, one has to take these things in a particular order.
I turn to Amendment 4. As drafted, Clause 2(2) allows the terms of an international agreement, subject to suitable modifications, to be applied between United Kingdom jurisdictions: for example, between England and Scotland. Amendment 4 seeks to restrict this power to allow for only the Lugano convention to be applied in this way. International agreements on private international law would not ordinarily apply between the United Kingdom’s three jurisdictions because such agreements apply only between contracting parties and it is the United Kingdom Government, not their separate jurisdictions, who join international agreements. Although the relationship between the different parts of the union are perhaps far deeper than they are between foreign jurisdictions and ourselves, it often means that the rules between different UK jurisdictions need to be detailed and bespoke. Applying the same rules between United Kingdom jurisdictions that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will, not invariably but very often, be desirable. For example, it could reduce the number of sets of rules that courts need to apply in cases raising cross-border issues, making them more efficient and easier for courts, lawyers and litigants to understand. It would also mean that intra-UK private international law rules are at least as effective and up to date as the rules applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(2) allows for such keeping pace but would be exercised only if the relevant jurisdictions agree that it is beneficial to do so.
These sorts of arrangements are not without precedent. All three UK jurisdictions already apply rules that mirror the EU Brussels 1A regulation on jurisdiction for cross-border cases and much of the EU maintenance regulation as between themselves. The fact that, thanks to Schedule 4 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, a modified version of the Brussels 1A rules is applied to cases between Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales means that there might be limited prima facie rationale for suggesting that we replace this with the application of the rules under the Lugano convention. The rules are already substantially similar.
However, in addition, the amendment that I referred to has an altogether more significant deficiency. By limiting the intra-UK application of private international law agreements to the Lugano convention, the amendment may well result in the perverse situation in which the intra-UK rules are out of step, out of date and less effective than those governing the relationship between all three of these jurisdictions and a foreign jurisdiction. If the amendment were accepted, separate primary legislation would be needed to achieve this, potentially resulting in the intra-UK rules being less effective and less comprehensive than the rules that we apply with foreign jurisdictions until such primary legislation was passed.
Perhaps I may give an example. If the United Kingdom decided in future to join a new private international law agreement dealing with cross-border cases regarding children, the inability to implement that agreement between the UK’s jurisdictions at the same time as implementing an agreement between the UK and foreign jurisdictions could lead to families finding it more difficult to resolve disputes where parents live in, say, Northern Ireland and England than where one parent lives in the United Kingdom and the other in a foreign country. That would be a very strange outcome.
Amendment 5 has an effect similar to that of Amendment 4 in that it seeks to restrict the ability, under the Clause 2 power, for the United Kingdom to enter into arrangements with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that mirror, subject to suitable modifications, the provisions of a private international law agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party. As I explained in relation to Amendment 4, the UK Government are the contracting party to international agreements on private international law. As such, these agreements would not ordinarily apply as between the United Kingdom and one of the Crown dependencies or overseas territories.
However, as with the relationships between the different legal jurisdictions of the UK, applying the same rules between the UK and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will sometimes be desirable. It can ensure that the relationships between the various members of the wider UK family can be at least as effective and up to date as those applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(3), as presently drafted, allows for such keeping pace but only if the relevant territorial Government agree that it is beneficial to do so.
I submit that this builds on a significant body of precedent. Both the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 enable the Government, via Order in Council, to recognise and enforce civil and commercial judgments from the Crown dependencies and overseas territories where reciprocal arrangements have been entered into with them. Furthermore, Section 39 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 enables the Government, by Order in Council, to apply a modified version of the Brussels 1968 convention between the United Kingdom and a Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, an order was made in respect of Gibraltar in 1997 to do exactly that: applying a modified version of this convention to relations between the UK and Gibraltar—an arrangement that sustains to this day.
The United Kingdom having the ability to implement arrangements based on the 2007 Lugano Convention between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories may well hold value if the UK does succeed in becoming a participant in that convention. However, limiting this ability to implement private international law arrangements with the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories only to those based on the Lugano convention would result in the intra-UK family rules in other areas of private international law simply failing to keep pace with future developments. Primary legislation would need to be brought forward each and every time the United Kingdom wanted to mirror the provisions of a private international law agreement as between itself and one of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, which I suggest would be a wholly disproportionate requirement.
It might also be helpful for me to point out at this stage that my consultation has extended to the Attorney-Generals and Governments of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, who are all supportive of the Bill in this form. From this engagement, there is clear support for the intentions of the Bill, including this power to implement such mirroring arrangements with them where it is of mutual benefit to do so.
As I have noted before, the immense value of private international law agreements is not limited to the Lugano convention, and private international law is an area of productive international co-operation and activity. Such productivity will continue, and we would expect future agreements to build further and deeper levels of co-operation.
I submit that it is in the UK’s interests to implement private international law agreements in domestic law and mirror those arrangements, with appropriate modifications, as between the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and as between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, without the delay that would inevitably arise if primary legislation were required on each occasion. This power is both reasonable and proportionate. Delays to these matters would be detrimental.
I noted the point made by a number of noble Lords that the amendment is somehow seen as a subsidiary amendment to the desire to remove Clause 2 entirely from the Bill. However, taking these amendments as they stand, I submit that they would have a detrimental effect on our ability to take forward our agreements with regard to private international law, both as regards foreign jurisdictions and the position intra-UK with the other jurisdictions and with the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories. In these circumstances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
I will add one further point. I was asked about a procedural issue by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, regarding Report and Clause 2. Clearly, that will be for the relevant authorities to determine. However, my understanding is that we will not take these matters to Report unless and until there is the ability for the House to vote on them, whether by being present in the Chamber or by means of remote voting. I understand, but cannot give any undertakings in this regard, that steps are being taken to consider remote voting, just as these matters have been addressed in the other place.
Again, I thank noble Lords for their submissions to the debate but ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the following noble Lords indicated a wish to speak after the Minister: the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. I shall call them in that order and ask the Minister to respond to each of them in turn.
I had not intended to intervene at this stage. However, since this, is or ought to be, very similar to Committee if we were sitting in the Chamber, I hope that Members will understand why I do so. It is not to deal with questions that the Minister raised about Crown dependencies and overseas territories—although he answered the question that I had intended to ask later on, on other amendments, so that will shorten the debate later—nor indeed about the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. Again, that will be dealt with in subsequent amendments and I can come back to that during that debate.
I want to say two things. First, I agree totally with what my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said; that will surprise neither him nor the Minister. Secondly, the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, made important points, which the Minister just touched on. As the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said, we should note the significance of this being the first Committee stage of a Bill that we have held virtually. It is very important that we see that it operates properly.
As it happens, two members of the Procedure Committee are in this debate: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and me. At the committee’s last meeting, we asked for a report on the workings of this Committee stage—that is, how it will proceed. At its next meeting, the committee will discuss the procedure for virtual voting. If my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer hopes to divide the House on Report, as he indicated—I hope that he will—that cannot be done without virtual voting. It would be improper and unconstitutional for that to take place. My noble friend Lord Adonis should be reassured by that.
Finally, I hope that the Minister will treat this Committee stage just as he treats Committee stages on the Floor of the House—that is, take account of what has been said, be prepared for a challenge on these issues on Report and bear all this is mind before bringing the Bill in its present form back on Report. I hope he takes note of that.
My Lords, I of course am listening to the contributions made to the debate in Committee and will take account of the observations that have been made. I make no comment on the procedural issues that the noble Lord raised.
My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for his full answer to the concerns that were raised. Perhaps I misunderstood his response, but I think that the thrust of the interventions of noble Lords—nearly to a man and a woman—was that it is inappropriate to seek to put into UK law by delegated secondary legislation a new treaty that the Minister and the Government seek to sign. The thrust of the remarks was that it should require primary legislation. Have I misunderstood my noble and learned friend on that point? Why are the Government resisting the usual procedure of agreeing to implement anything that has been agreed by the Government by way of international treaty through primary legislation?
First, let me make it clear that I do not accept that it is an invariable constitutional practice that the implementation in domestic law of an international law treaty is undertaken by way of primary legislation only. Secondly, when it comes to the implementation of a treaty that has been entered into at the level of international law, the purpose of drawing it down into domestic law is either to accept it into domestic law or not to accept it into domestic law. There is no scope for amending the terms of the treaty that has already been entered into. Therefore, the use of the affirmative statutory instrument procedure is considered appropriate. It gives this House and the other place ample opportunity to debate whether they should draw down the treaty obligations into domestic law. There is, essentially, no real scope for amendment; therefore, we consider the affirmative procedure perfectly adequate for that purpose.
I have just a few points to raise with the Minister. At one point, he said that the first amendment would prevent us joining two other measures, the Singapore mediation convention and the 2019 Hague Convention. It is too easy to slip into that sort of language. What he really means is that it would prevent us joining those measures without proper parliamentary scrutiny by primary legislation.
In response to the Minister’s last point, yes or no can be a very important question, even if you cannot amend an international treaty once it is made; Lugano is a classic example. It is a difficult decision, as has been illustrated. It is also very easy to say that we would be prevented from implementing future measures in a timely manner, but there is no real evidence for that at all.
The Minister took various rather minor—if I may call them that— drafting points on, for example, the definition of related international instruments and ancillary provisions. Those would all be sorted out if the principle of the first four amendments was accepted.
On that principle, the Minister also took various points about the intra-UK relationship, suggesting that Amendments 4 and 5 raised complexity. As I see it, those amendments are perfectly simple. They ensure that the general power marches in tandem with the specific power to legislate Lugano into the intra-UK jurisdictional relationships and interrelationships with overseas territories. They are “keeping pace” amendments and there is nothing inconsistent or complicated about them.
As to the 1920 and 1933 Acts, I pointed out in my previous remarks that they are quite different, minor and limited measures relating to recognition of superior court judgments overseas, coming either from UK overseas territories or from territories with which we have reciprocal arrangements. Those judgments would have been recognised as common law by action on the judgments, which would operate as an estoppel in any event, so they are minor amendments.
It is true that the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act contained some provisions for delegated legislation in respect of, for example, Gibraltar. However, it was a piece of primary UK legislation in the first place, and it is no doubt a tribute to the quality of the UK Parliament’s consideration of that legislation if overseas territories are willing to accept that they should be legislated for on a delegated basis.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, for his further observations. I simply notice this: for the last 20 years, Parliament has had no oversight of the drawing down of these obligations into domestic law because it has been an EU competence. That has not led to any dramatic constitutional issue, as far as I am aware.
In the meantime, however, we have introduced CRaG, which means that the entering into a treaty at the level of international law is now subject to scrutiny by Parliament. After that scrutiny, the Executive can enter into the relevant treaty. Then, when it is drawn down into domestic law, the affirmative statutory instrument procedure ensures that both Houses of Parliament have an opportunity to scrutinise and debate this. There is no difficulty about that; it is the outcome that matters.
However, I notice the noble and learned Lord’s observation that there is little that can be done by way of amendment at that stage. That is why we would suggest that the affirmative procedure was a perfectly adequate mechanism, as distinct from primary legislation.
My Lords, before I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I should say that the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, have indicated their wish to speak after the Minister. I shall call them in that order after the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
My Lords, I was not suggesting—and neither, I believe, was the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh—that we can stay in Brussels recast or rejoin it after the end of the transition period. I was merely regretting the loss of the benefits of Brussels recast and pointing out that Lugano, if we joined it after the transition period ended, would not offer us comparable benefits. Apart from conceding that point, the Minister has not addressed the points made—notably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—that joining Lugano may be undesirable, and that we are deprived of the opportunity of debating that in the context of primary legislation. That, I think, is a point that he needs to address.
On that point, of course I accept that Lugano does not go as far as Brussels Ia and IIa—Brussels restated. We are all well aware of that. As regards the interplay between Lugano and the Hague Convention 2019, one has to bear in mind that Hague has not been signed or acceded to by the EU. We do not know if or when it may intend to do so. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it took the EU 10 years to sign and accede to the Hague Convention 2005. On the other hand, Lugano is there and available as a convention. A number of noble and learned Lords have acknowledged its importance in the context of private international law. Therefore, it is appropriate that we proceed with Lugano at this stage.
I took the Minister’s response to my noble friend Lord Foulkes to mean that he did not recognise the constitutional doctrine that international treaties could take effect in UK law only by primary legislation. I took him to speak of “recent precedents”. Can he tell the Committee what those recent precedents are?
I mentioned them earlier in my observations with regard to the 1920 and 1933 Acts, which, by Order in Council—not even a statutory instrument—can draw these matters down into domestic law.
