What recent representations he has made to EU Defence Ministers regarding Iraq.[93168]

Before answering this question, I should be grateful for the House's permission to pay a brief tribute to one of my distinguished predecessors, Viscount Younger of Leckie, who died yesterday. George Younger was a well-liked and respected Member of this House for 28 years from 1964 to 1992. He served as Secretary of State for Scotland between 1979 and 1986 and was Secretary of State for Defence between 1986 and 1989. I am sure that the House will join me in sending our sincere sympathies to Lady Younger and other members of his family.

I thank the Secretary of State for his gracious words about Lord Younger.

I am not sure that I agree that there are such different views. The only country that has specifically ruled out the use of military force is Germany. There was an agreement at the Copenhagen summit to support United Nations resolution 1441, and I anticipate that at its meeting today the General Affairs and External Relations Council will again issue a unanimous declaration supporting resolution 1441, making it clear to the Iraqi Government that they have a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully. I do not detect the disunity that may be implied by the hon. Gentleman's question.

Does the Secretary of State not recognise that Britain's position is, far from being in the mainstream, quite isolated from the rest of European opinion, that nobody in Europe believes that resolution 1441 gives authority to take military action and that the overwhelming majority of public opinion in this country and throughout Europe is strongly against military action? Will he confirm that there is no question whatever of Britain, alongside the United States, taking unilateral action to attack Iraq and that instead he will listen to the voices of reason and peace that are so loud in Britain, Europe and the United States?

I believe that I have already answered the first part of my hon. Friend's question. I simply do not accept that Britain is isolated; moreover, in all the meetings and discussions that I have had with European counterparts there is a consistency of view about the need to ensure that Security Council resolution 1441 is implemented. If my hon. Friend looks at the terms of the resolution, he will see that it calls for further discussion by the Security Council before any further action is taken, and that is precisely the British Government's view.

In wishing the Secretary of State well at this very difficult time, may I ask how many of his counterparts in the European Union have said that they would be prepared to place forces at the disposal of a coalition against Saddam Hussein?

I do not believe that all countries have yet made that announcement. They are all determined, as we are, to seek a political and diplomatic solution to the problem before resorting to military force. I refer hon. Members to the recent statement by President Chirac of France in which he said that it was necessary for French forces to be ready for any eventuality.

Did the Secretary of State discuss with Ministers the Pentagon battle plan "Shock and Awe", which in the words of the US military strategist Harlan Ullman would have a Hiroshima effect and take down the city, presumably killing thousands and cutting water and power? Is not such a plan a war crime, and will the Secretary of State tell his friends in the White House that we will have nothing to do with such barbarity?

As I have indicated to my hon. Friend on previous occasions very recently, no decisions have been taken about military force. Clearly there have been decisions about the contingencies necessary, and I hope that she agrees that it is necessary clearly to indicate our willingness to use force in order to support the diplomatic and political process at the United Nations, which is supported by this Government.

Given the widespread anxiety among people who are perfectly willing to be persuaded that there is a case for war against Saddam Hussein, will the UN weapons inspectors, if they ask for more time to carry out their inspections, be given that time, and if so, how much more time will they be given? Who will decide how much more time they should be given?

I am sure that if the hon. Gentleman is patient and waits a few more minutes, the initial report by the weapons inspectors will be made to the United Nations Security Council in New York. We will be in a much clearer position to answer his questions when we see the nature of that report.

May I first thank the Secretary of State for his extremely kind words about Lord Younger of Leckie, who was not only an esteemed statesman, but a great friend of many Conservative Members? The right hon. Gentleman's words will be of great comfort to Lord Younger's family.

Again, I have dealt with unity. On one factual matter, however, the hon. Gentleman should look at the signature at the end of the Maastricht treaty, which first gave expression to the concept of developing European defence. To the best of my recollection, that was signed by a Conservative Prime Minister, presumably supported at the time by both a Conservative Foreign Minister and a Conservative Defence Secretary. He should have regard to that as a matter of historic record. However, I agree to the extent that it is important that there should be unity of purpose, as demonstrated by the unanimous vote of the UN Security Council on resolution 1441 and the Copenhagen European Council. I am sure that it will also be demonstrated by the General Affairs and External Relations Council today. All those bodies have given consistent support to the agreed international position adopted by all countries.

