Motion on Amendments 1 to 1B
1: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Implementation of other agreements on private international law
(1) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement, as it has effect from time to time, so far as relating to private international law (a “relevant international agreement”).
(2) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom.
(3) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, giving effect to any arrangements made between—
(a) Her Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom, and
(b) the government of a relevant territory,
for applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between the United Kingdom, or a jurisdiction within the United Kingdom, and that territory.
(4) Regulations under this section may make—
(a) consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision;
(b) different provision for different purposes or for different parts of the United Kingdom.
(5) Regulations under this section may include provision about—
(a) enforcement of obligations arising under or by virtue of the regulations;
(b) sharing of information;
(c) legal aid.
(6) Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)) makes further provision about regulations under this section.
(7) In this section—
“appropriate national authority” means—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, the Secretary of State;
(b) in relation to Scotland—
(i) the Scottish Ministers, or
(ii) the Secretary of State acting with the consent of the Scottish Ministers;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland—
(i) a Northern Ireland department, or
(ii) the Secretary of State acting with the consent of a Northern Ireland department
“international agreement” means a convention, treaty or other agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party; “private international law” includes rules and other provisions about—
(a) jurisdiction and applicable law;
(b) recognition and enforcement in one country or territory of any of the following that originate in another country or territory—
(i) a judgment, order or arbitral award;
(ii) an agreement, decision or authentic instrument determining or otherwise relating to rights and obligations;
(c) co-operation between judicial or other authorities in different countries or territories in relation to—
(i) service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures, or
(ii) anything within paragraph (a) or (b);
“relevant international agreement” has the meaning given in subsection (1);
“relevant territory” means—
(a) the Isle of Man;
(b) any of the Channel Islands;
(c) a British overseas territory.
(8) This section and Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)) have effect, with the following modifications, in relation to a model law adopted by an international organisation of which the United Kingdom is a member as it has effect in relation to an international agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party.
The modifications are—
(a) a reference in this section or that Schedule to implementing or applying a relevant international agreement is to be read as a reference to giving effect to the model law (with or without modifications);
(b) subsection (1) is to be read as if the words “as revised from time to time” were substituted for the words “as it has effect from time to time”.”
1A: After subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsections (1) to (3) may only be made during the operative period.
(3B) The operative period is the period of five years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(3C) The appropriate national authority in relation to a part of the United Kingdom may by regulations extend the operative period for that part of the United Kingdom by a period of five years.
(3D) The power under subsection (3C) may be exercised more than once.
(3E) The operative period may not be extended for any part of the United Kingdom after it has expired in relation to that part of the United Kingdom.”
1B: In subsection (5) leave out “this section” and insert “subsections (1) to (3)”
My Lords, I will speak to Commons Amendments 1 to 5 and Amendments 1A, 1B and 4A to 4E, which are in my name.
Private international law is a technical area of law, but it is important to people and businesses that become involved in legal disputes with a cross-border aspect. A family may need to enforce a maintenance decision when one parent moves abroad, or a small business that has been left out of pocket by a foreign supplier may need to seek redress. Agreements on private international law create reciprocal rules to enable UK businesses, families and individuals to resolve these difficult and challenging situations. They prevent multiple court cases taking place in different countries and allow for the decisions of UK courts to be recognised and enforced across borders. All of this helps to reduce costs and anxiety for the parties involved.
The House will recall that this Bill contains two substantive clauses. The first implements three key Hague conventions which currently apply as a consequence of our former membership of the European Union, allowing us to continue to co-operate on important aspects of private international law with existing partners. The second establishes a delegated power to implement further agreements on private international law now that we have regained full competence in this area from the European Union. This stood part of the Bill on its Lords introduction but was removed on Report. Commons Amendments 1, 2, 4 and 5 simply return this clause, and related provisions, to the Bill.
There is also Commons Amendment 3, which I hope will be uncontroversial and will not address in detail. It adds a permissive extent clause to the Bill allowing the implementing power to be extended to the Isle of Man; this is at the request of the Isle of Man Government. This is the standard approach to extending UK legislation to the overseas territories or Crown dependencies and in this case does not directly affect the United Kingdom. My noble and learned friend Lord Keen spoke in detail on this amendment back in May but was unable to move the amendment at the time.
The agreements implemented under Clause 1 are widely supported by interested parties in the legal and finance sectors, and indeed by Members in this House and the other place. The 1996 Hague Convention aims to improve the protection of children in cross-border disputes. It deals with issues such as residence of and contact with children whose parents live in different countries. The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements aims to ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial transactions. The 2007 Hague Convention provides rules for the international recovery of child support and spousal maintenance. The Government have already taken the necessary international steps to ensure our continued membership of these agreements following the end of the transition period.
It is vital that the UK’s membership of these agreements continues seamlessly from the end of the transition period. This means that Clause 1 needs to be in force within a few weeks. Although the implementation of the Hague conventions contained in Clause 1 is agreed and not subject to further amendments, the timing aspect creates an imperative for us to agree a way forward on the delegated power promptly.
Before I address the amendments, I will clarify the types of agreements that can be implemented under the delegated power. The power only covers the implementation of international agreements on a very narrowly defined area of law: agreements which are typically uncontroversial and have received widespread support in Parliament in the past. The Bill only allows implementation of private international law agreements which it defines in subsection (7) of the relevant clause. Principally, such agreements cover rules on jurisdiction to hear disputes which raise cross-border issues; which country’s law should apply to such cases; recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and co-operation between judicial and other authorities in different countries on these matters. It will not be possible for matters outside the areas covered by the definition of “private international law” in the clause to be implemented using the power.
I know that, in the past, debate on this Bill has touched on topics such as the Hague-Visby Rules, or the 1961 Warsaw Convention on the carriage of goods by air. Let me be clear: these conventions—bar possibly one or two provisions—are out of scope of the power, and if the UK joined these conventions today they would still need to be implemented by primary legislation. This Bill is only concerned with implementing provisions on private international law, not any international agreements on private law matters generally.
Bearing that point in mind, I turn to the amendments. This House has already discussed the delegated power at length and made its views known. However, the clause comes back from the other place with a majority of 149, so, despite the reservations many of your Lordships have and have expressed, I believe we need to accept that such a clause has a place in the Bill and think about how to make it more acceptable to this House. The amended clause will still allow private international law agreements to be implemented promptly. This is important because, following the end of the transition period, there is a need to update the United Kingdom’s private international law framework. The Government have already made clear their intention to join the Lugano Convention. This power minimises any gap in its application if we are able to rejoin that convention and allows us to respond flexibly if we are not.
Implementation of these narrow and technical private international law agreements is largely about drawing down into domestic law detailed rules that have already been agreed at an international level. There is very limited ability for Ministers to deviate from these once the UK agrees to become bound by the relevant agreement. The rules in the agreement will not be amendable, and implementation will often largely be a yes or no question, coupled with making provisions largely of a procedural or technical nature, making the affirmative statutory instrument procedure appropriate. There are well-established precedents for implementing agreements which meet our definition of private international law by secondary legislation. It is not just that much of our current private international law framework was implemented under the powers of the European Communities Act. Even before that, there were many examples of agreements of this type being implemented through secondary legislation. The most notable of these is the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.