An important part of the Minister’s argument is that an affirmative procedure suffices because all that Parliament is doing is approving, or not approving, an international agreement which cannot be amended. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has already made the point that this may involve very detailed and important policy questions. Can the Minister comment on a further point that, in any event, Clause 2 confers power on the Minister, not only to make regulations for the purpose of implementing the international agreement but in connection with implementation? He will know that implementing legislation often includes provisions which may be of some importance, which are not mandated by the international agreements but arise from them.
There may be discretionary decisions to be taken—for example, in relation to the creation of criminal offences. Therefore, I put to the Minister that it is not good enough to say that all Parliament is doing is implementing an international agreement which has already been negotiated and agreed. There are policy decisions that the statutory instrument will contain, and primary legislation is required so that Parliament can debate these policy choices in a proper, effective way and, if necessary, seek to amend the provisions, which are distinct from those contained within the agreement itself.
There may of course be incidental policy issues that arise when we come to draw down into domestic law an obligation, or obligations, undertaken at the level of international law. Clearly, in circumstances where there were policy choices to be made, a Government would consult upon those matters to bring forward policy choices that were acceptable to stakeholders. If they were not acceptable to Parliament, even after consultation, Parliament would not pass the affirmative SI in question. I do not accept that it is necessary in each and every instance to bring forward primary legislation for this purpose. In those exceptional cases where there may be consequential issues to be addressed, clearly they will be addressed at policy level. They will be consulted upon and the matter brought forward. The Government will not bring forward a policy proposal for an incidental measure without realising that Parliament would be prepared to accept it. That would be a pointless exercise.
This very interesting debate has raised, in effect, two substantial questions: as a matter of principle should there be the Clause 2 power at all and, if not, should we nevertheless make an exception for the Lugano convention?
First of all, should there be this power at all? In a speech that might be described as a Scottish smokescreen —because it dealt primarily with drafting issues and issues about the dependent territories and, important as those are, did not really address the principle at all—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, gave one line to justify this unprecedented power. He said that not having this power under Clause 2 would prevent implementation of any international treaty “in a timely manner”. I forgive the noble and learned Lord for putting it in such wide terms and assume he means private international law treaties only. With respect, what he says is plainly wrong.
The noble and learned Lord was given the opportunity on two occasions to provide evidence that it would prevent the implementation of private international law treaties in a timely manner, once before the Delegated Powers Committee of this House and once before the Constitution Committee. The Delegated Powers Committee said that the Ministry of Justice
“offers no empirical evidence that delay has been caused to stakeholders by late implementation of private international law agreements … The argument from delay, apart from involving unsubstantiated assertion, might justify dispensing with Acts of Parliament in other areas where governments need to legislate quickly.”
It rejected it on grounds of lack of evidence and on grounds of principle.
The Constitution Committee also looked at the very same assertion made to it, and said:
“However, the Government offers no evidence to support this argument. The UK has become a party to only 13 Hague Conventions over the course of nearly 60 years. In respect of some of the Conventions the UK has signed, full ratification and implementation has taken years to complete. The Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults … was ratified for Scotland in 2003 but has not been ratified for England and Wales or for Northern Ireland … While there may or may not be an increase in the number of PIL agreements that are made in the coming years, there is nothing to suggest that PIL agreements will be produced at a rate that would preclude implementing them via primary legislation, nor that there are exceptional circumstances so urgent that resort to a fast-track bill would be impossible. It is therefore difficult to give weight to the Government’s argument that reputational damage will result from not having the power.”
Anybody who has looked at this in detail thinks the Minister’s argument is rubbish. It is not surprising that he never mentioned it at Second Reading.
The Minister then cited occasions when it has been done before, in particular two primary Acts of Parliament: the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. Reading those is worth while. The 1920 Act refers to a provision whereby a judgment obtained in one dominion can be enforced in other dominions as long as the dominion passes a power to agree to that. The 1920 Act—the 1933 Act is the same, but not in respect of the Empire—says that if another country agrees to this convention, we can add the name of that dominion or country to the list, having approved the convention by primary legislation. The idea that those two Acts give support to the proposition that we can now import wholesale into our domestic law every international treaty we enter into is absolute nonsense. They provide no sort of precedent at all. I really hope the Minister has noted that every single person who spoke took the view that Clause 2 was inappropriate.
As far as Lugano is concerned, I thought the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, were powerful. I do not know whether they are right or wrong, but they illustrate that we need a proper debate about Lugano: we cannot just import Lugano into our law by secondary legislation. Our debates about Lugano today—which, as one speaker identified, were not answered by the Minister; we never debated Lugano, we simply debated the principle of whether Lugano could be an exception to the deletion of Clause 2—illustrate that this very important convention, about which two views prevail, should be the subject of primary legislation. Of course, I will come back to this on Report.
The important point that was made about procedure, and which is worth emphasising, is that we cannot change a Bill unless there is consent, or as a result of a Division which agrees to change that Bill. It means that we cannot proceed with legislation until we have the ability to divide on legislation, whether remotely or in person. We cannot get to the next stage of this Bill until we have the power to divide. With the permission of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 1 withdrawn.
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 2. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put made that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee: this Committee cannot divide.
2: Clause 2, page 2, line 29, leave out “relating to” and insert “that agreement exclusively relates to”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that Clause 2 shall apply only to those international agreements that exclusively relate to private international law.
My Lords, I shall try to deal with this group very quickly. It illustrates the width and uncertainty of the power given in Clause 2. Clause 2(1) states:
“The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement, as it has effect from time to time, so far as relating”.
As I understand it, if there is a treaty that relates partly to private international law and partly to other things, the Government can use regulations to implement the part that relates to private international law and make any regulations relating to that. For legal certainty, it would be much more appropriate if this power could be used only if the agreement it covers relates exclusively to private international law. That is what Amendment 2 does.
The next amendment in the group is Amendment 6. Clause 2(5) states:
“Regulations under this section may include provision about … legal aid.”
For reasons that are completely mysterious, provisions about legal aid can be made under a Bill on private international law. There should not be power under this Bill to deal with legal aid. If the Government want to make provisions about legal aid that might relate to the consequences of a private international law agreement, they should be made under legal aid legislation, not under this Bill.
Line 22 of page 3 of the Bill allows the Government, by regulation, to introduce changes to our domestic law in respect of not only agreements that have been entered into but of agreements to which we are expected to become a party. That would mean that if the Government reasonably believe they are about to sign something they can pass legislation that gives effect to it. What happens if we do not sign it? I suggest that we restrict the power to where the United Kingdom is a party to such an agreement. It would not cause a problem in relation to time. We normally sign and become a party before ratification, so the amendment would not cause any difficulties.
Amendments 10, 11, 12 and 13 would restrict the definition of private international law in a variety of ways. Currently, the definition of private international law in the Bill is not an inclusive definition but states what private international law includes but not exclusively. It says that it includes
“jurisdiction and applicable law … recognition and enforcement in one country or territory of … a judgment, order or arbitral award … an agreement, decision or authentic instrument determining or otherwise relating to rights and obligations”
and “co-operation between … countries”. First, for legal certainty reasons it should not be a definition that includes only some examples and nothing else. It should relate only to those for the purposes of legal certainty. Secondly, it should not deal with arbitral awards because if it does it will be stamping on the toes of other bits of legislation. Thirdly, when the Bill refers to
“an agreement, decision or authentic instrument determining or otherwise relating to rights and obligations”
that covers practically everything. It needs to be restricted.
The final amendment in this group relates to Clause 2(8), which allows model laws to be introduced. Model law is where a number of countries agree, for example on insolvency, that certain principles should be agreed across borders to apply to that area of law. There is no reciprocal requirement for each country to introduce the model law and it is for each country to decide how it implements a model law. Clause 2(8) would allow, for example, the UK to introduce by statutory instrument wholesale changes to our insolvency law, even though there was no reciprocity with other countries. It would be a door that opened a range of legislation on insolvency simply because some of the provisions included model laws. It is wholly inappropriate that this should be in the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, those of us who are less than happy with Clause 2 have three options: restricting it to Lugano, as we have just debated; voting to remove it altogether, as both the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee have recommended; or voting to trim its scope in a variety of respects, as the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in this and the following group seek to achieve. I welcome the amendments in this group, essentially for the reasons given by the noble and learned Lord, which there is no point in my repeating.
However, Amendment 16, which would remove the reference to model laws, is particularly important for two reasons. First, as the noble and learned Lord said, model laws are not international conventions but, as expressed by the Bar Council, collections of soft law provisions which often need to be modified substantially before being given effect in domestic law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, illustrated that very well with the example of insolvency. Secondly, model laws are not subject to the provisions of CRaG and cannot benefit from such “limited and flawed” comfort—in the words of the Constitution Committee from April 2019, repeated today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance —as may be given by the operation of its mechanisms.
That said, I incline to think that these amendments, even viewed collectively, are insufficient to meet the substantial constitutional concerns that the Constitution Committee identified in its recent report on this Bill, concerns which to my mind the Minister has not yet allayed, for example with his remarks on timing and reputational damage. That is a matter for the debate on whether Clause 2 should stand part, on which I see that a good deal of firepower has been virtually assembled and which I do not seek to pre-empt or express a final view on at this stage.
Finally, I think we all want to acknowledge the enormous efforts made by the staff of the House to ensure that debates on legislation such as this can take place in a coherent manner. I hope that I do not tempt the fates by saying that. However, I echo the comments of my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that voting on the Bill must be possible, by whatever means, when it is brought back on Report. I am grateful for the reassuring words of the Minister on that, but I would be even more grateful if he would upgrade his reassurance into an undertaking, which I think he indicated it was not.
My Lords, I am indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, for drawing my attention to the impressive eighth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, of which he is a member, and the Minister’s reply.
Any expertise I acquired in the course of my academic education in Cambridge has, I fear, slipped away. I am glad that, as a law officer, I was not particularly troubled by questions of private international law, in stark contrast to public international issues such as advising on Kosovo, Iraq, Sierra Leone, the United Nations and elsewhere. My remarks are addressed to Amendment 16 but equally apply to a lot of issues I would have raised on the stand part debate, and therefore I may be excused from repeating them when we come to that issue as the same questions arise.
Having examined the evidence in the two documents, surely the preferred course is a matter of judgment. I leave on one side the hugely impressive technical arguments we have heard during this debate. The issue is this: does one depart from the practice of 100 years of the need for primary legislation to implement a treaty or does one bow to the urgency and the apparent narrow window to implement the application of the Lugano convention before the end of the transition period? Other examples have been cited, but I do not expect that they have the same urgency as that.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, mentioned the hearing of the Justice Sub-Committee, which I used to chair, in which some rather fundamental concerns were raised about Lugano in the course of the evidence, particularly regarding family matters.
The Minister believes that proceeding by statutory instrument is necessary to implement agreements in a timely manner. That is the issue he puts before us today. The question that concerns me is, while there might be a discrete argument for dealing with issues in the way proposed during the transition period, has it occurred to Her Majesty’s Government that it might be more acceptable to put forward a much narrower clause to deal with a specific mischief such as Lugano? I agree with the spirit of the remarks made by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer.
It would be better if we had something much narrower to deal with the specific issue than the rather wide power that is now being granted to the Government. That certainly would have the attraction of being more proportionate. Failing that, my submission would be to delete Clause 2 altogether. That really would meet the harm that has been ventilated so ably in the course the debate.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, does not wish to contribute at this point. I therefore move on to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance.
My Lords, as has been pointed out, these amendments illustrate the width of the delegated power proposed. They really matter only if Amendments 1, 4 and 5 fail and Clause 2 remains in the Bill unaltered. I basically agree with all my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said and will add some comments on only some of the amendments.
On Amendment 10—replacing “includes” with “means”—Clauses 2(7) contains a quite exhaustive definition. “Includes” suggests that it is not exhaustive and that there are further things to be covered. To suggest that the definition is only partial in that way is a recipe for future doubt and argument.
Amendment 2 aims to rephrase the power
“so far as relating to private international law”
to read so far as
“that agreement exclusively relates to”
private international law. In his letter responding to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, pointed out that the Warsaw convention, governing the responsibility of international aviation carriers, and the CMR convention —he described it as the Geneva convention, but it is better known as the CMR convention—governing the liability of international road carriers each contain an individual provision relating to private international law. He went on to say that
“importantly, only those individual provisions could have been implemented under the clause 2 power in the Bill.”
That statement illustrates the reason for this amendment, because if that is how this Bill is or may be interpreted, it certainly needs amendment. It is wholly inappropriate to use this Bill to cherry pick a provision about jurisdiction, for example, or recognition of judgments out of a composite scheme, and to suggest that the Bill enables such a provision to be enacted without any context.