I think that President Chirac would be surprised to hear that the Government believe that Europe is speaking with one voice on the issue. The Government clearly said this morning that Iraq's failure to make a full declaration in December and its failure actively to co-operate with the weapons inspectors is a material breach of UN Security Council resolution 1441, which says that serious consequences must follow. Even if we cannot get unity in Europe, is that the view of the whole Cabinet? Will the International Development Secretary express that view and stick to it when she appears before the House of Commons on Thursday? How can the Government expect to win public support for their policy if there is any doubt that the Cabinet is united?

The hon. Gentleman is well aware of the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility to which all Cabinet members subscribe. I have no difficulty in pressing on him the various constitutional law text books that I used to read. I can even give him an old tutorial paper if he wishes to study the detail.

Whether he intends to amend the information, which he provided for the dossier on Iraq published on 24 September 2002.[93169]

The British Government's assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, published on 24 September 2002, was based on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The dossier provides a detailed assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, including chemical and biological weapons, as well as efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. There are no current plans to amend it.

So much for the value of British intelligence. All the sites mentioned in the dossier have been visited by UN and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. The Government say that they have discovered no signs of any weapons of mass destruction and no evidence that those sites were ever used for their production. We also know that on the day on which the report was published, journalists visited the sites and found some of them derelict and the others used for benign purposes. Is it not crazy that the House took that piece of evidence from the Government in good faith, because we now know that it was a piece of vacuous propaganda? Would it not be greater folly if we continue to trust the intelligence that we have and make up more fairy stories about the threat from Iraq, so sending our soldiers to kill and be killed on the basis of further falsehoods?

I am sorry that my hon. Friend appears willing to believe the Iraqi Government before his own Government. It is perfectly likely that since the publication of the dossier of weapons of mass destruction the Iraqi Government have moved large quantities of material. Indeed, there is already some evidence of that. Before reaching the conclusions that my hon. Friend appears to have reached, he should at least have assessed the probability that Saddam Hussein has not co-operated entirely with the weapons inspectors—a matter that, I anticipate, they will make clear in the weeks ahead.

Will the Defence Secretary take the opportunity to reissue that dossier, fully taking into account the assessment of Hans Blix and the Security Council, and will he add to it his own assessment of the humanitarian cost and the cost to the civilian infrastructure of a war in Iraq so that people of this country can decide whether they support such an effort?

Of course, since the publication of the dossier, a United Nations Security Council resolution has been passed authorising the weapons inspectors to go about the task of investigating the whereabouts of weapons of mass destruction, so it would not make sense at this stage to attempt to duplicate their work. They are doing that work on behalf of the international community and we support their efforts very strongly.

Does my right hon. Friend not connect the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein now has with the weapons of mass destruction that we know he used against his own people in the past?

My hon. Friend is quite right. Indeed, one of the significant omissions from Iraq's declaration before Christmas concerned its failure to account for large amounts of chemical and biological equipment recorded by UNSCOM way back in 1998. It has made no effort whatsoever to explain to the world what has happened to those items and, indeed, to a range of other materials that clearly fall into the category of weapons of mass destruction.

The Government have produced a dossier on weapons of mass destruction, and have produced a separate dossier on human rights abuses in Iraq. The third string in their justification for what is happening at the moment is the alleged links between Saddam Hussein and terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda. Will the Secretary of State produce a dossier laying out precisely what those links are, as some people believe them to be a little thin?

We are aware that there are well-established links between the Iraqi regime and terrorist organisations. The links with al-Qaeda are much less strong, as I have made clear to the House over a period of time, and certainly the case for a connection with the events of 11 September 2001 is not at all persuasive. Nevertheless, it clearly can be argued that Saddam Hussein has consistently supported terrorist groups. Part of the concern, as set out by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister the other day, is that at some stage his weapons of mass destruction may fall into the hands of terrorist groups willing to use them.