Without this power, each new private international law agreement or update to an existing agreement would require primary legislation. Given the need to update our private international law framework and the current busy parliamentary agenda, such a requirement would be disproportionate and damaging. The intellectual arguments about the extent to which the implementation of international agreements by secondary legislation is constitutionally appropriate are important, but the other House recognised that those arguments are not the beginning and end of this debate. We must remember that these agreements can have a real impact on the lives of the general public, and delays in implementing them and reaping their benefits could negatively impact UK businesses and families. It is my view that the power provides a proportionate solution to an important problem, while retaining a far greater role for Parliament in the scrutiny process than it has had for many years.
All that said, I recognise the many and varied concerns that have previously been raised about this power. Opinions are sincerely held and there is merit to many of the points which have been made. I have sought to familiarise myself with the views your Lordships expressed in the Chamber during earlier debates, and I have listened closely to concerns expressed by noble Lords in engagement with myself and ministerial colleagues in recent weeks. The amendments in my name are a good-faith attempt to find a way forward. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described the suite of amendments that I have put before this House as “substantial and constructive”. They attempt to strike a balance, sensitive to the aims of the Government and the concerns of your Lordships’ House.
First, Amendment 4A removes from the power the ability to create criminal offences which are punishable by imprisonment. In my analysis of the debates on this Bill, it is clear that this aspect of the power has been the most widely criticised. I certainly see that this is a sensitive issue, and it is right that the Government act cautiously. Although private international law agreements do not generally require contracting parties to create criminal offences, there are exceptions. Some conventions include non-discrimination clauses that require states to apply the same enforcement methods for foreign judgments as are available in domestic cases.
In fact, our current approach to the implementation of the Lugano Convention, which the Government intend to reimplement promptly should our application to rejoin as an independent contracting party be successful, includes a criminal offence in Northern Ireland. This applies where a person obliged to pay maintenance under an incoming maintenance decision, subject to recognition and enforcement in Northern Ireland, fails to update a Northern Ireland court with changes to their address. In my view, this is a good example of the “limited” type of criminal offence with which we are concerned and highlights the value of retaining the ability to create offences punishable by, for example, fines. Although I understand the concerns that some may have about even this type of criminal offence being created by secondary legislation, there are in practice a large number of offences created by secondary legislation and retaining this aspect of the power, albeit in a more restricted form, is not out of step with other legislation.
The effect of the amendment, therefore, would be to require any provisions in a private international law agreement that entail the creation of criminal offences carrying a custodial sentence to be implemented by primary legislation. This will provide Parliament with significant additional scrutiny of this important matter. I hope that this addresses a major source of concern about the power.
Secondly, Amendments 1A and 1B, and 4C, 4D and 4E, add a five-year sunset period—extendable on a recurring basis by affirmative statutory instrument—to the regulation-making power. This is not an amendment that the Government would ideally have wanted to make to the Bill. We still consider the delegated power to be a proportionate approach that would afford the flexibility to implement future private international law agreements promptly in the years to come. The Government have already been clear about how they intend to use the power over the next few years. This amendment would ensure that if a future Government, of any colour, wanted to extend the five-year period, they would need to provide similar clarity. This approach of providing an extendable sunset period has been taken in other legislation, such as the Trade Bill. It is also, in my view, proportionate for the implementation of agreements of this nature—technical agreements, agreed at international law level, being drawn down into domestic law. This additional role for Parliament provides significant additional scrutiny and will influence how Governments use the power.
The reviewable sunset period means that the Government can still make necessary changes to the UK’s framework of PIL agreements over the next few years and maintain their ability to respond flexibly to any uncertainty following the end of the transition period. However, it would also provide the Government with an opportunity to review the use of this power in the future without the current time pressures and to take a reasoned decision on whether it should be terminated. If the Government believe at that stage that the power should be extended, they will need to make their case to Parliament and have the regulations approved in both Houses. I also remind colleagues that a statutory instrument to extend the power would still be subject to an obligation to consult—something I will come on to talk about in more detail shortly. I believe that this approach strikes the right balance between flexibility and scrutiny and offers an effective solution to many of the concerns raised. To my mind, it represents a workable compromise between the position of the Government, as set out, and the principal concerns that the House had aired.
The third amendment, Amendment 4B, puts an obligation on the Secretary of State to consult before using the implementing power or extending it for a further five-year period. My ministerial colleagues have made it clear at various stages of the Bill’s passage that they greatly value the views of experts in this area. The current Lord Chancellor reconvened the advisory committee on private international law, chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and I know that both the Lord Chancellor and Minister Chalk have engaged regularly with other members of the legal sector through the Ministry of Justice’s International Law Committee. Consultation is our usual practice, and indeed the Ministry of Justice has already consulted the advisory committee on draft regulations that it may make under the power to implement the Lugano Convention 2007, should our application to rejoin be successful. However, having reflected on the views expressed to me since I took on responsibility for the Bill, I have concluded that putting on the face of the legislation an obligation to carry out such consultation, before making regulations under the delegated power, is a proportionate and appropriate step.
This obligation to consult is drafted in a general way so as not to refer specifically to any groups or bodies. This is because, while the advisory committee, for example, contains a significant wealth of expertise in the field of private international law, it is not a statutory body. Therefore, to refer specifically to it in legislation would not be appropriate. Equally, referring to specific parliamentary committees is not without risk, as interested committees may change or be renamed as time passes. Parliament would already have an opportunity to scrutinise draft affirmative statutory instruments to be made under the power and, even without naming them in the legislation, the Government would always consider most seriously any representations made by parliamentary committees. The same applies to other named consultees that some may suggest adding to the Bill. The Government will be under a duty to make sure that the consultation carried out is appropriate.
I also remind the House that a statutory obligation to consult carries with it a requirement to take due account of the representations received. I can give an undertaking that the Government will meet that requirement. We will provide a thorough and detailed explanation of the consultation that has taken place, setting out not only those with whom we have consulted, but a fair and balanced summary of the views expressed. That will be set out in the Explanatory Memorandum that must accompany any statutory instrument laid before this House. This will give parliamentarians and any relevant parliamentary committee an opportunity to scrutinise the consultation that has taken place and the way the Government have taken account of the views that have been expressed.
I am satisfied that this approach strikes the right balance between ensuring that the Government take account of the views of the relevant experts while allowing for a flexible approach to engage with the most appropriate interested parties in each specific case. I hope that your Lordships will agree that it demonstrates that the Government are sincere in their intent to engage Parliament and other stakeholders in the process. In my view, when taken as a whole, these three amendments represent a significant amount of extra scrutiny for Parliament. I hope that the House will consider them a compromise sensitive to the aims of both sides. I beg to move.
The question is that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1 and do propose Amendments 1A and 1B as amendments thereto. On Amendment 1C, I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
Amendment 1C (as an amendment to Amendment 1A)
1C: Leave out subsection (3D).