Take either convention. The jurisdiction provisions—who can be sued and where—make sense only in the light of the provisions regarding who can claim and who is liable. To require a consignor or consignee of goods, whether by air or by road, to sue in a particular country without incorporating the provisions that create the cause of action, and provide against whom the cause of action is, would be completely to misunderstand the scheme of such conventions. They are conceived as a composite package. Take the CMR convention—the acronym is French, but it deals with transport. The concept of a contract for the carriage of goods by road is fundamental to the operation of that convention, but it is an artificial one which may be satisfied by status and activities, such as taking over goods and the consignment note, rather than on ordinary contractual principles. If you incorporated the jurisdictional provisions, you would not incorporate the liability provisions—the two do not make sense separated.
The insertion of the words “exclusively relates to” in Clause 2(1) would ensure that it is only pure private international law agreement matters that can attract the use of the general delegated power, if that remains at all in Clause 2.
Turning to Amendment 3, I declare a potential interest as a practising arbitrator, in view of the definition in the Bill of private international law to include recognition and enforcement of an “arbitral award”.
My Lords, for information, Amendment 3 is in the next group of amendments. In this group we have Amendments 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16. I hope that that is helpful.
Yes, it is very helpful. Have I started addressing Amendment 3 by mistake? I certainly did not intend to. I want to address Amendment 11, which seeks to include the words “or arbitral award” in the definition of private international law.
As I said, I declare an interest as an arbitrator. Perhaps I might mention that, although I may not speak on this, I chair the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law, which is referred to later, in proposed Amendment 20. I assure the Committee that that committee had nothing to do with that amendment.
To go back to arbitral awards, the recognition of arbitration clauses and the enforcement of arbitral awards are matters governed by special international agreements, most notably the highly successful 1958 New York convention and the 1966 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes convention, also known as the World Bank convention. The current Brussels regime, the Lugano convention, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the 2019 Hague Convention are all extremely careful to exclude arbitration expressly. But this definition for some reason includes it. One of the virtues of the 2012 recast of Brussels 1 was to reinforce that exclusion still further. London is a world centre of arbitration, and there would be concern about any suggested intervention by delegated legislation.
The inclusion of a reference to an “arbitral award” is therefore inappropriate and will arouse concern. It will also raise the further question: if arbitral awards are within private international law, what about international agreements on the jurisdiction of arbitrators? Is the word “jurisdiction” in Clause 2(7)(a) to be interpreted as enabling delegated legislation about arbitral jurisdiction?
The response at Second Reading from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was not comforting. He said:
“We do not intend to intrude wholesale on the New York convention or other aspects of arbitration, but it might be that there will be bilateral or multilateral … issues where a party wishes to refer to arbitration … we will want to have the power to proceed with such an agreement.”—[Official Report, 17/3/20; col. 1451.]
On the face of it, that suggests that, so far as the Government have any clear conception of why these words are there, they would cover jurisdictional issues—in other words, issues about where a party wishes to refer to arbitration and not just the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. That is an unwise and unnecessary indication of possible future interference by international agreement and delegated legislation in one of this country’s more successful export activities.
Surely the better approach is: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. If, at the international level, the New York or ICSID convention is supplemented, their domestic implementation should be by primary legislation, as it currently is under the Arbitration Act 1996 and the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966.
Finally, on Amendment 16, I endorse what has been said by my noble friend Lord Anderson and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Admirable though they may be, model laws do not have the same status as international agreements and frequently need close attention before domestic implementation.
My Lords, in his letter of 19 April in response to the report of the Delegated Powers Committee, the Minister said:
“The Committee’s Report implies that the power in clause 2 of the Bill would allow the Government to implement agreements on any aspect of private law with a foreign element, rather than merely agreements on the much narrower subject area of private international law, as defined by clause 2(7) of the Bill. … It will not be possible for matters outside of the areas indicated by the definition of ‘private international law’ in clause 2(7) to be implemented using the power.”
The Minister echoed what was set out in paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes, which state:
“PIL agreements cover a discrete area of law that is narrowly defined.”
One would therefore have expected that the interpretation of Clause 2(7) to be narrowly defined, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, there is a width and uncertainty about these provisions that really do not follow the expressions being used.
For example, the definition clause for “international agreement”, which Amendment 9 deals with, includes,
“an agreement to which the UK is, or is expected to become, a party.”
What does that mean? Does that mean that legislation will be brought forward under these provisions and regulations brought forward in respect of an agreement to which we are not a party? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, what happens if the agreement is not ultimately made and the negotiations fall through? We would then, presumably, have regulations on the statute book dealing with an agreement to which we were not a party.
The definition of “private international law” is also contained in that same subsection, and Amendments 10, 12 and 13 demonstrate the loose wording that is used in case anything has been missed. That is rather typical of the drafting of the legislation. It is so drafted that anything can be bought in and the door is kept open. For example, it includes “rules and other provisions”, and there is to be co-operation in relation to the
“service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures”
not defined. Paragraph (c)(ii) deals with
“anything within paragraphs (a) and (b).”
It is so loose and ill-defined.
So the purpose of the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is to define the scope of regulation-making powers of the Bill so that the regulations should be confined exclusively to the field of private international law. Any provisions that trespass into any other territory could not be incorporated into domestic law by these regulations. I wholly support what he says about that.
I also support what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Manse, on arbitral awards and model laws.
But I am interested in Amendment 6. Perhaps the Minister will share his thoughts about any proposed regulations concerning legal aid. What proceedings in the field of private international law does he envisage? To what is this directed? Would these be additional provisions to existing legal aid regulations? Would there be more hoops or fewer? Would there be more generous or less generous provision, and in what fields?
My Lords, I begin with Amendment 2, which as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, noted, would seek to limit the scope of the Clause 2 power to implement agreements to those that relate exclusively to private international law, whereas of course in its present form of drafting it is clearly intended to extend to the implementation of private international law provisions in wider agreements. In previous correspondence, as noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, I referred, as an example, to the jurisdiction of the provisions of the 1961 Warsaw Convention, which is concerned with international carriage by air. The point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, was: why would you seek a power to implement such a private international law provision outwith the wider terms of the relevant international agreement? There may be some force in that point. It is one that I would like to consider further, and I will do so before we reach Report.
Amendment 6, which was just referred to by noble Lords, seeks to remove legal aid from the scope of the matters about which Clause 2 regulations can make provision. In the light of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, perhaps I should explain that the Bill as presently drafted does not expressly include legal aid in the scope of the definition of private international law. However, under Clause 2(5)(c), it allows for regulations that implement or apply a private international law agreement to make provision for legal aid. This would mean that, where a private international law agreement to which the UK chose to become a party included obligations in relation to legal aid, those could be given domestic effect through Clause 2 regulations.
The reason for that approach to the matter of private international law and legal aid in the Bill is that, although there is some doubt about whether legal aid is typically encompassed in the scope of what is referred to as private international law as generally understood by practitioners and academics, there are circumstances in which a private international law agreement could contain specific legal aid provisions. This normally arises, as one might expect, in the field of family law. For example, there is a requirement in the 1980 Hague Convention on international child abduction for a contracting state to apply the same legal aid rules to citizens of, and persons habitually resident in, other contracting states in matters covered by the convention as it would to its own citizens and residents. It is therefore the Government’s view that, should similar conventions arise in the future providing for critical cross-border co-operation in matters of private international law, it would be unfortunate if there were to be a delay in people benefiting from the provisions of such an important convention.
Where a private international law agreement imposes requirements relating to legal aid that go beyond the sorts of areas for which the United Kingdom Government currently provide such funding domestically, we would need to think very carefully before proceeding. However, the normal process of consultation during the development of, and before taking the international steps to join, a convention of this nature would provide an opportunity for consideration of any legal aid implications.
In short, the amendment would create unhelpful doubt around whether the Clause 2 power could be used to implement a private international law agreement that included provisions relating to legal aid, and indeed it might even render that impossible.
Amendment 9 seeks to restrict the Clause 2 power to implement in domestic law only the private international law agreements to which the UK is already a contracting party and nothing further. It will not be possible for the Government to take the final steps necessary under international law for the United Kingdom to become bound by a new agreement in this area, such as depositing an instrument of ratification, because, in order to do that, the necessary implementing legislation must already have been made and, as a result of this amendment, it would need a different legislative vehicle.
This amendment would make it more difficult for us to remain, as it were, a player at international forums such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law because if the new conventions were adopted there, and we intended the United Kingdom to become bound by them, we would not have a ready-made legislative vehicle for their implementation in domestic law in what might be regarded as a timely manner. More immediately, the amendment may mean that we could not use the power to implement existing private international law agreements that the United Kingdom either seeks to join or is considering joining in future; that would include the Lugano convention, subject to our application being successful. On Lugano, that is particularly problematic because there would not be time to take through bespoke primary legislation between the outcome of our application being known and the end of the transition period.
I turn to the first of what appear to be several amendments proposing to amend the definition of private international law in Clause 2(7). The first, Amendment 10, seeks to change the definition from non-exhaustive to exhaustive. That means that, for an agreement to be implemented via the delegated power in Clause 2, it must relate to rules and provisions about a matter expressly listed in the paragraphs of the definition at Clause 2(7). The reason the Bill contains a detailed but indicative, rather than exhaustive, definition of private international law is that there is no standard exhaustive definition of private international law.
It is generally recognised, however, that private international law agreements belong to a very narrow category of agreement in a specialist area of law. Our definition aims to give a detailed indication of the sort of matters typically contained in such international agreements. These are generally understood to reflect the limits of the expression “private international law”. The definition is based on examples of existing private international law agreements or instruments. We are confident that it will be generally clear whether an agreement falls under the power, which will not be able to be used to implement agreements outside the usual scope of the narrow field that is private international law.
In the case of multilateral agreements, these are likely to be agreements adopted at international forums such as the Hague Convention; we currently participate in 13 Hague Conventions. We are, of course, aware that the Hague conference has a busy programme of work on new private international law projects. This could lead to a new or updated convention or other instruments on private international law that we may wish to implement in due course. It is also possible, then, that new or updated agreements may contain provisions that fall outside an exhaustive definition of private international law, or there may be uncertainty as to whether the power in the Bill could be used to implement it if the definition is drafted exhaustively. New primary legislation would then be needed for the United Kingdom to meet its international obligations fully. Again, that has the implication of delay.
A past example of a private international law agreement that includes supplementary provisions in relation to which there could have been some doubt over whether they fell within the core concept of private international law rules is the 1980 Hague Convention on international child abduction. This convention, adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, is primarily about the recognition and enforcement of decisions and cross-border administrative co-operation between relevant authorities, but it includes obligations around the prompt return of a child that may not be considered fitting within an overly restrictive definition of private international law. That is why I believe we have taken an appropriate approach to give sufficient clarity on the scope of the Bill, while allowing us not to limit unduly its effectiveness to accommodate some margin or flexibility that will future-proof our legislative requirements in that area.
Amendment 11 seeks to remove the express reference to arbitral awards, alluded to by a number of noble Lords. It is not clear whether the intention of the amendment is to remove any agreement on private international law concerning arbitration from the scope of Clause 2, but it is at least doubtful whether in practice the amendment would have that effect. Let me be clear, as I hope I was before, that the Government recognise the importance of arbitration and the role of the New York convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Arbitration has of course been a real success story for the United Kingdom legal services sector, with London a leading global seat for international arbitrations. Of course, we want to support this in the years to come and thus ensure that London remains a global centre for arbitration.
Perhaps I may turn for a moment to the amendment in question because what I want to be clear about is this. The Government do not intend to use the Clause 2 power to amend the current implementation in domestic law of the New York convention. There are certainly no plans to implement any specific international agreements in private international law covering aspects of arbitration. But the definition of private international law, as currently drafted, covers rules on the recognition and enforcement of various types of decisions or agreement that determine or relate to rights and obligations ranging from court judgments to private agreements, such as agreements between parents on maintenance payments, and we consider that the rules on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards would naturally fall within that range. By expressly including arbitral awards in the scope of the private international law definition, we ensure that we can capitalise on any developments in the years to come in private international law, including those related to arbitration, and that arbitration is not separated from—indeed, potentially left behind—other aspects of international law implementation in the future. Again, I seek to reassure noble Lords that any broader change in our approach to arbitration, including arbitral awards, would include full consultation with the sector. We have no intention of changing our approach in this area at present.