One of the moral justifications given by Britain and the United States for contemplating war against Iraq in 2003 is that in the 1980s Saddam used chemical weapons obtained from us and other major powers against the Iraqi people. Is speculation that we may use nuclear weapons against the Iraqi people designed to demonstrate our moral or our military superiority?

My hon. Friend proceeds on a wholly false basis. The use of force against Iraq would be in support of an agreed United Nations position once there had been a discussion in the UN Security Council on the proper course of action. I want to make it clear to my hon. Friend that efforts to bring Iraq into line are efforts of the international community—something with which I would have expected him strongly to agree.

If he will make a statement on Britain's contribution to NATO's defence capabilities initiative.[93170]

The United Kingdom has long supported and worked towards the improvement of NATO's capabilities. We have a good record among allies for implementing improvements related to NATO's defence capabilities initiative, and have made a significant contribution to the Prague capabilities commitment—a new initiative launched at the summit in November.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply. Does he agree that a world where one country spends the equivalent on defence of that spent by the next 15 added together is not entirely healthy? Does he agree that the best way that Europeans, particularly countries such as Germany, can exert more weight in current debates is not to cut their defence spending but to make a greater contribution to the collective defence of NATO, so that the European collective voice is backed up by capabilities and we are not always dependent on one hyperpower?

I agree with the general thrust of that question. Given this country's commitment to a substantial increase in our defence budget, we are setting standards that—hopefully—our European neighbours and allies will follow. To improve the capabilities set out in the various initiatives—whether that be the NATO capabilities initiative or one in the European Union—requires expenditure, but that must be properly targeted to deliver the broad range of capabilities that we desire.

Will the Minister take this opportunity to set right a no doubt inadvertent error made by the Secretary of State at the previous Defence Question Time? In answer to a question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) on the percentage of gross domestic product spent on defence, the Secretary of State said:

"There were periods during the Conservatives' control of defence when the percentage was higher, but equally there were periods when it was lower."—[Official Report, 9 December 2002; Vol. 396, c. 4.]

I will study what the House of Commons Library has said and write to the hon. Gentleman.

My right hon. Friend will be aware that the decision taken in Prague to set up the NATO response force was indeed to make NATO more effective in changed circumstances. Does he believe, however, that decisions on that force acting out of area will be made by NATO and beyond the diktat of the United States?

NATO operates as a collaborative partnership; it can succeed only on that basis. That is why, increasingly, effort has been put into ensuring that capabilities are lifted progressively, so that we can deliver on the key objectives. As the contributions made by NATO allies will be part of that collaborative whole, the international response to any threat will be one that I know my hon. Friend would always want. That is clearly NATO's underlying principle, and one to which the Government strongly adhere.

May I associate myself with the Secretary of State's comments about Viscount Leckie? When he was George Younger, I worked with him as a special adviser at the Ministry of Defence. He worked tirelessly on behalf of the armed forces, and the Secretary of State's comments will be much appreciated.

"action is in hand to procure the necessary equipment to ensure that the equipment used by our forces is in every way compatible with the equipment that the United States is using."—[Official Report, 20 January 2003; Vol. 398, c. 37.]

We are currently involved in a procurement process to enhance the technical capability of our equipment, but the matter is much more profound and complex than that. There is a range of other issues that need to be addressed. That procurement is not a matter that we discuss openly, nor do we clearly identify the equipment that we are putting in place. I know that the hon. Gentleman would expect such a rule to be rigorously applied. We do not divulge all our technical capabilities, for very obvious reasons.

What assessment he has made of the progress of weapons inspections in Iraq. [93171]

We maintain regular contact with UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency about the progress of inspections. Dr. Blix and Dr. el-Baradei will be reporting to the United Nations Security Council later today. Dr. Blix had a meeting with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 17 January at which he told the Prime Minister that, although the inspectors had encountered no direct obstruction in carrying out their tasks, the onus was on Iraq to be more proactive in its co-operation.

Polls consistently show that two thirds of the public are prepared to support the Government in military action if the inspectors report consistent obstruction and the Security Council endorses that. I have had that view confirmed by my own constituency poll. However, there is widespread concern that we will plunge in, regardless. Does the Secretary of State agree that if the inspectors ask today for more time to reach a conclusion, most people would want Britain strongly to support that request?