My Lords, I move my Amendment 1C as an amendment to Amendment 1A. It would leave out subsection (3D) of the Government’s proposed amendment. Leaving out the subsection would mean that the power to extend the sunset period could be exercised only once.
I start by welcoming the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Throughout the process of this Bill, he has been very engaged, incredibly helpful, very courteous and really engaged in the detail, and we are all incredibly grateful for that. I also compliment him on the presentation he has just made, which was persuasive and clear and addressed all the issues. So I really am glad to see him there and I completely support him—as indeed does the whole House—in relation to the bringing into UK domestic law and ratifying the three treaties referred to, and which remain referred to, in Clause 1 of the Bill.
I remain disappointed and believe it to be very much the wrong policy to give the Government the power to introduce private international law treaties by secondary legislation, as in the amendment introduced by the Commons to the Bill that was sent from the Lords. There was an almost universal view in this House when it was last here that that should not be dealt with by secondary legislation, because it would reduce the quality of private international law agreements that were given the force of law by legislation. The question of whether it was legitimate to do it by secondary legislation was considered after the consideration of evidence, both by the Constitution Committee of this House—and I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, here as a distinguished member of the Constitution Committee—and the Delegated Powers Committee of this House as well. Both considered, in detail, evidence put before by them by the Ministry of Justice and rejected the suggestion that secondary legislation was the appropriate way to deal with such treaties.
I did not find the reasons given by the noble and learned Lord convincing. But he, like his distinguished predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, did not really engage on the issue of why to use secondary rather than primary legislation. He asserted that secondary legislation had been used in the past, and, like his predecessor, referred to the 1933 and 1920 Acts. What he was referring to was bringing into force the provisions on enforcement of judgments in those two Acts in relation to individual territories or countries. All that happens by that secondary legislation is that additional countries are added, whether they be Commonwealth countries for the 1920 Act, or non-Commonwealth countries for the 1933 Act. I would not have any objections whatever to something like that. But that is not the power taken in this Bill; it is the whole of the private international law agreement. It would not just be the addition of countries; it would be the whole Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 in the examples that have been given. That will lead to this country having a worse network of private international law agreements than it has had previously. That is bad for this country, because one of the things we are incredibly good at is private international law. That is what makes English law so attractive to commercial institutions. I am disappointed that no real additional arguments have been advanced.
I accept the political reality here; this House has almost universally asked the other place to think again, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, is right to point out that it had the opportunity to think again and decided to go ahead. We have to accept that in a case such as this.
In relation to the sunset clause, these agreements take a long time to negotiate and introduce—with the possible exception of us adhering to Lugano, because that may have to be done in a hurry, so I can see that there is a case there. I am interested that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, has said that if one had Hague-Visby or Warsaw, that would not be covered by this Bill and would, therefore, have to be introduced by primary legislation. I am not sure, then, under what circumstances this is ever going to apply in substance, because the nature of these private international agreements is that they will have provisions about jurisdiction and enforcement as well as about substantive law—Hague-Visby and the Warsaw convention.
If there is anything about substantive law, such as what it would be in relation to the return of children—that comes under the Hague convention—as I understand what the noble and learned Lord is saying, although it does deal with jurisdiction and judgment issues, it also sets out a standard of law like Hague-Visby, and that would not be covered. I am grateful for that, because it means that, in significant private international law agreements, primary legislation will always be used. If that is right, although I can see the arguments in relation to Lugano, after the five years are up, the right predilection for the Government would be to say, “That is enough—let us go back to being the country that really looks at private international law agreements.” It would meet the Government’s requirement to deal with Lugano, and it would preserve our primary place in relation to the quality of the private international law agreements we make and the quality of the way we introduce them. Yes, you have to introduce what you have agreed, but there are many other things around them as well. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be able to assure me that the starting point of the Government would be that one is enough and that there would need to be special reasons why there would be an extension for a second time.
I strongly support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which would place in the Bill an obligation to consult with each head of the three judiciaries of the United Kingdom, on the basis that if you put those consultees on the face of the Bill, they will ensure that the right people in the legal community are consulted. I am, at the moment, at a loss to understand how on earth that could be objectionable. I note that it is said that the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law might change its nature. I can see that, but that could probably be dealt with by a power to change the title, to be given to the Minister under secondary legislation. However, I think it is extremely unlikely that the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland are going to have a significant name change within the next 100 years. If they did, no doubt every piece of legislation would be changed to reflect that. So why not?
The noble and learned Lord has done so much for us; the key thing from this side of the House’s point of view is that our quality as a country in this area should continue. There is no politics in this; it is just about getting the right result. I hope that he will reflect and give some assurances that might make the position easier.
My Lords, I add my welcome of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, to his place in taking over this technical but difficult Bill, one that raises issues of principle.
I welcome the government amendments, which have the power to act as safeguards on the power reinserted into the Bill by the Commons amendments. I agree with the summary by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, of the Government’s amendments as sensible and constructive. But I share the disappointment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that the Commons amendments reinstate the delegated power that this House so comprehensively rejected.
I also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, that outlawing the power to create offences punishable by imprisonment is of particular importance. I welcome the fact that the principle of a sunset clause has been accepted, although, for all the reasons mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, it should be meaningful and not liable to be endlessly renewed. It is also important that the Government have introduced a requirement for consultation before regulations are made. On that, in particular, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the time he and the Bill team have spent with me and others discussing the government amendments to the Commons amendments and considering suggested changes.
For my part, I support the amendment on the sunset clause in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for all the reasons he gave. I understand the Government’s concern to ensure that there is sufficient time to bring new private international law agreements into UK law, and I accept that there may possibly, on occasion, be a need for more than five years to achieve that. However, I simply cannot see the need for further extensions beyond 10 years. It is in the nature of these international agreements that they take a long time to be finalised. However, the point about the first five years is that there are a number of international agreements, notably the Lugano Convention 2007, to which the Government wish to accede, which may need to be brought into law in the reasonably short term, and there are others on the horizon that may need more than five years. The problem with allowing for extensions beyond 10 years—that is, more than one extension—is that such a long sunset period may involve permitting the Government to implement in the UK international agreements that are currently unforeseen and unforeseeable. It was partly to address that issue that this House took the view that primary legislation should be required before implementing such agreements in domestic law.
I appreciate that this issue is addressed, in part at least, by the requirement for consultation before regulations are made implementing further private international law agreements. That requirement is, indeed, a welcome safeguard. My amendment to government Amendment 4B is designed to ensure that such consultations are both objective and impartial and seen to be so. The shortcoming of the present proposal is that the choice of those to be consulted lies entirely, in England and Wales, with the Secretary of State and, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, with Scottish Ministers, the relevant Northern Ireland department or the Secretary of State acting with their consent. That means that the power to choose who is to be consulted lies entirely with the Executive.