Amendment 12 also seeks to narrow the definition of private international law in Clause 2(7) by providing that, in terms of rules and provisions about co-operation between judicial and other authorities on procedural matters, only the service of documents and the taking of evidence would be expressly included in scope. It is well understood and accepted that for substantive private international law rules relating to jurisdiction-applicable law in recognition and enforcement to operate effectively, there needs to be a level of procedural co-operation between the relevant authorities in the participating countries. While I accept that the most important elements of this procedural co-operation have, at least traditionally, been the serving of documents and the taking of evidence across borders, it is not true to say that these are the only matters on which such co-operation has existed. For example, the European Union has also had procedural rules in respect of the operation of cross-border small claims procedures and cross-border orders of payment, In my view, the inclusion of the words “and other procedures” provides helpful clarity that the power in Clause 2 could be applied should we wish in the future to implement any private international law agreements that contain similar procedural and technical co-operation alongside more traditional rules, and make that effective.
Amendment 13 seeks to narrow the definition of private international law by limiting the class of rules and provisions about co-operation between judicial or other authorities which are expressly included in the definition of private international law to those which are about service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures, or exclusively about matters of jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition and enforcement of the types of foreign judgment and agreement listed therein.
To my eyes, the practical effect of the amendment is unclear. As I referred to earlier, the definition of private international law has deliberately been drafted to be non-exhaustive, and this amendment would not by itself change that. However, it could potentially add unhelpful confusion as to the Government’s intentions when reviewed by practitioners.
To deliver its full benefit, the power in Clause 2 must be able to be used to implement the full range of possible future private international law agreements in the years to come. Any attempt to restrict the power in the way the amendment proposes could result in primary legislation being required more often, leading again to potential delays in the implementation of relevant agreements.
Amendment 16 would remove Clause 2(8). Subsection (8) allows for the Government and devolved Administrations to implement any model law pertaining to private international law adopted by an international organisation of which the United Kingdom is a member. As has been noted, model laws on private international law have the same intent as international agreements relating to private international law—in other words, they seek to achieve uniformity and reciprocity in different jurisdictions—but rather than forming part of international law, as is the case with a treaty, model laws, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, observed, provide a template for countries to implement the same legal rules, adaptable where necessary, in a way that is suitable to their own jurisdiction. Model laws are not binding at international law. Countries can incorporate all or part of them into their domestic law in a way that accommodates diverse legal traditions. In the end, however, they have a very similar effect to international treaties: they reduce conflict between different jurisdictional laws and legal systems, and the effect is to enhance access to justice. They are often selected by international organisations as the most appropriate mechanism for co-operation because of this flexibility, and they allow for a wider number of countries to participate and co-operate in what might be regarded as shared principles and a common approach to cross-border issues.
Reference has already been made to insolvency, where the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law—UNCITRAL—model law on cross-border insolvency provides a common framework in which some 50 jurisdictions participate. I accept that the issue of model law is not subject to the CRaG process. Nevertheless, such model laws have an important role to play. They are a relatively recent phenomenon; they were not conceived when earlier legislation such as the 1920s Acts were being considered, but they are an important area of law. The power in Clause 2(8) is essentially of the same scope and subject to the same limitations as any binding international treaty implemented under the same clause. For example, such model laws will still need to fall under the definition of private international law and will be subject to consideration before they are drawn down into domestic law by reason of the affirmative procedure that I have previously referred to.
Clause 2 is therefore a reasonable and proportionate provision that delivers clear policy objectives. Of course, I understand why noble Lords have scrutinised the scope of the definition and probed our rationale for it. In a way, it is almost a shadow of the wider objection that is taken to Clause 2 as a whole, but these amendments would not add to what is carefully drafted legislation and, in some respects, would detract from its clarity. It is in these circumstances that I invite the noble and learned Lord not to withdraw his amendment.
The extraordinary tedium of that answer should not detract from the enormity of what the Minister has just said. He basically said “I can’t really give you a definition in the Bill of a private international law agreement but we, the Government, will know it when we see it. Yes, it’s true that we’re taking power to do things that nobody really wants us to do, but generally we won’t do it—and if we were thinking of doing it, we’d consult first.” That was in relation to arbitral awards. In relation to model laws, he was saying, “It did occur to us that this looked like quite a convenient power for us to have, so could we have it?”
My answer is that this debate illustrates what a danger Clause 2 constitutes. I also look with real scepticism at the suggestion that the Government would consult, when they did not consult the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law, chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, at all on the network of private international law instruments they introduced in the light of us leaving the European Union; they did not consult at all on this constitutionally unacceptable Bill. Although it was very hard for us to listen to that speech, it was quite an important one. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 2 withdrawn.
My Lords, I think it timely that we should now adjourn until 5.15 pm. That means that broadcasting will stop. Noble Lords may leave their device and turn off their microphone and camera, but please do not close the call or shut down. We will resume proceedings and broadcast at 5.15 pm.
Virtual Proceeding suspended.
My Lords, the Virtual Committee will now resume. We come to the group beginning with Amendment 3. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put made that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee, which cannot divide.
3: Clause 2, page 2, line 31, leave out subsections (2) and (3)
My Lords, we have adumbrated many of the same points over and over, because they keep coming up again and again, so I will try to restrict my remarks on these amendments to essentially only new points. This group of amendments effectively deletes the Government’s regulation-making power where the regulations in effect intend to say how an international treaty shall apply either as between Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland—within the United Kingdom—or as between the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, any of the Channel Islands or a British Overseas Territory.
The effect of my amendment is that the Clause 2 power cannot be used where it is proposed to apply an international convention between the parts of the UK; to apply an international convention between the UK and a relevant territory; or to amend, extend, adapt or revoke any declaration made at the time of ratification. It is wholly wrong that any of these things should be done by regulation as opposed to primary legislation. I use these amendments simply to indicate the width of the power being sought. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will make two preliminary points. The first echoes what has been said in many of our proceedings so far this afternoon. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a member of the Constitution Committee, I do not think that Clause 2 should be in the Bill, for all the reasons already outlined both in committee reports and by a number of your Lordships in debates on earlier groups. I have not yet been persuaded or heard any argument to the contrary, so my primary position is that Clause 2 should not be there.
The second point is that, where these amendments relate to jurisdictions within the United Kingdom, it is a question not of whether it should be done but of how. In his response to the first group of amendments, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, gave some good reasons why, as a matter of public policy, there should be certainty in the arrangements, for argument’s sake, for enforcing a Scottish court’s order in England, as there would be for enforcing an English court’s orders in France. Therefore, it is a question not of whether there is merit in having some kind of intra-UK arrangements but rather of how it should be done.
During Second Reading I reflected briefly on this and referred to the briefing from the Bar Council. It is perhaps worth going back to it and reminding ourselves what it said in relation to the provisions in Schedule 6:
“The question, however, whether to apply an international convention’s rules between parts of the United Kingdom is often a very difficult one. Where it is to be applied, extensive amendments to that convention are often appropriate, (an example being the provisions in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which apply a substantially modified form of the European Union rules to intra-United Kingdom cases). The Bar Council is concerned that schedule 6 does not provide sufficient safeguards in this respect and considers that it should be amended to provide the requisite clarification.”
I endorse that. It is not a question about whether it should be done. We have heard that, for example, in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 there were requirements to amend or change the rules for intra-UK cases.
It is also important to note that we are giving powers to the national authorities—not just the United Kingdom Parliament but to Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Assembly Ministers. As far as I can see—I stand to be corrected if I have not noticed something —these regulations would be brought in without any consultation between the different Administrations. There is no doubt that private international law is a devolved matter as far as the Scottish Parliament is concerned, but negotiating international treaties does not affect the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and it seems to make some sense that there should be some negotiation, or at least consultation and discussion among the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, before regulations are brought forward. As far as I can see, neither Clause 2(2) nor Schedule 6 makes any provision for that.
My position is that it is not a question about whether it is right and proper that there should be intra-UK arrangements but rather that what is proposed in the Bill does not provide adequate safeguards about how that should be done.
I have nothing to add to this discussion.
My Lords, the question raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness is about how legislation should be made regulating implementation between jurisdictions within the UK and between the UK and other relevant territories. It seems to me that Clause 2(2) and (3) and Schedule 6 infringe the principles of devolution, particularly in the lack of provision for consultation with Scotland and Northern Ireland, as he pointed out. They also infringe the autonomy of the other relevant territories. For those reasons it seems to me that, in addition to the general reasons about the width of Clause 2 and the points already made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, we will support amendments such as these on Report.
My Lords, as with the previous groups of amendments, the underlying theme is that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill, but we have to look at these amendments in the context that it does stand part. They would therefore limit the power conferred by that clause—that context is important.
When discussing Amendments 4 and 5, I pointed out that, in the context I have just described, they in turn would result in an unacceptable restriction of the power in Clause 2 and would mean that co-operation on private international law matters between different parts of the United Kingdom family would be significantly less well developed than it is between the United Kingdom and international partners. As a matter of policy, we see no way to justify such a position. Why, for example, should two parties in London and Edinburgh have less legal certainty about the way in which their dispute will be resolved than if the dispute was between parties based in London and Paris or New York? Of course, the point is then made that it is not a question of whether, but how. If you are able to have this regulatory-making power under Clause 2 with regard to foreign jurisdictions, why not intra-UK?
If, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, the concern is the power being perceived as risking imposing a position on Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Crown dependencies or overseas territories without consultation or consent, I would seek to assuage those concerns. Such arrangements under the power would require the agreement of all the relevant Administrations—the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the relevant devolved Administration, Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, such a measure would be considered only after the Government had consulted appropriately with relevant stakeholders, and the statutory instrument to give effect to such a “mirroring” provision—that is what it would be—would still be subject to the scrutiny of the affirmative procedure, as I noted before.
There are examples where such mirroring-type relationships already apply. We apply a modified version of the terms of the 1968 Brussels Convention, an instrument that was the forerunner to Brussels I and the recast Brussels IA regulation, between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. That works perfectly well. Therefore, assuming Clause 2 stands part of the Bill, we do not see any reason why it should be amended in the way suggested.
I now turn to Amendment 18, which would in turn require fresh primary legislation if the UK wished to amend or revoke, at a later date, any declarations it chose to make when it first implemented a new international agreement. This would mean, for example, that if, in implementing the 2005 Hague Convention, the Government decided to replicate the current EU declaration in regard to certain insurance contracts being out of scope of the convention and then wished to review that decision later, primary legislation would be required to implement that change.
Our policy intention is to replicate the current EU declaration in relation to the exclusion of certain insurance contracts when we accede to the 2005 Hague Convention later this year, because this is how the convention rules currently apply here and, given the tight timeframe between now and the end of the transition period, it makes sense to maintain the status quo and then review in the longer term. Under the proposed amendment, if we wished to change our position following that review, we would have to wait for a primary legislative vehicle to give effect to that change. In our view, that would simply create undue delay on a matter which could be addressed through secondary legislation without losing any of the desired scrutiny. It is in these circumstances that I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendments.
One speaker has indicated that they wish to come in on the amendment.
My Lords, I note what the Minister said about fears that something might be imposed on Scotland or Northern Ireland, but as I read it, Scotland or Northern Ireland could actually impose something on England. He then went on to say that there would of course be discussion, negotiation and consultation. If that is the case, why does it not say so on the face of the Bill? Would he be minded to give further thought to these provisions and how they are drafted to secure some degree of consultation, which does not, I would argue, detract in any way from the devolution settlement?
Let me be clear: I do not accept the underlying premise of the noble and learned Lord’s argument. However, I am perfectly content to look at this before the next stage of the Bill in order that I can, again, reassure him of the position. There is no intent here to proceed to regulatory-making power without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration. That would be wholly inappropriate, and I accept the noble and learned Lord’s observation that it would conflict with the devolved settlement. However, I am perfectly willing to look at this again.
The Minister remorselessly misses the point over a period of time. The purpose of the amendment is to ask the question: is it right that you can have a different private international law settlement as between the two countries or as between the United Kingdom and the other territories? Should that be decided upon by a Minister without primary legislation? The way the Minister answers that is to say, “You have to assume that it’s got to be done by secondary legislation”, which does not deal at all with the point. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 3 withdrawn.
Amendments 4 to 6 not moved.
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 7. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the question is put made that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee, which cannot divide.
7: Clause 2, page 3, line 14, leave out sub-paragraph (i)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the next in the name of Lord Foulkes are to explore whether conflict might arise as to whether it is the responsibility of Scottish Ministers or of the Secretary of State in consultation with Scottish Ministers.
It is appropriate that these amendments follow those we have just been discussing, 3 and 18. I am pleased that four very distinguished lawyers will participate in this debate, as well as the Minister, who is an equally distinguished lawyer. I should explain that I am not a lawyer—although, mind you, that will become blindingly obvious during the course of what I have to say. These are very much probing amendments. I, like the vast majority of members of this Committee, hope that we will not have Clause 2. However, if we have it, we will need some clarification. I will therefore confine myself just to some questions for the Minister.