As I indicated to the House earlier, it is probably best that we should wait the relatively short time before Dr. Blix reports to the United Nations Security Council to see what, if any, requests he makes. I draw my hon. Friend's attention to what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday, namely, that the inspectors have

"got to be given the time to do the job".

I associate myself and my right hon. and hon. Friends with the words of condolence to the family of Lord Younger. Does the Secretary of State agree that the weapons inspectors must be given the time to perform their tasks, and that it should be the United Nations, after listening to Dr. Blix, that should decide on the timing of such inspections? It was the strong view of many members of the armed forces whom I met last week in Kuwait, that any force should be UN-authorised, and that although there are concerns about climatic conditions in the Gulf, it should be the UN, not the weather, that determines the timing of any conflict. Can the Secretary of State confirm that British forces remain under US Centcom command and will stay under Centcom command if hostilities break out? What plans are there to redirect or withdraw British forces, should the US engage in military action in which the UK does not participate?

I would have been much happier with the hon. Gentleman's question if he had said not that the weapons inspectors require more time, but that they require to see disarmament. That is central to the United Nations Security Council resolution, around which there was a unanimous view on the part of the Security Council. We want to see the Government of Iraq accepting their responsibilities to disarm under Security Council resolution 1441. That is the position of this Government and of the other 14 members of the Security Council, as well as of the European Union, NATO and every other responsible Government in the world.

Does the Secretary of State give any credence to the rumours that the United Nations inspectors have not been getting the level of information that they required from western intelligence sources? If that is the case, why is it the case?

I know that there are rumours to that effect, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman, as I assure the House, that this country in particular has co-operated fully with the weapons inspectors and has ensured that both equipment and information have been made available to them, which I believe has allowed them better to do their job.

What credence does my right hon. Friend attach to recent reports that the issuing of protective clothing to Iraqi troops is proof positive, despite denials, that Saddam Hussein has and intends to use weapons of mass destruction? Does that mean that the issuing of protective clothing to British troops means, despite denials, that we have such weapons and also intend to use them?

The authenticity of the report is obviously a matter for the BBC, which I think was first responsible for broadcasting it. That particular report is certainly consistent with previous reports that this Government have received and, indeed, with the dossier that we published last September. Obviously, it is a matter of grave concern to this country and other members of the international community that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, including the sort of chemical weapons against which it would be necessary for Iraq to protect its forces with the sort of equipment that the BBC has described. I can assure my hon. Friend that such chemical weapons are not part of the United Kingdom's arsenal.

Since the Kurds of northern Iraq are likely to be in the front line of any military action, and since chemical and biological weapons have been used against the Kurds in the past, has any consideration been given to providing the Kurds with protective clothing in the event of military action?

My hon. Friend is right to express concern about the population of northern Iraq. That is precisely why British forces risked their lives in order to protect people in the area because of previous appalling attacks on the Kurds. Obviously, we do not control the ground in northern Iraq, which is a difficult part of the world. While it is arguably safer than many other parts of Iraq, it is still extremely dangerous territory.

May I press the Secretary of State further on the question asked of him by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), which I think is one of the key questions? I believe that the Prime Minister is absolutely sincere in saying that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction, and I understand that this is not a game of hide and seek. Does the right hon. Gentleman accept, however, that what the public do not understand is that while the Prime Minister is saying there is clear evidence, the UN is finding so little? May I press him further to reassure the general public and the House that all the information that he has that convinces him that Saddam is in possession of such weapons is passed to the UN inspectorate, so that we can get clear evidence in front of the British people?

I do not think that it is a great surprise to the weapons inspectors that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Weapons inspectors have been in Iraq over many years since the end of the Gulf war, bearing in mind that it was a condition of the ceasefire that Iraq should abandon its programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction. I accept that the issue is convincing the present set of inspectors that they have found proof on the ground that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but, equally, I invite hon. Members to look carefully at the terms of the UN resolution. It is a question of ensuring the co-operation of Iraq with the terms of that resolution. There is an obligation on Iraq to produce the material that it has. Although it has made a declaration, it is already clear that that declaration is insufficient, but we certainly await the further report of the weapons inspectors to take the matter further at this stage.