Of course, we accept that many Ministers can be confidently relied on to exercise that power dispassionately, but that confidence cannot always be assumed, and it has not always been justified by Secretaries of State. The change in the role of the Lord Chancellor may also have had an impact. I understand the Government’s concern to ensure that there is flexibility in the choice of those to be consulted. It goes without saying that, for example, a convention concerned with family law matters may call for different experts to be consulted than would a convention concerned with commercial law or contractual matters. That is why my amendment does not seek to impose on the Secretary of State a list of those who must be consulted. It lies behind what the noble and learned Lord said about the Government’s reasons for not setting out such a list, but I and others are also concerned to ensure not only that the choice of those to be consulted is clearly objective, impartial and apolitical but that the organisation, management and follow-up of the consultations are thorough and meaningful.
Accordingly, I understood the noble and learned Lord to be offering, on behalf of the Government, assurances to the House in that connection. I invite him to confirm, first, that consultation on the implementation of a private international law agreement will generally be in public, and that the Government will announce their intention to consult and invite people to offer their views. Secondly, will he confirm that if the Government decide that such a consultation will not be in public they will publicly explain that decision and the reasons behind it? Thirdly, will he confirm that the Government will report on the outcome of such consultations, if not in a separate report, then, as he envisaged, in or in a document accompanying the Explanatory Memorandum that comes with any proposed regulations made under the powers in the Bill? Finally, I understood the Minister to be offering an undertaking, which I ask him to confirm, to ensure that the explanations in or accompanying such explanatory memoranda will be thorough and detailed, setting out whom the Government have consulted and a fair and balanced summary of the views expressed in any such consultation.
Such assurances and undertakings, if confirmed in the terms I have set out, would offer reassurance to those of us who are concerned that all such consultations will be the genuine safeguards we need them to be. I beg to move.
The following Members in the Chamber have indicated that they wish to speak: the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Berkeley. I therefore call the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
My Lords, I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in welcoming the Advocate-General for Scotland, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, to his post. I thank him and the Minister in the Commons, Alex Chalk, and their officials for taking the time to discuss with me and many other Members of this House our concerns, the House’s concerns and the concerns of the Constitution Committee about the delegated powers in the Bill and how those concerns can be accommodated by amendments. The noble and learned Lord has taken a very welcome constructive approach to these issues and I thank him sincerely for that. He has tabled amendments that go a significant way, in my view, to meeting those concerns.
Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I would have liked, ideally, to see greater restrictions on the use of delegated powers in this context, but the theme tune that often—not always, but often—accompanies Lords’ consideration of Commons amendments is the Rolling Stones song “You Can’t Always Get What You Want”, and since we will not get exactly what we want today, the next best thing is for the Minister to assure noble Lords of the Government’s intentions in this context. Again, he has very helpfully gone a long way to do that this afternoon. I ask him to confirm my understanding on three topics that are raised by paragraph 1A, on consultation, as introduced by government Amendment 4B.
The first of these topics is the purpose of the consultation. There is a mandatory obligation to consult. It is not a discretion; there is a duty to consult. The amendment does not expressly say what the purpose is, but does the Minister agree that it is implicit that one of the purposes of the consultation will be to assist the Secretary of State in deciding whether it is appropriate to implement a particular international agreement by regulations, or whether primary legislation is needed?
Can the Minister confirm that the Government recognise that some international agreements, even when they are in the scope of this Bill, as explained by the Minister, may require changes that are so significant that it would not be appropriate to implement the international agreement other than by primary legislation? I suppose, also, the consultation might assist on whether the international agreement would alter substantive law, albeit incidentally, which I understood the Minister to accept would not be an appropriate subject for delegated legislation. That is the first matter: the purpose of consultation.
The second matter on which I would welcome assistance from the Minister concerns who is to be consulted. This topic was addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Does the Minister agree that it is difficult to envisage that there would ever be a case when it would not be appropriate to consult the senior judiciary? I understand that the Minister does not want to write it into the Bill, but it would be helpful if he could acknowledge that it is very difficult to envisage that it would ever be appropriate not to consult the senior judiciary. Does he also recognise that, if the Secretary of State is to be properly informed by this consultation, it will also require—other than possibly in the most exceptional cases—an invitation to the Law Society, the Bar Council and NGOs such as Liberty and Justice to express their views? I am not asking him to give a categorical assurance that this will be done in every case but, in respect of normal cases, I ask him to confirm his understanding that that is what he would expect normally to occur.
The third matter that I hope the Minister will address concerns the publication of the fruits of consultation—a topic that he helpfully mentioned in his opening remarks. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to this. I too understood the Minister to have confirmed that the Government intend to publish a report on the consultation responses when laying regulations before Parliament. It would give the House great reassurance if the Minister could confirm—as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked—that this will be a full, detailed report of who has been consulted, what they said, and what the Government’s response was if the Government disagreed with them.
The reason why this is so important is because, if regulations are laid, the House will itself want to consider whether the subject matter of the regulations makes it inappropriate for the Government to proceed by way of delegated, rather than primary, legislation. The committees of this House—particularly the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee—and the House itself will want to take account of those consultation responses when forming their views. Again, I thank the Minister very warmly. I hope he can confirm my understanding on these issues.
My Lords, I am grateful to be able to participate in this debate. I join other noble Lords in welcoming the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart. I am grateful for the time he spent with me and the Commons Minister Alex Chalk MP discussing what I am about to talk about. I also congratulate my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton on his birthday today.
My interest is in something called the Luxembourg Rail Protocol, which we have all agreed is an item of private international law. The protocol is sponsored, along with the Cape Town convention, by the organisation UNIDROIT—I hope I have the right pronunciation. The UK is a full member of this organisation. The purpose of this rail protocol is very similar to a successful one that has existed for the air sector for many years. It is to do with moveable equipment: the financing, recognition, protection and enforcement of creditor rights in relation to equipment that can move. I spoke briefly about this in Committee on the Trade Bill, which I shall return to, but obviously, if investors want to financially support equipment that can be moved anywhere around the world, they want to have some comfort that they know where it is and will get their due money back or whatever.
I recall, from my experience in the railway industry about 20 or 30 years ago, that there was a time when rail wagons got as far as Italy and sometimes never came back. It is not like that today, but it might be like that in other parts of the world. It is really important for UK businesses—not only those that operate or own the relevant bits of equipment but also the export business that will come. I am advised that this needs to be done before the end of the year to provide continuity.
There has been quite a lot of debate here—and in our discussions with Ministers—as to whether this needs primary or secondary legislation. Other noble Lords with much greater experience than I have been discussing it this afternoon. I originally put down an amendment in Committee on the Trade Bill, and the Minister, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, said he was very supportive of fitting the Luxembourg Rail Protocol into UK law, but thought that the Trade Bill was not really the right place for it. He said it would be much better if it were done as a statutory instrument under the scope of this Bill, assuming that the text of this Bill allows it to happen. I know that there have been planned discussions between Ministers here and Ministers in the Department for Transport, because obviously they will have to promote some secondary legislation, but the important thing now is for the Minister, when he comes to wind up, to give the strongest assurance that the Government are empowered under this Bill—or Act, as it will be—to adopt the Luxembourg Rail Protocol through secondary legislation, and that he will do all he can to encourage the Department for Transport to get this moving so that we have a statutory instrument by the end of the year. I know there is a big queue of legislation, but it would be really good if that could happen. Given that so many Ministers have said to me that they want this to happen and that it is good for businesses—I have not heard anyone saying that it should not happen—I hope that the Minister will be able to give me the strongest assurance that he can.