On the question of the appropriate national authority, in the Bill there are two different options in relation to Scotland. First, there is approval by Scottish Ministers—it would be for the Scottish Government to decide—or approval by the Secretary of State with the consent of Scottish Ministers. Will the Minister explain the difference between the two? How is it decided which of these two is appropriate, and who decides whether it should be approved by Scottish Ministers or by the Secretary of State with their approval? Will it be clear which treaties are UK treaties, dealt with by UK legislation, or by Scottish legislation? Of course, this applies equally to Northern Ireland, although my amendments do not apply to that. Does the Minister envisage that there might be a dispute between the devolved Governments and the United Kingdom Government? We have seen a few of those recently, sadly. If so, how would the question of who would be responsible for resolving the disputes be resolved?
Secondly, are there likely to be any cross-border elements that apply both to Scotland and to England and Wales in this case, and if so, how would they be dealt with? For example, could custody of children create any difficulties? We have seen the problems regarding people moving over the border to deal with or to avoid custody being taken by one parent or the other. Could that create difficulties?
Thirdly, English law and Scots law are different with regard to issues such as power of attorney. Could power of attorney which was dealt with in one jurisdiction be different and not applicable in another jurisdiction, and would that create problems?
Fourthly, on global contract law, which, again, is one of the treaties and part of the Bill, is there an issue of which jurisdiction might settle any dispute? If so, would this go to the English or Scottish court? How would the dispute be decided, and by whom?
Finally, this Bill requires a legislative consent Motion of the Scottish Parliament. I understand that that Motion has been lodged. When does the Minister expect it to be dealt with, and does he envisage that there will be any problem? Those are my questions for the Minister. I look forward to his replies, and to the interventions of distinguished lawyers, including, in particular, two Scots lawyers of great distinction. With that, I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, has said, it is welcome that we have this opportunity to probe. In his Explanatory Statement, which appeared next to this amendment on the Marshalled List, the noble Lord said that it was
“to explore whether conflict might arise as to whether it is the responsibility of Scottish Ministers or of the Secretary of State in consultation with Scottish Ministers.”
But, as he indicated in his remarks just now, that is not actually in the Bill, which speaks of
“the Secretary of State acting with the consent of the Scottish Ministers”.
That is a crucial difference.
There is no doubt that negotiating or joining an international agreement on private international law is a reserved matter for the Government of the United Kingdom as a sovereign state. Equally, there is no doubt that private international law is a devolved matter. Section 126(4)(a) of the Scotland Act makes that expressly clear. Therefore, the implementation of these agreements is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.
It is right, therefore, that Scottish Ministers should be one of the appropriate national authorities. Equally, there will be occasions—perhaps a number of occasions —when it makes sense for the United Kingdom Secretary of State to make regulations with respect to the whole of the United Kingdom with the consent of Scottish Ministers. In paragraph 8 of their legislative consent memorandum, the Scottish Government draw attention to this fact:
“In 2018, the Scottish Ministers (with the approval of the Scottish Parliament) consented to two UK statutory instruments … including devolved material relating to the 2005 and 2007 Hague Conventions.”
So there is a very recent precedent for regulations to be made in the sphere of private international law. It has been done by a United Kingdom statutory instrument, but with consent not just in the case of Scottish Ministers but with the approval of the Scottish Parliament. These are often pragmatic matters, but the fact that it requires consent means that the UK Government cannot override the Scottish Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes asked whether the legislative consent Motion has been passed; I checked yesterday—I do not think it has. But paragraph 19 of the Scottish Government’s memorandum says:
“The Bill is drafted to respect the devolution position: the Scottish Ministers make provision for implementation in Scotland with UK Ministers only being able to do so with the consent of the Scottish Ministers. Legislation in this area has in the past been taken forward on a UK basis and it may be convenient for it to be so in the future so the Scottish Government recommends this approach.”
There is one final matter which is not really germane to the terms and text of the amendments but I shall be grateful if the Minister is able to respond. Given that the implementation can be a matter for the Scottish Government, what engagement is he aware of with Scottish Government officials in some of the negotiations on these private international law agreements? For example, two agreements are referred to in paragraph 53 of the Explanatory Notes of the 2019 Singapore agreement and the 2019 Hague Convention. Is the Minister aware of any engagement or involvement by Scottish Government officials? Quite clearly, if the next step is implementation, it is important that Scotland is a party to these negotiations, albeit at the end of the day, as responsibility for joining these international agreements rests with the United Kingdom.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, explained in his introduction that these are probing amendments, and I hope that the Minister will understand my remarks in that context. I would like to speak to both amendments but my main focus is on Amendment 8, which seeks to leave out sub-paragraph (ii) in Clause 2(7)(b)—that is, the reference to the Secretary of State acting with the consent of Scottish Ministers. However, anything that I might say now is without prejudice to my support for the notice given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and others of their opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill at all.
I have three points to make. The first reinforces what others have already said. It is important to know which of these authorities is expected to exercise the powers referred to in this clause. That is because if it is the Scottish Ministers, paragraph 4 of Schedule 6 applies and the regulation has to be laid before the Scottish Parliament as a Scottish statutory instrument under Section 29 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010. If it is the Secretary of State, it comes under paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 as a statutory instrument in this Parliament and the Scottish Parliament will have no say in the matter at all. The word “or”, which lies between those two alternatives, gives no guidance as to which of them, or in what circumstances, it is to be. My first question, following what others have said is: why is that?
This clause is about implementation and application—implementation in Clause 2(1) and application as between the relevant jurisdictions in Clause 2(2). I think that I could understand the position if the Bill said that implementation in Clause 2(1) was a matter for Scottish Ministers and application as between the jurisdictions was a matter for the Secretary of State with the consent of Scottish Ministers, but that is not how the Bill stands at the moment.
For example, on implementation, if one were considering the UK acceding to the Lugano convention, about which so much has already been said, it would seem that nothing more is needed to implement it into Scots law as an instrument as the instance of Scottish Ministers. One can look again at the illustrative statutory instrument—the Singapore convention, which the Minister attached to his helpful letter of 5 May. It gives the force of law to that convention in England and Wales. If the same were to be done for Scotland, surely that would be a matter for the Scottish Ministers alone. Therefore, in the context of implementation, what part has the Secretary of State to play at all?
My second point concerns whether the reference to the Secretary of State is consistent with the Scotland Act 1998. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to that Act provides that international relations are reserved matters, but paragraph 7(2) states that paragraph 7(1) does not apply to
“observing and implementing international obligations”
“assisting Ministers of the Crown in relation to any matter to which”
paragraph 7(1) applies. Therefore, the matters dealt with in paragraph 7(2) are devolved, as indeed is private international law itself, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has pointed out.
This clause is about implementation and application, and it would seem to fall squarely within paragraph 7(2). I should have thought that that reinforces the point that these should be matters for Scottish Ministers only. Section 53 of the Scotland Act provides for a general transfer of functions exercisable by a Minister of the Crown to the Scottish Ministers. That reinforces my query as to what function the Secretary of State has in this matter at all.
My third point is simply a teasing matter about terminology. The matter is not assisted by the fact that in this Bill the UK authority is described as the “Secretary of State”. In the Scotland Act, that authority is described as a “Minister of the Crown”; for example, in Sections 56 and 63. So too in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 we are told that the relevant authority there is a “Minister of the Crown”. The change of terminology puzzles me somewhat: why “Secretary of State” here and “Minister of the Crown” in the other contexts?
To sum up, the reference in Clause 2(7)(b)(ii) to
“the Secretary of State acting with the consent of the Scottish Ministers”
is very welcome in its reference to consent. When I made contributions on the withdrawal Bill I tried frequently to introduce the word “consent” without any success, so to see that word here is music to my ears. One must be thankful for small mercies. However, I cannot help thinking that Clause 2(7)(b)(ii) should not be in the Bill at all. If it is to be kept in, I would be grateful if the Minister would say, first, why mention is made here of the Secretary of State at all; secondly, how that is compatible with the provisions of the Scotland Act; and, thirdly, why the expression “Minister of the Crown” is not being used here instead.
I have nothing to add on this group.
My Lords, I am of course speaking as a Welshman. We have a very limited interest in the provisions being discussed, but I have some questions. Since the time of Henry VIII, who has a great deal to answer for, the jurisdiction of England and Wales has been merged. Only in very recent years has there been a suggestion that Wales should have its separate jurisdiction. We are one of the three jurisdictions that will be subject to the Bill’s provisions; we go along with England. I would like to know whether there is any prospect of consultation with Welsh Ministers about what provisions are being brought into effect, because private international law covers such a wide range of things. It has particular relevance to family life in Wales as much as anywhere else. Will there be any consultation? If so, what will it be?
I simply underline the points made by my noble friend Lord Foulkes and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Hope. As far as my noble friend Lord Foulkes is concerned, the purpose of these amendments is to probe; as far as I am concerned, they illustrate the lack of thought that has gone into Clause 2. They simply underline the sense that there should not be a Clause 2.
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for tabling what he very candidly pointed out were probing amendments. I am also obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, who drew on his experience of the devolved Administrations and was able to outline the position in this matter. I will come in a moment to address the questions raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in the context of these provisions.
As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out, two authorities are identified in this part of the Bill that might proceed to implement matters of private international law in Scotland. That is consistent with legislation in other areas. The Secretary of State might decide, with the consent of the Scottish Ministers, to make UK-wide provision for implementation. That is why he is one of the identified national authorities, because there are circumstances in which the Scottish Ministers would be entirely content for there to be UK-wide provision.
Alternatively, if that is not the case, Scottish Ministers may themselves then proceed as a national authority to implement the matter in domestic law. That is because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, pointed out, the position is that—I am sorry, something came up on another phone and rather distracted me—the implementation of private international law is a devolved issue under the Scotland Act, so allowance is made for both provisions.
As regards this Bill, an LCM was discussed between officials. The Scottish Ministers have recommended that such an LCM should be provided, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, pointed out the terms of the recommendation that Scottish Ministers have made to the Scottish Parliament with regard to this matter. Indeed, there was prior discussion about these proposals last year, when the Lord Chancellor, for example, was in communication with the Scottish Government on matters of the convention. Perhaps I can clarify this by reference to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Secretary of State may be a national authority with the consent of Scottish Ministers because Scottish Ministers may, as sometimes happens, wish to see UK-wide regulations made here for implementation. Alternatively, as the national authority, they may choose to do that for themselves. The Secretary of State clearly does have the power to do that because under the Scotland Act there is the power to legislate for the entirety of the United Kingdom as regards the implementation of a matter that is otherwise within the devolved competences, so that does not raise an issue either.
With regard to the matter of whether or when it would be one national authority or the other, that is simply a matter that will be discussed, as it is in other contexts, between the United Kingdom Government and Scottish Ministers. If Scottish Ministers are content that the UK Government should legislate UK-wide on this matter, that will happen. If they are content for that to be done, then Scottish Ministers will deal with the matter. The Secretary of State cannot deal with the matter without the consent of Scottish Ministers, so I hope that that puts minds at rest in this regard.
As regards the identification of the Secretary of State as an authority and the reference, for example, in the Scotland Act to a Minister of the Crown, I accept that the reference in this Bill is more limited. Because I cannot answer immediately, I will consider why it was thought appropriate to limit it to the Secretary of State as opposed to the wider reference to a Minister of the Crown. But I will look at that to see whether there is an issue there that needs to be addressed.
As regards consultation on the implementation of international treaties, that is not an issue, but as regards entering into international treaties, that is of course a reserved matter. I recognise that it is appropriate that Scottish Ministers and others should be consulted on these matters for their interests when they arise. I do not understand that to be a difficulty in this context, nor a matter that would require express provisions in the terms of this Bill.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for his probing amendment and I hope that I have been able to put minds at rest as regards why there are two identified national authorities for the purposes of Clause 2. In the event that Clause 2 stands, these are appropriate alternative mechanisms for the implementation of these provisions.
One final matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was the issue of contract, but of course, where you have a contract, it will have a choice of jurisdiction and a choice of law. If the contract has Scotland as a choice of jurisdiction and Scots law as the choice of law, that will be binding if we have a situation in which, for instance, the Lugano provision applies. I hope that that answers the query in so far as I have understood it.
I cannot give a precise date for the provision of the LCM, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, himself indicated, Scottish Ministers have recommended the granting of an LCM, and it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulty. With that, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
As no further speakers have indicated that they wish to intervene on this amendment, I call Lord Foulkes.
I apologise for jumping in a little prematurely.
This has been a very useful debate and the Minister has answered a number of my questions. It is awfully useful that he is taking away the third point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about Ministers of the Crown. But the debate has highlighted that there is a difference of opinion between the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Hope, on the one side, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on the other. Now, it is not unusual to find different opinions among two or three lawyers, but it highlights that there may be a problem around whether this is to be dealt with by the Secretary of State, after consultation with and the permission of Scottish Ministers, or directly by Scottish Ministers. I hope that is something that can be looked at further.