What assessment he has made of the impact of wind farms on military radar; and if he will make a statement. [93172]

Trials conducted by the Royal Air Force in 1994 and 1997 found that a wind farm in direct line has a detrimental effect on civilian and military radar performance, as the rotating blades can be a source of interference. The turbines can appear as genuine aircraft targets that could either mask aircraft responses or desensitise the radar within the sector containing the wind farm, and they can also cause an unquantifiable general effect on radar.

Given the potential impact on military radar, I recognise the need for the Ministry of Defence to examine each planning application for a new wind farm, but does my hon. Friend acknowledge the anxieties of several wind farm developers about the Ministry's occasional lack of speed in deciding whether to lodge an objection to a wind farm? Given the wind farm industry's considerable potential to create new jobs and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, will he consider carefully further action to speed up the Ministry's consideration of such matters?

Yes, I shall. Every proposal to the Ministry of the Defence receives a full appraisal by at least seven separate technical advisers, each with their own specialism. The criteria for the case-by-case consideration are the effect of the development both on the ability to train our pilots safely and operational capability. We are members of a steering group on wind energy, which is considering ways to speed up the process. Between July 1996 and November 2002, our experts had to consider some 1,900 proposals from wind farm developers throughout the United Kingdom. In 2002, we were consulted on a total of 952 developers' proposals, to which we have objected to 248 so far.

What the budget and planned delivery dates are for the defence information infrastructure.[93173]

The Ministry of Defence currently spends approximately £500 million per year on its information infrastructure and related services. The defence information infrastructure programme, which will bring together all the Ministry's information networks in a single managed service, will be subject to competitive tender and is expected to deliver significant savings over current expenditure. The defence information infrastructure will be delivered incrementally, and current plans are for an initial operating capability by 2005.

The public sector's record in managing information technology projects over many years can best be described as chequered. Given that the Ministry of Defence recently had to write off costs relating to the defence management system, what special project management measures are being taken to ensure that the defence information infrastructure programme, which is so important to the UK's defence, is provided on budget and on time?

We are learning from the mistakes of the past all the time. The Office of Government Commerce is designed to capture such experiences and ensure that we identify the shortfalls and weaknesses in some big, expensive and important IT projects. As I said, the project will be provided incrementally. It has received a high level of oversight, and a McKinsey study has examined various aspects of it. We are alert to the problem of industry promises that are not always fulfilled. We are therefore putting better management resources and high-level oversight into the project. We are also keeping a close ministerial eye on it.

What assessment he has made of the military effects of bombing Baghdad.[93174]

There has been no decision to take military action against Iraq. It is still not too late for Saddam Hussein to decide to accept United Nations resolutions and thereby avoid the necessity for any kind of military action.

I echo the tribute to George Younger.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, at least for suggesting that we should think things through. That is precisely the British Government's position. I invite him to think through Iraq's history and its failure to comply with a series of international obligations, going back to the ceasefire provision that I mentioned earlier. It gave Saddam Hussein 15 days in which to co-operate with abandoning his programme of weapons of mass destruction. The process continues. There were some 26 United Nations obligations before what was described as the final opportunity for Iraq in resolution 1441 to comply with the will of the international community. It therefore remains up to Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq to comply with the decisions of the international community. I am sure that my hon. Friend would strongly support that.

Given that our quarrel is not with the Iraqi people, but with their dictator, what discussions has the Secretary of State recently had with the Secretary of State for International Development to ensure that once the bombing of Baghdad has begun—and thereafter. we hope, quickly comes to an end—we can put in place an immediate humanitarian relief and rescue package to demonstrate our commitment to the Iraqi people?

The hon. Gentleman is certainly right that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people, and nor have we ever had. However, it is important that the regime in Baghdad accepts the will of the international community. We set out very recently the aims and objectives of our policy in relation to Iraq, which certainly include rebuilding and restoring in Iraq a degree of representative government, and that is something that we are determined to achieve. I do not want to go into details of aftermath planning of the kind that he mentions, because that implies the inevitability of military action. Military action is still neither inevitable nor imminent.