Does anybody else in the Chamber wish to speak? I call the noble Lord, Lord Mance.
My Lords, I declare an interest as a practitioner in the field of private international law and as joint chair of the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law, to which reference has been made. I do not, of course, speak in that capacity and, as I mentioned on a previous occasion, that committee was not consulted about this Bill before its original introduction, although we have been very happy to be involved subsequently in relation to machinery under and related to the Bill.
I too welcome the Minister to his place and possibly, in succession to his predecessor the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to a co-chairing of that committee with me. I would of course welcome that very much. I particularly welcome his measured and very careful consideration of the issues raised by the Bill. Described as “technical”, it has happily and rightly also been described as “important”. It is promoted as part of the United Kingdom’s preparation for the post-Brexit era—I will come back to that. It will certainly introduce into the UK’s legal systems three identified and very valuable Hague conventions, which have been mentioned, including the choice of court convention of 2005. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said, what has been controversial is the provision for the introduction by delegated legislative regulations of any number of further private international law measures which might be agreed at international level during an indefinite future.
I hope that I shall not be thought ungrateful in what follows for the mercies which have been granted. Certainly, the amendment relating to offences and the removal of the delegated power to create criminal offences punishable by imprisonment is highly welcome. So too is the Government’s agreement to limit the operation of Clause 2 to an operative period of five years. However, that is renewable, as has been pointed out, so that is not as large a change as the House wished —and I think would still wish—to see. The five-year period is capable of being extended by regulations and, moreover, more than once. In that respect, I support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said.
If the Bill is addressing the post-Brexit era, let us truly hope that that at least will be well and truly past within 10 years. In any event, we should be under no illusion that any great volume of instruments is likely to require attention under the Bill. Again, I echo a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, made. We know that the Government have, for better or worse, decided, if permitted by the European Union, to sign up to membership of the Lugano Convention 2007—that paler image of the present Brussels regime, which, as I previously remarked, is well accepted and understood, and popular in the City in particular. The signing up to the Lugano Convention 2007 will, as I have also pointed out, largely undo as regards EU states the potential benefits of signing up to the Hague choice of court convention 2005. That is because Lugano trumps the choice of court convention under the internal terms providing for their priority.
Apart from that, the 2019 Hague convention is a possibility which has been mentioned. It relates to recognition of judgments and one day, but certainly not soon, it may come into play as a possibility. At the moment it has no subscriptions of any significance at all. Then there is the Singapore mediation convention, previously much loved by government speakers here and in another place—but I am glad to see that, I think realistically, it was not mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart. Its significance in promoting the enforcement of agreements reached as a result of mediation is certainly commendable but hardly earth shattering, those agreements being in any case enforceable at common law.
The reality is that as a country we do not go around the world trying to reach new ad hoc agreements regarding private international law matters, whether on jurisdiction or on recognition or enforcement of judgments. Such matters are nowadays undertaken at a regional—for example, EU—level or at an international level, such as the Hague conference level, which has produced the three conventions to which we will sign up under Clause 1. The UK is currently playing its part, and the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee has been involved in relation to the discussions in The Hague regarding the possible supplementing of the 2019 convention by a lis pendens and/or forum conveniens convention—in other words, a convention dealing with the plague or problem of concurrent litigation in different countries. However, there never has been and there is unlikely ever to be, at least after the end of this year, any imperative to make immediate decisions about accession to or implementation of private international measures. As has been pointed out previously, they have in the past merited parliamentary consideration on the Floor of this House. Indeed, I consider that the merits or demerits of the Lugano Convention would have been such a matter. It will not get that consideration, but future measures should. Even if Clause 2 goes through as it is, that, as has been pointed out, does not preclude Ministers from bringing matters to the House in the ordinary, traditional way.
I will not go back at length on the limited number of past measures which have allowed a limited degree of delegated legislation in this field: the Administration of Justice Act 1920, a measure covering other of Her Majesty’s jurisdictions overseas, and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. These Acts deal with judgments which would anyway have been enforceable by action at common law and were simply given a convenient means of enforcement by statutory delegated legislation. They did not cover jurisdiction but only recognition and enforcement of judgments. I endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said on that. I see that reference was made in another place to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but that is a wholly unpersuasive precedent which simply enabled the bringing into force by regulations of the specific Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults 2000. In other words, it is a parallel to Clause 1, which brings into force specific Hague conventions, and not a parallel to the present Clause 2 that we are considering.
The appropriate course in private international matters which are important is that wherever possible they should receive full parliamentary attention before international ratification. Looking back over the history of legislation, there is the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, but it also occurred in relation to legislation which has been mentioned previously: the Carriage by Air Act 1961 and the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965, which are hybrid—they have provisions extending outside private international law.
Three committees had no doubt about the inappropriateness of the reinstated clause—two of them have been mentioned—and the Constitution Committee noted the inadequacy of CRaG as a means of scrutiny of matters proceeding at international level. One hopes that will be addressed at some point, but it is a fact at the moment. So my message would be that if Clause 2 is to stay in the Bill, we should welcome the concessions which have very helpfully been made, but we should do all we can still further to limit its presence as an intruder. I therefore support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in that respect.
The amendment to Amendment 4B tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I also support, arises again from another small governmental step, for which I express gratitude. However, it is not a very large one. Under it, before making regulations, the Secretary of State must
“consult such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”
Well, no doubt that means that he cannot simply consult his own conscience or go into the next room, but I suppose he might go out into Petty France. It is completely open, and of a generality and subjectivity which is not very helpful. Therefore, I welcome the suggestions that have been made and the assurances which the Minister has given today about actual intentions.
The background, as I have said, is that there was no consultation with the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee about the original Bill, so any assurances now are valuable. Those proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Pannick, are welcome in the interests of, first, public consultation, which will generally be appropriate; it may not be appropriate in every case but it is generally important. Family and commercial issues arouse great interest around the country. Secondly, there should be an objective process, and thirdly, it should be transparent.
The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, selects three persons whom he suggests—and I endorse—should be introduced as consultees, at least to identify other consultees. One could, as has been suggested and as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned, identify the presence of the Law Society and the Bar as invaluable contributors, as well as the senior judiciary. One way or another, such persons would have the independent task of identifying relevant stakeholders, which would ensure objectivity and completeness in consultation.
The present phrase has a certain bathetic quality about it, which the Minister has done a considerable amount to dispel. I repeat my welcome for that but I ask him to give the assurances requested by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Pannick. On that basis, the Bill would be on a sounder footing and those of us who had understandable concerns about it would, I hope, find them considerably alleviated.
My Lords, it is indeed a privilege to follow the magisterial and extensive exposition of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, whose depth of experience and knowledge I defer to. He referred to the Bill as an intruder, which was an interesting description.