Nevertheless, in the light of the explanations given, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 3 withdrawn.
Amendments 4 to 13 not moved.
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 14. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put makes that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee. This Committee cannot be divided.
14: Clause 2, page 3, line 39, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the next in the name of Lord Foulkes are to explore any issues regarding how this Bill might impact on the constitutional position of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories in relation to the United Kingdom.
My Lords, this brings me to another of my special interests, and one that I have been pursuing for some time. Amendments 14 and 15 concern the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands—namely Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark—and the dependent territories. I will not mention all of the dependent territories, because those such as the Falklands are not quite so relevant in this context, but they include Gibraltar, the Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda. I mention those particularly and not by chance, because many are well known as tax havens and the offshore basis for companies whose principal trade and activities are elsewhere, and not on those islands.
My first question is this. In an earlier intervention, the Minister indicated that there has been consultation with the islands’ authorities, and that they had approved the provisions in the Bill. But with whom were these consultations? Were they with just the governor, or were they with the directly elected councils and parliaments of the various overseas territories and Crown dependencies? It is important that the elected representatives were involved in these discussions. Secondly, what response has there been? I understand from what the Minister said that the islands have all agreed, but was that agreement conditional in any way?
As I said in respect of the earlier amendment, the Bill deals among other things with global contract law. The very helpful background briefing that the Ministry of Justice has produced states that
“the Crown Dependencies may be authorised to conclude their own international agreements by a process of entrustment.”
It would be helpful if the Minister could explain this. The briefing goes on to say that
“the UK retains responsibility at international law for all of their international obligations.”
It is therefore the British Government who have responsibility for ensuring that all these territories maintain their international obligations. How is this done? What monitoring takes place? Who is responsible for it? The Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands have had to be suspended not once but twice. Interestingly, that was by a Conservative Government. I was the opposition spokesman on foreign affairs the first time that the constitution was suspended. The then Minister, Tim Eggar, came to me and asked whether the Opposition would agree. Of course, we did so because of some of the things that were going on in the islands. There has to be very careful monitoring of this.
I turn finally to the choice of court of arbitration. If there is a choice of court of arbitration, could some people—there are the tax dodgers, let us face it; we have seen a lot of it recently—choose the jurisdiction in which their matters were dealt with and the judgments made? I imagine that some of them would love to go to Jersey or to Cayman—just to name a couple arbitrarily.
Some matters here need careful scrutiny. I hope we will get a clear response and undertaking from the Minister that they are being kept under careful and constant review. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have nothing to add to the points succinctly made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.
I have nothing to add.
I have nothing to add.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for what I understand are, again, probing amendments. As I perhaps explained, the Crown dependencies and overseas territories have a constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom whereby the United Kingdom is responsible for their foreign relations. This means that the Crown dependencies and overseas territories do not generally themselves join international agreements, including agreements in the area of private international law, which we are concerned with here. Instead, an agreement that applies in the United Kingdom can usually be extended to apply also in a Crown dependency or overseas territory. We work with those Crown dependencies and overseas territories to determine where and when they would wish to have a private international law agreement apply between them and other contracting parties. The scope of the United Kingdom’s ratification of that agreement is then extended to them. This means that multilateral agreements extended to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories apply only between those jurisdictions on the one hand and the other contracting parties on the other, but not between the Crown dependencies and overseas territories and the UK. To apply the agreement with the UK, there needs to be a separate mirroring arrangement, as it is sometimes termed. I referred to that in responding to earlier amendments.
The general power within Clause 2(3) allows the United Kingdom to maintain and develop a private international law framework with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories as well as with foreign partners. That is the intent here.
The noble Lord asked about consultation. There was consultation, not with the governors of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, but with each attorney-general and their officials. My understanding is that they were entirely content with the way in which these provisions are extended to the benefit of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.
The noble Lord raised the question of entrustment. It does not directly arise in this context, but entrustment is where the United Kingdom essentially consents to a Crown dependency, for example, entering into an agreement at the level of international law. That can sometimes happen where, for example, a Crown dependency wants a reciprocal agreement with a foreign partner.
The behaviour of the overseas territories is monitored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and there are instances in which, for the purposes of good governance, the United Kingdom will intervene in the affairs of an overseas territory. The noble Lord himself gave an example in respect of the Turks and Caicos Islands where that has been done.
As regards the choice of court or arbitration that the noble Lord referred to, in so far as I understand his point, I would respond that it is up to parties to a private contract to determine how their disputes, if any, will be resolved. For that purpose, the parties can choose a law or legal system to apply to their private contract and the jurisdiction in which their disputes will be resolved. That is an issue that arises only in the context of their private contract and in the context of what we are dealing with here, which is private international law. At the level of private international law, we are concerned with the way in which other jurisdictions respect that law, respect the choice of jurisdiction and, indeed, then respect the judgment of that jurisdiction when it comes to enforcement.
I hope that answers the points raised by the noble Lord. I thank him for the probing amendments, but I invite him to withdraw Amendment 14.
My Lords, I am not aware that any other noble Lords have expressed a wish to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock.
My Lords, I am really very grateful to the Minister for a helpful reply; he has dealt with each of the points that I raised very properly and helpfully. This is an issue that I feel strongly about generally and will need to pursue in another context in the light of that. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 14 withdrawn.
Amendments 15 and 16 not moved.
Debate on whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill.
I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the question is put made that clear during debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee; this Committee cannot divide.
My Lords, I believe that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill. We have discussed these matters at considerable length today. I simply make the point that it will be constitutionally unprecedented if we end up in a situation where the Government have complete power in relation to private international law agreements in the future, not only to implement the changes to domestic law that are required by secondary legislation but to make regulations that relate to those agreements or connect with them, which goes very much wider than the terms of the agreement itself.
We have discussed considerably today the justification for this unprecedented power and it has been demonstrated —mainly on the question about timely implementation—not to withstand any degree of examination. I feel strongly that the House should reject Clause 2; we cannot do it in this Committee but, when the time comes, we should vote to remove it from the Bill. I think it is a separate debate as to whether there should be a special power in relation to Lugano, but this provision gives unlimited power for an unlimited time to introduce the consequences of international agreements into our domestic law with no primary legislation.
One final point, which has been made by the Constitution Committee, is that the consequence of doing this by secondary legislation is that it can be challenged in the courts and set aside by the courts on the grounds of judicial review. So not only is it constitutionally inappropriate, not only will it damage the quality of our private international law, but it will lead to legal uncertainty. Actions will be brought in court but set aside. I will invite the House on Report not to allow this provision to stand part. There is unanimity in this Committee with the exception—the plucky exception—of the Minister in that respect.
My Lords, I agree with the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I gave my reasons earlier for thinking that Clause 2 should not stand part and I shall not repeat them. I shall add just one further point. There has been discussion this afternoon, particularly from the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, about the disadvantages of Virtual Proceedings, disadvantages notwithstanding the exceptional efforts made by the clerks and the staff, for which we are all very grateful, to ensure that these Virtual Proceedings can take place. The additional disadvantage that I want to mention—additional to those who have already been identified—arises from the correct observation of the noble and learned Lord that the Minister stands alone on this subject; all other speakers have explained why Clause 2 is objectionable.
The point is that if we were on the Floor of the House, the Minister would not just hear and see those who are speaking; he would see and hear expressions of disapproval from all around the House, including from his own Benches; he would sense the degree of concern that there undoubtedly is about the constitutional implications of Clause 2. This debate has highlighted those concerns, but I hope the Minister will understand that there is a very widespread concern around the House, not just from those who have spoken today but from those who would be present in Committee were normal proceedings to apply. By their presence and their body language, other Members of the Committee would indicate their profound concern. I hope he will take all that into account before Report.
I am in a slightly different position from many noble Lords because I joined this Committee sitting simply because of the strong feeling on the Constitution Committee, which I chair, that Clause 2 should not be part of the Bill. I am not a lawyer, so I have listened to the last nearly four hours with great interest. I knew that this was a complex area; having listened to all that has been said I think it even more incredible that the Government are actually suggesting that issues of this kind should be decided simply on their say-so and by secondary legislation. I cannot comment on the details and complexities of Lugano or anything else, but I have heard qualified senior lawyers talking about this, and anyone who has heard that would be convinced that there should be proper parliamentary consideration of all these issues before the Government are allowed to take any direct action. It is simply wrong, I think, that these matters will be determined by secondary legislation.
The Constitution Committee was unanimous in its view: we do not divide on party lines anyway, but it was not a difficult discussion, because members of the committee thought it was blindingly obvious that Clause 2 should not be part of the Bill.
We did, of course, have another thought at the back of our minds. That is the fact that we have been increasingly concerned, over many years, by the way in which the Government have used—or maybe abused—secondary legislation. We have seen an increase in the powers taken through secondary legislation. It is a question of not just the number of SIs but their content. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred earlier to some of the consequences that might arise from this situation in the creation of new criminal offences if Clause 2 remains. We have seen new criminal offences created by SIs produced by the Government. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will speak later; I am sure that he will emphasise this very significantly.
Put simply, the Constitution Committee thinks it wrong that international agreements should be dealt with by the Government through secondary legislation. I certainly hope that either the Government will think again about this or that this clause can be taken out on Report. I share the concerns expressed by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, my noble friend Lord Adonis and others about the procedure whereby we cannot vote at this time and express our opinion properly. However, I urge the Government to consider absolutely all that has been said today and realise that it is not good for parliamentary democracy and accountability for Clause 2 to remain part of the Bill.
During the rehearsal for this afternoon, I was asked to say my piece, and I used two words. I said, “Henry VIII”. Just in case it was not apparent to anybody who heard me say that,I was trying to convey, as I did on 17 March, when the rather claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us, that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive power in the Executive and does so by secondary—
My Lords, the Committee is having some problem in hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I wonder whether his connection is stable.
Shall I start again?
Perhaps start again, or perhaps go at least two sentences back.
I will try again. On Henry VIII, I was trying to convey that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive powers—
Lord Judge, I am afraid that there is a problem with your connection. I suggest that we move to the next speaker and hope to come back to the noble and learned Lord at the end of the list, by which I hope his connection will be better. If that is acceptable, I ask the broadcasters to please unmute the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
My Lords, I was looking forward to hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and saying that I agree entirely with what he said. I still imagine that I will agree with him, even if he has to come in a little later in the debate.
I start by declaring two interests. The first is as a practising lawyer whose practice includes international, commercial and public law cases, so some of the things discussed today affect the practice that I carry on. The second, and more important for present purposes, is that I am the recently appointed chairman of your Lordships’ EU Sub-Committee on International Agreements. It is in that capacity that I put my name forward to speak today.
My focus is on Clause 2. I have not spoken in any of the other debates that have taken place but, for all the reasons powerfully advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick —and in the future, no doubt, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I see this as a very unusual and constitutionally unprecedented thing. I could not improve on the speeches made already, including those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, in an earlier debate, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
However, I want to deal with one aspect in my capacity as chairman of the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee. It has authorised me to write to my noble friend Lady Taylor expressing its agreement with the conclusion that the Constitution Committee had reached in its report and concurring with its opinion that the clause, if it goes through, would reduce parliamentary scrutiny of international agreements inappropriately.
It is not an answer, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has rightly said, to say that this is dealing purely with technical things. I know from experience that, although they may be technical, they are matters of great moment and matters of great importance both to the people who are making agreements and to this country. It is common for lawyers to be asked to advise which law should be put into an agreement or which law should govern any disputes that have to be dealt with, and the Bill would affect that.
As I understand it, two principal answers have been given about why the Government say this is appropriate. One is that all agreements will have been subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and that is the bit on which I particularly want to focus. The problem with that is that, as the Constitution Committee said,
“current mechanisms available to Parliament to scrutinise treaties through CRAG are limited and flawed”.
That is particularly so because of the gaps in the CRaG coverage—some of them have been mentioned today, such as model law—and the timing of CRaG means that an agreement will have been concluded by the time, strictly speaking, that the CRaG processes come into effect.
I shall quote one paragraph, paragraph 19, from the Constitution Committee’s report on CRaG, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Treaties. Professor David Howarth from the University of Cambridge observed:
“From the Whitehall point of view, everything is perfect. The whole process is under the control of Ministers. Parliament does not really get a look-in until after signature and, even after signature, the CRAG processes are very difficult for anyone to operate, especially in the Commons where the Government controls the agenda.”
That is the problem with CRaG.