Should not the Secretary of State bear it in mind that the dire warning given by my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) used exactly the same words that he used in relation to the liberation of the Falklands, to Kuwait 12 years ago, and, much more recently, to Kosovo? On all those issues, he was wrong and was proved to be wrong. If military action is to be avoided, is there not a need for Iraq's criminal and murderous regime to be far more honest about weapons of mass destruction? How many Members of Parliament, if my hon. Friend had to hazard a guess—

Order. That is enough questions for the Secretary of State to be going on with.

I accept that there are those who are sincerely opposed to military action in any circumstances and those who are opposed to military action in most circumstances. I would put the Government into the second category. We want to avoid military action if at all possible. A political, diplomatic route remains available to Saddam Hussein, and we believe that he should take that route and comply with the wishes and decisions of the international community.

May I pursue the point made by my friend and colleague of 40 years, the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell)? I am one of those who believe that, if it is definitely established that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and is in a position to use them, we will certainly have to disarm it, but I hope that all the tactical and strategic considerations will be borne in mind. Speaking as somebody who, as a very young officer, led patrols in a hostile Arab city much smaller than Baghdad 53 years ago, I put it to the Secretary of State that as Baghdad is a city of 5 million people, if Saddam Hussein withdraws, as I suspect that he will, his entire army inside Baghdad, so that the city has to be taken street by street and house by house, the casualties—not only on our side, but on the civilian side—will be absolutely enormous. Even the German army in 1871—

Order.

I believe that I have probably answered the hon. Gentleman's question already, but I point out to him that he assumes that those 5 million people will be fighting for Saddam Hussein.

On a point of order. Mr. Speaker. In view of the fact that the issue of Baghdad needs more exploration, may I be considered for an Adjournment debate on that subject?

How many new recruits have joined the armed services in each of the past two years, having completed all training courses.[93177]

The number of new recruits in the financial years 2000–01 and 2001–02 were 22,960 and 23,578 respectively. The time taken to complete full training varies, with some trades requiring well in excess of two years, but the numbers completing basic training and joining the trained strength of the armed forces in the past two years were 16,600 and 17,040 respectively.

Given the number of young people joining the armed forces and the possibilities of a first-class career, but given also the build-up in the Gulf, can the Minister reassure us that there will be sufficient British forces for the peacekeeping missions around the world for which they are renowned?

Yes, I can assure my hon. Friend that that is so. What is important is the proportion of those whom we recruit to initial training that we manage to bring through on to the full trained strength. Over the past few years, we have put a great deal of effort into improving the training stream to try to ensure that we lose fewer people on the way.

The Army remains stubbornly short of about 6,000 men. We stand on the brink of war, yet sections of the Army have had their recruiting suspended. Can the Minister explain that?

Recruiting has held up very well this year and we have reached 16,990 new recruits in total after eight months, which is 68 per cent. of the target. The Army has not stopped recruiting and it has not stopped initial training. Due to a successful Army recruiting year, the numbers have exceeded available training places for the remainder of this financial year. As a result, a small number of Army recruits who were due to commence initial training in March will be offered places in April and May 2003. There will be no effect on any immediate operational activity.

Would my hon. Friend like to hazard an estimate of the percentage of those recruits who are from ethnic minorities within and outside this country?

I can answer that very briefly—not sufficient, but the numbers are increasing. There are gratifying signs that we are recruiting more effectively from ethnic minorities, and we shall continue to put a great deal of effort into increasing the percentage.

If he will make a statement on the size of United Kingdom armed forces on duty in the Gulf. [93178]

UK armed forces on duty in the Gulf region include about 1,000 Royal Air Force personnel supporting patrols over the no-fly zones and about 1,500 Royal Navy, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and RAF personnel supporting our contribution to the campaign against international terrorism. As part of our continuing preparations for possible military action in Iraq, a relatively small number of service personnel are working in liaison and planning teams in the Gulf region. In addition, a wide range of personnel from all three services perform defence diplomacy duties throughout the Gulf region.