The Second Reading took place on 17 March, just at the beginning of lockdown. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, outlined the wide scope of the issues raised by the Bill. He said:
“Without private international law agreements, UK businesses, individuals and families would struggle to resolve the challenges they face when dealing with cross-border legal disputes.”—[Official Report, 17/3/20; col. 1439.]
The Minister echoed that opening today but I was surprised when he suggested that the area of law was narrow. As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, it may encompass disappearing railway carriages in Italy, which has an Agatha Christie ring about it.
The new clause inserted by the other place reflects that width. The Westminster Government or a devolved Government may, by regulation, implement any international agreement so far as it relates to private international law. Further, the appropriate national authority may, by regulation, apply any agreement between the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom or give effect to any arrangements between the UK Government and the British Overseas Territories, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands. The emphasis throughout is on any future agreement of whatever nature that involves private international law anywhere in the world or internally within the United Kingdom.
It would appear that the Government have listened to the many voices suggesting that these clauses are excessively wide. Consequently, in response, the Minister today introduced the outline of a sunset clause, limited in the first instance to five years. He said that the urgent need is “ to update the framework” lost by our leaving the EU. The principle that there should be a temporal limit to the exercise of these wide powers in the uncertainties of the present time is clearly a good one. Unfortunately, the Government have decided that, like the British Empire, the sun shall never set upon these provisions. That is the effect of granting power to extend the operative period, not just for a further period of five years but, under proposed new subsection (3D), to renew the power to extend the period indefinitely. It just keeps rolling along. That makes a mockery of a sunset clause; consequently, I am delighted to support the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.
As I said at earlier stages of the Bill, our hugely unsatisfactory procedures for passing secondary legislation by resolution, whether affirmative or negative, may be tempered in the interests of democracy by consultation with interested parties. Amendment 4 pays lip service to that concept but, in effect, gives power to the Minister to choose whomsoever he thinks appropriate to consult. The wording is loose, such that although there is a duty to consult if the Minister thinks subjectively that there is nobody appropriate—as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said—he does not have to exercise that choice; or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, said a moment ago, he could walk out into the street and consult someone.
The purpose of the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is to bring some objectivity to the exercise. The Minister may be surprised to know that the shelf life of a Minister in this and the previous Government tends to be no more than two years, and that Secretaries of State come and go through the various offices of state without necessarily knowing anything at all about their work. As WS Gilbert put it over 100 years ago, the way to advancement may well be to polish up the brasses on the big front door of No. 10.
Consequently, it is only sensible to have the guiding hand of the head of the judiciary in the various jurisdictions. No doubt the Sir Humphreys of this world can suggest that the Secretary of State rounds up the usual suspects, but that is no substitute for the Lord Chief Justice and his peers, who have a lifetime of experience of the legal world and the whole of the judiciary to draw on for advice as to who the suspects should be. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is inconceivable that they should not be consulted in any event.
I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks and, in particular, his call for a full and transparent report on the fruits of the consultation.
My Lords, I begin by thanking noble Lords for their thoughtful and erudite contributions. I thank them also for their courteous and warm words of welcome to me at the Dispatch Box. I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in a phrase that I think will resonate with the entire House and with which none of us would disagree: our imperative is the preservation of this country’s good name and its standing in private international law matters.
The matters raised in the course of our discussions overlapped to some extent but I will, if I may, do my best to treat the contributions to the debate in the order in which they were made. First, I shall address the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in relation to Amendment 1C, which omits some text from my Amendment 1A, the effect of which would be to allow the sunset period—which my amendment allows to be extended for five years by affirmative statutory instrument—to be extended only once.
The Government have been clear about how we wish to use this power over the next few years. As your Lordships have heard, this includes Lugano or alternatives with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, should our application be unsuccessful, as well, potentially, as the Singapore convention on mediation and the 2019 Hague judgments project, following consultation. If the Government ask Parliament to extend the power in five years, we will need to make our case again and have regulations approved in both Houses. To make a persuasive case, the Government will provide similar clarity on how we intend to use the power over the next five years and for every five-year period thereafter, should we pursue further extensions. Clearly, I cannot provide that detail now but, by the time such an extension is requested, it will be available and Parliament will be able to consider how the power has previously been used.
Essentially, this reviewable sunset requires the Government to consult on, and obtain parliamentary approval for, our strategy in this area of law every five years. I submit that this gives Parliament more oversight of government policy in private international law than it has ever had before. The need to come back to Parliament at five-year intervals with a plan for how the power will be used will act as a powerful regulator.
I mention the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, on the ability of our procedures to properly scrutinise statutory instruments brought before this House and the other place. I respectfully submit that the Bill is not an occasion for a referendum on those powers generally, irrespective of the views that Members of this House have of their efficacy.
I do not know what the situation will be like in nine years. If this power is deemed to have been necessary only in the years following our departure from the European Union, the Government could decide not to extend the power any further or Parliament could refuse to approve such an extension. By then, this power may be widely accepted as proportionate and appropriate. If that is the case, requiring Parliament to pass new primary legislation to extend an existing uncontroversial power seems highly undesirable, especially if the delay while parliamentary time is found for primary legislation leaves, for example, a family who would benefit from a new agreement about child maintenance or custody across borders in a worse position than they would be in if the Government could move quickly to implement such an agreement by secondary legislation.
My view is that the power represents a balanced and proportionate approach to implementing these uncontroversial and technical agreements. The sunset amendment in my name represents a significant concession by the Government to take account of the concerns of this House, while still retaining some aspect of the flexible approach that we originally sought, so that we balance constitutional concerns with the needs of those who depend on these agreements. I urge the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
I turn to the views of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who tabled Amendment 4F, which adds a requirement for the Secretary of State to consult specified persons. This overlaps with matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It specifies that the Secretary of State should consult the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland ahead of using the main delegated powers in the Bill. I recognise that the intent behind this is to ensure that the consultation process is robust, and that is clearly important. We consider that the Government would greatly value the opinions of these persons on these matters, but we believe it unnecessary to stipulate in the Bill that they should be consulted. I am concerned, because there are a number of reasons why this may not work in practice.
It is worth making the point that there may be specific subject areas within private international law, such as disputes around child abduction, in which not only the legal profession would have a stake. I fully appreciate this—I see the noble and learned Lord across the Table nodding. To echo the point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it may be difficult to conceive of a situation in which the views of those specified senior judges would not be considered important, so that they were not consulted. But it may be more appropriate for the Lord Chancellor to take the views of third-sector organisations. The original drafting of the amendment allows for flexibility when this is the case.