The committee which I am honoured to chair may be an important part of the response to that lack of scrutinising ability. We are only in the foothills of our work, and we do not yet know how well this will work. Quite a lot will depend on how the Government engage with us and with Parliament more generally. I hope that they will wholeheartedly engage not only once an agreement has been concluded but at earlier stages. I know there is some disappointment already that, for example, the amendments made by this House to the previous Trade Bill have not found a place in the current incarnation of the Trade Bill.
Some assurances have been given in the context of the conclusion of trade agreements. Dr Fox made some important statements about the consultation and engagement that will take place. In its paper Public Consultation on Trade Negotiations with the United States, the DIT repeated the assurances that it gave. For example, paragraph 39 of that report repeats commitments made in its earlier paper, including,
“confirmation that at the start of negotiations, the Government will publish its Outline Approach, which will include our negotiating objectives, and an accompanying Scoping Assessment, setting out the potential economic impacts of any agreement.”
The second argument perhaps put forward is that the issue will be only yes or no and therefore the affirmative procedure, as proposed in the Bill, will be enough. I am not persuaded by that argument. It will often not be a question of yes or no. For example, there are treaties which contain options for the member states, such as powers to derogate from particular provisions. Under this binary approach to approval or engagement by Parliament, how will those treaties be considered? Or there may be methods of implementation which are available under the agreement. But more fundamental is the fact that if there is a power to amend that could strengthen the hand of the Government in negotiations, and there is some evidence that in some countries where scrutiny is not limited to yes or no, that is the case.
It seems inevitable that unless the Government drop this, as many noble Lords are urging them to do, this will come back on Report. If in doing so, the Government intend to rely upon the argument about the effect of parliamentary scrutiny under CRaG, they will need to give a very clear explanation of how they will engage with Parliament and the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee so that we can see the reality of what parliamentary scrutiny of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements will be. I look forward to those explanations being given, and in the meantime I support the amendment.
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I am not a lawyer, but I care about democracy and I care very much that if the Government make promises, they should actually deliver on them. Clause 2 is a case of the Government reneging on promises made only last year. I voice my concern about Clause 2, which would allow Ministers to subjugate our national law to international agreements and the jurisdiction of foreign courts, with minimal parliamentary scrutiny from people such as noble Lords, who actually know what they are talking about.
Last year, the Government promised us that we would take back control of our laws and our courts; there was no caveat that we would then delegate our laws to international organisations with nothing more than a tick-box exercise by Parliament. The clause gives far too much power to international trade organisations and allows model laws to be imposed on us at the whim of a trade Minister.
I am also concerned that this measure would be better addressed in the Trade Bill, so that we could develop a comprehensive and coherent system of scrutiny for agreements relating to international trade. Otherwise, we end up with different scrutiny arrangements for trade agreements and the private international law agreements that might go alongside them. Will the Minister please explain how this clause fits with the Government’s promise of Parliament taking back control of our laws and courts? I look forward to Report and the vote that I am positive will happen.
Two questions arise when laws are made by secondary legislation: is there democratic legitimacy and has there been proper scrutiny? If private international law raised simply technical issues, that might be less important. But as has been said so often today, private international law raises a wide of range of matters; in particular, family law issues, where basic human rights are frequently involved.
On parliamentary scrutiny, the Minister referred to the ample opportunity for debate in the affirmative procedure. We all know about the affirmative procedure. It is a yes/no question, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, pointed out a moment ago. The matters before the House cannot be amended and frequently, nothing happens as a result of any Motion that may be moved in opposition. If it is Her Majesty’s Opposition’s policy not to vote in favour of a fatal amendment, the whole process is completely nugatory. I have heard Labour Whips tell their members not to vote in the case of a fatal amendment simply for that reason alone. Their turn will come.
The affirmative procedure is not in any way proper parliamentary scrutiny. Scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 has proved to be a non-event. It has already been quoted, but I will do so again: the Constitution Committee referred to that procedure being “limited and flawed” and indeed never properly applied.
It could be said that you can have democratic legitimacy providing there is direct participation in the legislative process by means of consultation. It is very noticeable that in this Bill there is no provision for consultation. Schedule 6 is devoid of any mention of it. That gives an opportunity for those affected by legislation directly to influence its content. Consultation is not everything: it has its problems. There are issues, for example, about the quality of the consultation document. That document may not reach the hands of everybody who is affected. The choice of who gets the document will be with the Government. Organisations or individuals may not have the time or the skills to deal with it. Strong groups who are well organised may have a disproportionate influence in the consultation process. It is of course useless, unless the Government are prepared to take the views of the consultees into account.
Surely, if consultation is to give democratic legitimacy and afford a measure of scrutiny before legislation comes to Parliament, the Government should produce a report of that consultation, covering all the points that have been raised and giving reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with its findings. Parliament can then assure itself that full and proper consultation has taken place. We do not have that. The super-affirmative procedure set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, covers these points admirably, but I shall have more to say on the question of criminal offences at a later stage.
My Lords, I agree that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill. Under our normal procedure for Committee in the Chamber, I would have been able to come in earlier when I saw how widely the debates on previous groups were ranging. However, with the rigidity of Virtual Proceedings, I was unable to do so.
I underscore the points made by all noble Lords, all of whom—except the Minister—have objected to Clause 2. This clause is constitutionally offensive on a variety of grounds. The issues that arise in private international law are many, varied and important. They may be complex and technical, but they are not obscure or trivial. In family disputes, questions of divorce, child custody and child maintenance can cause great anguish to all concerned. By definition, if a commercial dispute comes to court, it is of great importance to the parties involved.
What is Parliament for? Our responsibility is not simply to wave through significant new legislation, but to scrutinise it and satisfy ourselves on behalf of the people of our country that it is appropriate. That can be done only through the processes of primary legislation. It cannot be done through our procedures for regulations. Even my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer’s super-affirmative procedure would not be satisfactory. The Minister has suggested that these regulation-making procedures provide ample opportunity, but they do not because there is no scope for amendment and scrutiny is still relatively perfunctory compared to the lengthy process of primary legislation.
Hitherto, new private international law has been incorporated into our domestic law by way of primary legislation. The Minister disputed that, but he was unable to give us convincing examples of when that had not happened. What we are seeing is part of an objectionable behaviour pattern on the part of the Government. They seek to evade full parliamentary scrutiny and arrogate power to themselves to save themselves inconvenience.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was about to discourse on the matter of Henry VIII powers—I hope he will. We see egregious Henry VIII powers in this Bill, including an open-ended power to implement any future international agreement, even if it overthrows existing primary legislation. We see the deployment of those innocent-sounding but weasel words "in connection with", "consequential" or "supplementary" legislation, which would enable this Government to smuggle in very significant legislative changes in an arbitrary fashion.
Clause 2(5)(a) and Schedule 6, concerning enforcement powers, would allow the creation of new criminal offences, the extension of existing ones or increases in the penalties applying to them. Again and again, your Lordships’ House has said that is not an acceptable practice on the part of the Government when legislating. We see in Clause 2(5)(b) the Government taking a cavalier approach to questions of data protection, which are extremely sensitive and important matters in this era of surveillance capitalism and in the context of measures being taken to protect us against a pandemic.
At Clause 2(5)(c) a power to alter the regime for legal aid without scrutiny is brought in. This too is a super-sensitive policy and legal area, as we know from the history of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, in consequence of which, I am sorry to say, the Government forfeited the trust of Parliament, the people and the legal profession.
The Government’s justifications for taking these open-ended, wide-ranging powers in Clause 2 are specious. They suggest that there may be an urgent need to legislate; we have had a significant discussion about the Lugano convention. The intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, made it very clear that, while there may be urgency for us as a country to resolve whether or not we wish to participate in the Lugano convention, that is certainly not something to be dealt with by statutory instrument. It will possibly need to be dealt with by fast-track legislation, though again we should always be wary of that. There is certainly no case for allowing it to go through under the terms of this law.
It is almost comic to see the Government plead that they will be eager to implement Hague conventions. Let me gently remind the Minister that successive Governments of this country took 63 years to legislate to implement in our domestic law the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. It did not get on to the statute book until 2017; despite endless pressure from Parliament, successive Governments refused to make time to legislate for it.
The Government make the case that, as there is little or no scope to amend international agreements, scrutiny by Parliament would be otiose. However, it is for Parliament to determine on principle whether or not to adopt important new legislation. If it decides that it is appropriate, it is again for Parliament to determine the manner in which that legislation is to be implemented in the specific circumstances of the United Kingdom—what we might refer to as the vernacular of implementation.
The Minister conceded that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would not permit scrutiny of model laws, but he went on to say that model laws are a very important area of law. Surely, therefore, we need something beyond the zero scrutiny that CRaG would permit. The point has just been made by the noble Lord who spoke previously that statutory instruments fail to provide the same legal certainty as primary legislation. Recourse can be had to the provisions of the Human Rights Act and it may always be possible that what is legislated by way of statutory instrument can subsequently be modified and superseded by the development of the common law.
The Minister sought to assuage the anxieties of some of us that the provisions in the Bill would ride somewhat roughshod over devolution and fail to respect the status and responsibilities of the devolved Administrations. He gave some satisfaction in what he said about Scotland, but I think no satisfaction to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, or myself about how the provisions affect Wales. Of course, in Wales there is no provision for co-decision by Ministers in the devolved territory as there is in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Finally, the Minister, in pleading with us to be reassured, pointed out that, up until now and for a long period, the adoption of private international laws had been a matter for European Union competence. But we have just spent four years in a political convulsion to establish the right to make our own laws in our own Parliament, accountable to our own people, and for Parliament not to be obliged to rubber-stamp obscure deals made on our behalf by people who are not accountable. We have sought in all the agonising political disputes of the last four years to re-establish not executive absolutism but parliamentary governance. Having gone to all this trouble, we cannot accept the provisions of this legislation. Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, this matter has been so fully covered by the speeches already made that I have little to add other than my full support for what has been said. I hope very much that we may be able to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, before the Minister speaks.
I do, however, wish to emphasise two points. First, I refer to what I said in support of Amendments 7 and 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. The lack of clarity about whether it is the Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State who are to exercise the powers referred to in Clause 2(1) and Clause 2 (2) is surely an indication, among others, that this Bill is seeking to do too much. The umbrella phrase “any international agreement”—I stress the word “any”—indicates that it is intended to catch a wide variety of international transactions and model laws relating to private international law. At present, with the possible exception of Lugano, we have very little idea of what they might be. It seems likely, however, that they will not be many. The pressure on Parliament, if we were to proceed by way of public Bills and not statutory instruments, would be quite limited. It is therefore hard to see why we are having to go down this road at all.
Secondly, there is no sunset clause in the Bill. I could understand it, although I would not like it, if the Bill were designed to deal only with measures that needed to be enforced before the end of the implementation period or shortly afterwards. But without such a clause, the Bill is entirely open-ended; committing all international agreements and model laws to the statutory instruments procedure, as a permanent feature of our laws whatever they may be, seems to me to be a hostage to fortune.
It is very clear that the Committee is overwhelmingly against the Government on Clause 2, although we hope that the Minister will reflect further before Report. Assuming that the Government stick to Clause 2 on Report, it is clear that the House will want to debate it further and, probably, divide on it.
I turn to the procedural issues that are raised thereby. First, although we pay tribute to the officials and the remarkable technical team who have managed our proceedings—and done so, I would say, to the efficiency limits of the technology available—our reflection on the last few hours is that it has been patchy at best. We have not been able to hear in this debate from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, one of our most distinguished Members, and I could barely hear the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, another of our distinguished colleagues, when he was speaking earlier. I do not think we would find it acceptable in any other circumstances to proceed to a vote or a decision of the House while key Members were being silenced and were unable to participate in the debate.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred earlier to the interchange between Members, which of course is necessarily reduced when we are online, but perhaps I may also draw attention to something that has become very clear in this debate. We need to separate the ability to vote online from the process of debate that leads to votes. Clearly, we cannot have a Report stage until it is possible to have a reliable system of voting online. I hope that our colleagues on the Procedure Committee—I think that my noble friend Lord Foulkes, who is here, is one, as well as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—will bring to the attention of the committee an issue that has become very clear in this debate: the big divorce between the ability to participate online, which is extremely restricted, and the engagement of the House as a whole.
When we debate and make decisions in the Chamber, the House as a whole is engaged—not that every Member who votes is necessarily in the Chamber for a debate that leads to a vote, although normally quite a high proportion are—by virtue of the fact that every Member is in the House, at least while voting. They are aware of the issue and a large number of them are engaged with the subject of the debate. That is particularly important on the government side. On this occasion, only one Conservative Member besides the Minister has spoken, whereas in the Chamber quite a number would be present and able to listen to the arguments.