While private international law is not ordinarily a subject on which the Government undertake a full public consultation, such as was mooted, there could be situations in future where that would be proportionate. There may also be situations when the power is used to bring forward a minor technical statutory instrument to update the terms of an agreement. My colleague Minister Chalk, in his speech in the other place, referred to an Order in Council that the previous Labour Government had made in 2003, simply updating the names of courts captured by an agreement between the United Kingdom and Israel. If such an instrument were brought forth under this power, we would anticipate the level of consultation on it being proportionate, compared to situations when we are implementing a new agreement. It would not require the views of the senior judges specified by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and other noble Lords. It remains important that the Lord Chancellor can retain the flexibility to consider whom it is appropriate to consult on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, this amendment would require us to consult the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland in every case. As the delegated power is currently drafted to respect the devolution position and allow for the devolved Administrations to bring forward their own implementing legislation should they wish to, it may be that, in some circumstances, this Parliament and the Secretary of State are concerned only with implementation for England and Wales. In those circumstances, I am not sure that consultation with the judiciary of Scotland and Northern Ireland would be appropriate. In the exercise of their devolved competence, I am not sure that the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly ought to be bound to consult the judiciary of England and Wales—enlightening and important as such consultation may be.
Further, since the start of this process, the Government have been clear that this power would be used to implement the Lugano Convention. The importance of this has come up several times during debates on the Bill. There is widespread agreement that it needs to be implemented promptly if the United Kingdom’s application is to be successful. To that end, we have already discussed the matter at length with the Ministry of Justice’s international law committee and have shared a draft of the proposed implementing regulations with, and received views on them from, the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law, which includes representatives from both Scotland and Northern Ireland, and sitting and former members of the judiciary. This has provided useful feedback. A requirement to go back to these judges would cause unnecessary delay, increasing the gap when the Lugano Convention is not in force—a situation that we all want to avoid. What would happen if, for instance, a consultee suggested by the Lord Chief Justice failed to respond? It is not beyond the realms of conjecture for that to be the case with third-sector organisations or specific learned individuals. Any of that could result in delay.
While I acknowledge that the intent behind the noble Lord’s amendment is to ensure that any consultation is robust, and is therefore entirely reasonable, for the reasons I have outlined, I am concerned about how it would work in practice. I consider it to be unnecessary if the objective is simply to ensure that the Government consult in an effective manner, and I therefore respectfully ask him to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for his comments and for meeting to discuss these issues with me and my ministerial colleague Minister Chalk last week. I endorse the noble Lord’s views on the importance of the rail industry and of the Luxembourg protocol. I suggest that the analogy he drew of disappearing railway carriages was an example of him speaking figuratively. The application of the protocol is narrower than that. The Government consider this to be an important issue and are thinking about how best to implement the protocol in the United Kingdom. As we discussed last week, we consider that the power in this Bill is too narrow to fully implement the protocol, although the provisions in applicable law would be within its scope. I acknowledge once again his excellent work in championing this important issue and assure him that the Government are fully seized of his views and of the importance of the matter he has raised. It would provide, as it is intended, things to assist the smooth and seamless flow of trade across borders.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised a number of issues, and if I overlap in the comments I am making, I apologise to the House. I confirm that the obligation to consult will require us to take account of all the views expressed, including where people might express a view that primary legislation is appropriate to deal with a particular issue. The Government’s approach throughout on the delegated power has sought to be pragmatic and not dogmatic. We want to be proportionate in our implementation of PIL agreements but, where consultees make strong arguments about the appropriateness of primary legislation for a particular agreement, we would listen and consider them in the proper manner.
I shall go back to a matter raised by the noble Lord that I may have already touched on, which is the identity of consultees. As he does—I think it is universal across the Chambers—I envisage that the views of the senior judiciary would be sought on these matters. We have already shared the draft of a statutory instrument to implement Lugano with the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law and have discussed the issue at length with the international law committee at the Ministry of Justice, both of which contain representatives of the judiciary. The matter of whether concerns were raised at that stage by those representatives is perhaps neither here nor there, but the consultations took place and in neither case were concerns raised about the use of secondary legislation for the matter. As I think I said earlier, I can envisage a situation where there may be very technical procedural updates to a convention that do not require a senior judicial view on their implementation, such as updating the name of a foreign court that is referred to in an existing agreement. However, where a statutory instrument under the power implements a new agreement or makes material changes to an existing one, I agree that the views of the senior judiciary would be sought. To put the noble Lord’s point shortly: why not then simply stipulate in gremio of the Bill that the judiciary should be consulted? I reiterate my point that that might add extra bureaucratic weight to the burdens of its office and would not promote the flexibility in this exercise which the Government seek to accomplish.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also asked about the terms of a report that would be issued at the conclusion of the consultation process. This matter was raised by other noble Lords as well. While it is not the Government’s intention to publish a separate report summarising the consultation responses, we intend to provide Parliament with a detailed explanation of the persons with whom we have consulted and a fair and balanced summary of the views they have expressed within the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanies any statutory instrument made under the power. Of course, were that summary of those views to misrepresent them to any extent, that could immediately be brought to the attention of this House and the other place. That is the right approach. It will give Parliament the opportunity properly to consider the exercise which the Government have undertaken and to scrutinise and hold to account where appropriate. Those remarks also echo the views of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in his point relating to the effectiveness of the consultation procedure. I respectfully disagree with the proposal that this would permit the Government to make a mockery of the sunset clause. As I have stated, the procedures that I have outlined provide Parliament as a whole with a greater opportunity to scrutinise such measures than has been afforded for many a year.
In spite of my initial remarks, I appreciate that I have taken speakers out of order. I turn finally to the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and the valuable tour of the private international law horizon that he gave, which were most welcome. On the matter of the period of five years, the approach that the Government seek to take and urge on the House will take into account the fact that, notwithstanding that tour of the horizon of private international law, we cannot know precisely what lies ahead. The five-year periods permit the Government to see measures as they arise, to see the approach of conventions as they arise and to act accordingly in relation to formulating what the country’s policy ought to be. In those circumstances, we take the view that the five-year sunset period with the renewable extension permitted would give the Government the opportunity to give full and careful consideration to private international law agreements which they may decide would be beneficial for the United Kingdom to join. It would also provide ample time to fulfil our obligation in statute to consult relevant stakeholders.
The Ministry of Justice is in the process of formulating a 10-year strategy for private international law. The five-year renewable sunset would align more closely with our long-term strategy and enable the Government to be more agile in negotiations with our partners around the world. That sunset clause which the Government need to bring back to Parliament every five years would, as I have said, act as a good regulator to ensure that they are achieving their aims of re-establishing an effective framework of private international law agreements in the years to come. It is important that the Government can do this without the current pressures, but it is right that Parliament also has the opportunity to hold the Government to account, should they fall short.
Before I conclude, I remind the House that we need to agree a version of the Bill so that Clause 1 can be enforced before the end of the transition period. This clause provides a clear and simple approach to the implementation of three vital Hague conventions which affect the lives of people in the United Kingdom. Because of this, the Government’s priority is to avoid an extended back and forth between here and the other place. That does not mean, however, that we are trying to avoid the valuable scrutiny that the ping-pong process can offer.
I am grateful once again to your Lordships for your time and consideration of the Government’s proposals. The approach we have taken in these amendments reflects this. We have engaged with a number of your Lordships ahead of the Bill returning to this Chamber. We have sought to listen and have tabled the suite of amendments that has been considered today. We submit that this is not a paltry offer of the bare minimum which would address on any level at all the principal concerns your Lordships have raised. The amendments are a genuine attempt to reach a meaningful compromise in the areas that have raised most concern. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and to others for their acknowledgement of the importance of removing matter relating to the criminalisation of offences punishable by periods of imprisonment.
The amendments seek to address the particular concerns around appropriate scrutiny, while protecting the Government’s core policy objective. We could send this Bill back to the Commons, only to have it come back to us once more to make final tweaks to these amendments, but I urge your Lordships to see the bigger picture. This package of amendments is balanced and proportionate. We must consider not just the constitutional issues but the impact these agreements have on families and businesses. We need to pass this Bill, and time is moving on. This is an opportunity for us to send the Bill back to the other place with a clear signal that this House has balanced pragmatism with principle and found an effective compromise that it should support. I beg to move.
May I express the gratitude of the whole House for the care with which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, dealt with every single issue that was raised? That I disagree with some of the answers is not the same as saying that he did not deal with them. For a Bill like this, it was an absolute model of going through every issue and putting the Government’s argument; I am incredibly grateful for that. There is nobody more disdainful than me when questions are not answered but, my goodness, the noble and learned Lord did a very good job and the whole House is grateful for that.
I will focus on my amendment, which concerns not being able to extend and extend the provision. My reading of what the noble and learned Lord said is that the sunset clause was intended in part to deal with the objections raised by this House. As he knows, the reason for those objections is that we do not consider secondary legislation appropriate. He replied, in effect, that there are good reasons for it—Lugano, primarily. As I read it, he is saying that unless there are good reasons, the sun will set on this Bill. If that is the right approach and what he is indeed saying, my view is that the Lugano provisions that currently apply—we may be only four or five weeks away from wanting them to come into force—mean that it is very unlikely that future circumstances will arise that would justify using secondary legislation. I hope that is what he means.
The noble and learned Lord has acknowledged the reasons why this House did not want the secondary power. In those circumstances, mindful of the need to get the three conventions in Clause 1 on to the statute book 1, I will not be moving my amendment—but only on the basis that I earnestly expect that the Government will not need one, let alone two extensions to the sunset clause. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.
Amendment 1C withdrawn.
Motion on Amendments 1 to 1B agreed.
Motion on Amendments 2 and 3
2: Clause 2, page 2, line 28, at end insert—
“(2) Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) may make provision binding the Crown.
(3) The reference to the Crown in subsection (2) does not include—
(a) Her Majesty in Her private capacity,
(b) Her Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster, or
(c) the Duke of Cornwall.”
3: Clause 3, page 2, line 30, at end insert—
“(2) Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (including Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law))) and section 2(2) and (3) to extend, with or without modifications, to the Isle of Man.”
Motion on Amendments 2 and 3 agreed.
Motion on Amendments 4 to 4E
4: After Schedule 5, insert the following new Schedule—
Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)
Restrictions on power to make regulations
1 (1) Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) may not include—
(a) provision that confers power to legislate by means of regulations, orders, rules or other subordinate instrument (other than rules of procedure for courts or tribunals);
(b) provision that creates an offence for which an individual who has reached the age of 18 (or, in relation to Scotland or Northern Ireland, 21) is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than two years (ignoring any enactment prohibiting or restricting the imprisonment of individuals who have no previous convictions).
(2) Sub-paragraph (1)(a) does not prevent the modification of a power to legislate conferred otherwise than under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law), or the extension of any such power to purposes of a similar kind to those for which it was conferred.
(3) A power to give practice directions or other directions regarding matters of administration is not a power to legislate for the purposes of sub- paragraph (1)(a).
Regulations to be made by statutory instrument or statutory rule
2 The power to make regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)—
(a) is exercisable by statutory instrument, in the case of regulations made by the Secretary of State;
(b) is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)), in the case of regulations made by a Northern Ireland department.
Parliamentary or assembly procedure
3 (1) This paragraph applies to a statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law).
(2) If the instrument contains (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) provision made for the purpose of implementing or applying, in relation to the United Kingdom or a particular part of the United Kingdom, any relevant international agreement that has not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) or otherwise),
(b) provision made for the purpose of giving effect, in relation to the United Kingdom or a particular part of the United Kingdom, to any relevant arrangements that relate to a particular territory and have not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under that section or otherwise),
(c) provision that creates or extends, or increases the penalty for, a criminal offence, or
(d) provision that amends primary legislation,
it may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before each House of Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
(3) In this Schedule “relevant arrangements” means arrangements of the kind mentioned in section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3).
(4) If sub-paragraph (2) does not apply to the instrument, it is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
4 (1) This paragraph applies to regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law).
(2) The regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure (see section 29 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010) (asp 10)) if they contain (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) provision made for the purpose of implementing or applying, in relation to Scotland, any relevant international agreement that has not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) or otherwise),
(b) provision made for the purpose of giving effect, in relation to Scotland, to any relevant arrangements that relate to a particular territory and have not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under that section or otherwise),
(c) provision that creates or extends, or increases the penalty for, a criminal offence, or
(d) provision that amends primary legislation.
(3) If sub-paragraph (2) does not apply to the regulations, they are subject to the negative procedure (see section 28 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010).
5 (1) A Northern Ireland department may not make regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) that contain (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) provision made for the purpose of implementing or applying, in relation to Northern Ireland, any relevant international agreement that has not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) or otherwise),
(b) provision made for the purpose of giving effect, in relation to Northern Ireland, to any relevant arrangements that relate to a particular territory and have not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under that section or otherwise),
(c) provision that creates or extends, or increases the penalty for, a criminal offence, or
(d) provision that amends primary legislation,
unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly and approved by a resolution of the Assembly.
(2) Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) made by a Northern Ireland department are subject to negative resolution, within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954, if a draft of the regulations was not required to be laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly and approved by a resolution of the Assembly.
(3) Section 41(3) of that Act applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) in relation to the laying of a draft as it applies in relation to the laying of a statutory document under an enactment.
6 In this Schedule—
“amend” includes repeal or revoke;
“primary legislation” means any provision of—
(a) an Act of Parliament,
(b) an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
(c) an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru, or
(d) Northern Ireland legislation;
“relevant arrangements” has the meaning given in paragraph 3(3); “relevant international agreement” has the same meaning as in section (Implementation of other agreements on private international
4A: In paragraph 1(1), in paragraph (b), leave out from “offence” to end of paragraph
(b) and insert “punishable by imprisonment.”
4B: After paragraph 1 insert—
1A Before the Secretary of State makes regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”
4C: In paragraph 3(2), after paragraph (d) insert “, or
(e) provision made under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3C),”
4D: In paragraph 4(2), after paragraph (d) insert “, or
(e) provision made under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3C).”
4E: In paragraph 5(1), after paragraph (d) insert “, or
(e) provision made under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3C),”
Amendment 4F not moved.
Motion on Amendments 4 to 4E agreed.
Motion on Amendment 5
5: In the Title, line 1, at end insert “and to provide for the implementation of other international agreements on private international law.”
Motion on Amendment 5 agreed.