Therefore, if we proceed to an online vote with an exclusively online debate, we will be faced with a debate almost entirely divorced from the process of voting. Indeed, while I have been listening to the discussion, I am afraid I have allowed myself to be distracted and have looked at what is going on on Twitter. Successive online votes have taken place in the House of Commons this afternoon. One of my Labour colleagues—I shall not identify who it is—has been tweeting about how she has been able to give online interviews and indeed construct and send tweets while voting, so little engaged has she been in the subject of the votes.
Therefore, I hope that it is possible for our colleagues on the Procedure Committee to take back what I think will be the strong feeling in the Committee based on today’s proceedings that it is not good enough to have just an online process of voting. We need debates to take place in the Chamber on a hybrid basis, obviously allowing people to participate from outside too, but with real interaction and engagement in the Chamber leading up to the vote so that we have the best approximation possible to proper parliamentary debate and engagement before we divide.
: My Lords, I am hoping to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, in a second, but, before doing so, I should say that after the noble and learned Lord I intend to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whose contribution we were not able to hear earlier. I understand that his connection is now properly established. I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon. Is he with us? I think we must assume that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, will not be joining us at this time. Is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, available?
Can you hear me?
I can certainly hear you, Lord Judge.
Good. Do you mind if I ask whether you heard anything that I said when I started last time?
In the interest of making sure that everybody hears everything that the noble and learned Lord has to say, perhaps I may suggest that he starts again from the top. I think that would be preferable to trying to start in the middle.
I thank the Deputy Chairman very much. I apologise to those who have already heard me say this but, when I was tested at the rehearsal to make sure that my machine was working and I was well plugged in, my only response was “Henry VIII”. It was a wonderfully short speech. Effectively, it said what I wanted to say. However, just in case anybody does not know what I meant, I was intending to convey my view of the Bill, as I did on 17 March at Second Reading, when the awful, claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us. Having listened to the debate and read the report of the Constitution Committee, I summarised my view of the Bill by saying that it unnecessarily vests excessive power in the Executive by means of secondary, not primary, legislation. It is a very simple principle and it is wrong. At the time, I submitted to the House in what I hope was my characteristic way—understated—that it was not exactly regulation-light.
The result of reading the report and listening to today’s debate—I do not wish to add to the many wonderful contributions that have been made—is that I can be less circumspect this time: this Bill is now heavy. It is overweight with regulation.
Why can we not be realistic about what the affirmative process actually does? It is not a means of controlling the Government. When, in 2015, a go was had at trying to stop a Conservative Government using Labour Government legislation to achieve £4.5 billion-worth of change to fiscal issues, it was apparently regarded as a constitutional outrage. That is us. As far as the Commons is concerned, unless something has happened very recently, it is 1979 since it rejected an affirmative resolution. That suggests that if we are honest with ourselves, the affirmative resolution process, even the super-affirmative, is not nearly as good as every Government of any colour always says it is supposed to be.
The fact of the matter, although I cannot identify a particular Henry VIII clause here save and except the usual ones about amending and getting rid of primary legislation, is that, from his underworld, Henry VIII has hacked into departmental computers. Alternatively, he has been inserted—resurrected and put into departmental computers. We must be very careful about attaching so much weight to the use of secondary legislation that might affect individuals’, companies’ and organisations’ rights. That is really all I want to say at this stage. I will say something about the regulations relating to the creation of criminal offences, but I support the concerns that have been expressed all round. Thank you very much for helping me to get that through, Deputy Chairman.
We were very glad to have your contribution.
My Lords, for some years I had the privilege of serving on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester. That committee has increasingly come to stand as a crucial protector of the role of Parliament, alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whom I was delighted we were able to hear. The committee has acted in attempting to limit the Executive improperly taking powers for government Ministers to change the law by delegated legislation in significant ways and ways for which delegated legislation has never in the past been deemed appropriate.
The committee usually expresses itself, or certainly has until recent years, in circumspect terms and the Government have traditionally accepted its recommendations. The committee has left it to the House to implement its recommendations if the Government do not agree to do so. The clarity and decisiveness of the recommendation in paragraph 15 of the committee’s report on this occasion is anything but circumspect. The conclusion speaks for itself:
“We are of the view that clause 2 represents an inappropriate delegation of power and we recommend that it should be removed from the face of the Bill.”
The committee is forcefully supported by the report of the Constitution Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, from whom we have heard, and includes the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, from whom we have also heard. Paragraph 19 of that report contains the kernel of its conclusion:
“We are not persuaded by the arguments the Government has made in support of this power. If the balance between the executive and Parliament is to be altered in respect of international agreements, it should be in favour of greater parliamentary scrutiny and not more executive power.”
Another important point made by the Constitution Committee, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is that delegated legislation is amenable to judicial review so that future regulations implementing international treaties could be the subject of challenge. It is entirely right that delegated legislation, which involves an exercise of executive power of itself, should be capable of being challenged as unlawful.
However, it would be a highly undesirable consequence of the Bill if, when enacted, the lawfulness of conventions entered into by the United Kingdom Government as a matter of our domestic law could not be guaranteed to our international convention partners until such challenges were determined.
I also agree with the point made by the Constitution Committee, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that the CraG procedure is at present inadequate and ineffective as an instrument of parliamentary scrutiny.
In the light of all that, can the Minister say whether, given the Constitution Committee’s report published on 4 May, he is prepared to go away and reconsider his extremely negative response, dated 17 April, to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report? I ask, because if these important committees of your Lordships’ House are going to be routinely ignored by government, parliamentary democracy is entering treacherous territory, in which the conventional boundaries between executive power and parliamentary sovereignty are roughly and unceremoniously shifted by the failure of government to adhere to well-established, valuable and principled conventions.
The central point is this. As it stands, the Bill involves moving a whole area of legislation—that of implementing private international law treaties in domestic law—from Parliament to the Executive. That is a dangerous extension and an unwelcome trend—noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—in our constitutional arrangements from parliamentary democracy to government by an overmighty Executive. If it is private international law agreements this year, what might follow next year? This House has rightly sought to resist the trend, which is dangerous and must be stopped. As parliamentarians, and respecting the traditional role of this House as a guardian of the constitution, we have a responsibility to stop it.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their contribution to this part of the debate. Since the commencement of this Committee, the matter of whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill has in a sense been the elephant in the virtual Chamber—or perhaps the virtual elephant in the Chamber. I therefore do not intend to rehearse or repeat the arguments that have been made repeatedly in Committee. However, I want to make it clear that the Government regard the powers in Clause 2 as essential to achieving their objective to build up the United Kingdom’s position in private international law, not only in the immediate future but in years to come.
Of course, there is one particularly pertinent example of our ambition; namely, our ambition to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the desire—indeed, the need—to do that before the end of the transition period. It would be gravely unfortunate if a gap was to emerge between the end of the transition period, when we continue to look to the Brussels I and IIa regime, and the application of the 2007 Lugano Convention. We are concerned that that should be avoided.
Briefly, first, we consider that the proposal in Clause 2 is not only essential but proportionate. International law agreements are generally uncontroversial and technical in nature, and the detailed content of the private international law agreements to which the Bill will apply will already be determined at the international level; they are by their very nature clear and precise in their terms.
Secondly, I do not accept that the terms of Clause 2 are novel or unprecedented. As I sought to point out earlier, there are a number of precedents for the use of delegated powers to implement international agreements on private international law.
Thirdly, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—the CRaG process—can be used to ensure scrutiny at the level of treaty-making law or international law. There is then the affirmative statutory procedure, where steps are taken to draw down that international law obligation into domestic law, with, I venture, sufficient scrutiny for a treaty which is not in itself amenable to amendment at the level of domestic law.
Although repeated reference was made to the employment of primary legislation to carry out this process, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, made the telling point that successive Governments can take years to identify the time for primary legislation to bring into domestic law a treaty obligation that has been entered into. Sometimes, quite exceptionally, it can take more than 50 years. I accept that that is an exception, but it nevertheless illustrates why we seek to bring forward Clause 2 in its present form.
Listening to noble Lords, I detect an element of concern about the terms of Clause 2. It is something that I will consider before we reach Report, where a number of noble Lords have made it perfectly clear that they will want to revisit this issue and may want the opportunity to divide the House. However, at this stage, I invite noble Lords to allow Clause 2 to stand part of the Bill.
I understood that I would get an opportunity to speak before the Minister rather than after him, as I have been on the list for the past few days, but I shall proceed none the less with what I was going to say. At the risk of flogging rather a dead horse at this stage, I wish to add that while I support the basic aims of the Bill, I do not support Clause 2.
Private international law and our membership of the Hague and other global jurisdiction and enforcement conventions are an essential part of our global standing and our ability to welcome and to home families from overseas. They are essential particularly to the professional and legal services markets in which we are world leaders. I note my interests in the register, and particularly my work as a dual-qualified, cross-border litigator, whose practice touches variously on this area.
I shall not speak at length because pretty much all the issues have been addressed in some detail. However, I thought that your Lordships might appreciate some stories from the front line. Unlike many of our eminent jurists in the Lords, I am currently active in this space and spent 10 years as a litigator in California, as a California-qualified litigator, in which capacity I advised often on jurisdiction clauses and dispute resolution provisions.
For the most part, the most popular forum for these was the courts of England and Wales, irrespective of the parties—typically, one of them was an American party, but we dealt with parties from all around the world. There were plenty of reasons for this, not least the English language, our time zones, our excellent legal services, our use of the common law and precedent, the independence of our judiciary, and the broad membership we have of cross-border conventions, such as those under consideration in the Bill.
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the rule of law—particularly the transparent, thorough and long-established legislative process by which our laws are passed. This is the reason that England and Wales is so often chosen as the preferred third-party forum for jurisdiction and dispute resolution clauses. That is directly threatened by Clause 2. Indeed, by seeking to short-circuit the long-standing practice of passing treaties by primary legislation, the Government are in danger of undermining one of the most important pillars that supports the UK’s pre-eminence in the provision of dispute resolution services in the global market.
I note that the US-UK trade negotiations started recently. Can the Minister give us any indication as to whether the subject of private international law has been raised within that forum? Is any pressure being brought to bear on the UK Government to align their cross-border enforcement and jurisdiction regime towards that of the US, which obviously takes a very particular line in these matters? We know, for example, that the current US Administration disfavour cross-border co-operation. I understand that in recent rounds of Hague conference negotiations, the US has become increasingly reluctant to engage. It is taking a back seat while burgeoning economies, such as China, are increasingly engaged.
Finally, before we reach Report on this crucial Bill, we must have either mastered virtual voting or returned to a normal practice. This is too important an issue to slip through at such a procedurally challenging time. I appreciate your Lordships’ indulgence.
As regards the UK-US negotiations, I say only that I am not in a position to comment on how far they have gone, or on whether they have engaged the issue of private international law at all.
Perhaps I may add to my earlier contribution to the Committee, since it looks as if we will vote on this issue on Report. We are all agreed that it is a hugely important constitutional issue.
The House of Commons, which has been conducting its first online votes this afternoon, has descended into complete chaos on its latest vote. I can report to the Committee that on what was, I think, the third vote it held—after its Members had had an opportunity to get to know the system—there were 22 Tory rebels, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, who accidentally voted the wrong way. The Deputy Speaker, Eleanor Laing, pointed out that some MPs are struggling with the new electronic voting system but, she added, there was no need to rerun the vote because there was a majority of 51 for the Government.
I will point out two things for the benefit of our colleagues on the Procedure Committee. First, there is no natural government majority in the House of Lords, so how are we to know whether people have voted the wrong way accidentally? The constitution of our country could be rewritten because people did not understand the system of voting. Secondly, although I have the highest regard for all our colleagues in the House, if Members of the House of Commons are struggling with the new electronic voting system, it is fair to say that some colleagues in our House may also struggle with that new system.
I see not just a flashing orange light but a flashing red light about moving to electronic voting at any early stage in our proceeding, and certainly on a matter as grave and serious as this. If this were to be our first vote and it descended into chaos, as in the House of Commons, nobody could say that we were not warned.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has made a number of extremely telling and important points. We are clearly in a situation where we must ensure either that we have an entirely reliable voting system in the upper Chamber, or alternatively a clear and telling government majority. I suspect that it is more likely that we will seek to secure the former.
My Lords, I shall now put the question that Clause 2 stand part of the Bill; all microphones will be opened until I give the result. As many as are of that opinion shall say “Content”.
To the contrary, “Not content”.
My Lords, it takes unanimity to amend the Bill. If a single voice says “Content”, the clause stands part. The Contents have it.
Clause 2 agreed.
Clause 3 agreed.
My Lords, this may be a convenient moment for the Virtual Committee to adjourn.
My Lords, the Virtual Committee stands adjourned.
Virtual Proceeding suspended.