Does the Secretary of State agree that many thousands of those soldiers face weeks of anxiety and uncertainty as the campaign in Iraq hots up? Will he join me in condemning those insurance companies, such as Norwich Union and Prudential, that refuse to provide life assurance cover to them? When does he plan to talk to those insurance companies so that at least that part of those soldiers' fears and anxieties is addressed?

The situation was dealt with effectively on behalf of the insurance companies by the Association of British Insurers, which indicated that the recent report in The Times was "misleading and inaccurate". Those are its words. It went on to say that life cover for members of the armed forces can usually be purchased at standard premium rates, that existing life insurance policies will continue in force and that armed forces personnel are encouraged to recognise the long-term nature of life insurance. So, there seems to be a clear view from the insurance companies that policies will continue to be available.

One anxiety faced by our armed forces in situations where there may be conflict is the possibility of casualties due to friendly fire. Given the revelations from the investigation of the friendly fire killings of four Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan last year, will the Secretary of State tell the House what representations he has made to the United States authorities on the issuing of amphetamines to US pilots when they go into combat? Given that the side effects include irritability and heightened awareness all round, will he confirm that he has made representations to his US counterpart on the use of amphetamines in any military action?

I dealt with that question the other day. A disciplinary inquiry is under way in the United States, where the use of amphetamines by two pilots has been alleged, and the House should await the result of that inquiry before I comment on it.

The Secretary of State obviously did not hear the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch), so I shall repeat it. Are the British forces in the Gulf currently under US Centcom command, will they remain so if hostilities break out, and what plans are there to withdraw or redirect British forces should American forces engage in hostilities without British participation?

The question asked by the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Osborne) related to British forces on duty in the Gulf, and I answered that. Those on duty in the Gulf are currently performing acts of planning and liaison with relevant authorities, and not simply with the US authorities.

Is the Secretary of State aware that, if British forces are used in the war against Iraq, there will be concern not only about the military effect of action but about its politically destabilising effect throughout the Arab world and throughout the entire Muslim world from northern Nigeria to the streets of Bradford? Does he agree with the President of Egypt, Mr. Mubarak, who said a few months ago that, if America and Britain attacked Iraq without an explicit UN resolution, not one regime in the middle east would be able to contain its population?

I have had conversations with a good number of representatives of various countries in the Gulf and the wider middle east. Their views were not in accord with that expressed by my hon. Friend. Clearly, there are concerns about the destabilising effect of possible military action, should it prove necessary. However, there are stronger concerns about the politically destabilising situation of allowing Saddam Hussein to continue in power, particularly if he develops and is able to use weapons of mass destruction. I do not believe that views on what is politically destabilising are necessarily as consistent as my hon. Friend might suggest.

What progress his Department has made in its contingency arrangements for military action against Iraq; and if he will make a statement.[93179]

What plans he has for the use of military forces in Iraq.[93181]

No decision has been taken to use military force in Iraq. It is clear that Saddam Hussein will comply with international law only when diplomacy is backed up with a credible threat of force. That is why it is necessary to prepare our armed forces for any military operations, as set out in recent statements to the House.

On 7 January, the Secretary of State said that, to tackle the dreadful problem of friendly fire, which has been referred to already, the Government would

"acquire new equipment that will be available in time for any potential conflict".—[Official Report, 7 January 2003; Vol. 397. c. 28.]

New equipment is being acquired, as I have told the House more than once. Combat identification is not just about fitting equipment. We must also ensure that our forces and those with which we are in coalition are aware of our positions, and aware of accurate and agreed target identification, tactics and other techniques and procedures. That is a complex process, and it is under way with those responsible for preparing and planning for the necessity of any military operations in Iraq.

If there is no specific UN mandate for military action against Iraq, what will the Secretary of State do to receive the backing of the millions of people in this country who are against action being taken in their name without such a resolution?

The hon. Gentleman anticipates a situation that has not yet arisen. I assure him that this country wants effective action to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. I believe that the country will strongly support the Government's efforts to achieve that laudable end.

Pentagon officials were quoted this weekend referring to

"an aerial bombardment so intense that Iraqi forces will be disabled and demoralised, making a ground assault unnecessary."

I assure my hon. Friend that all decisions taken by the British Government in relation to any possible action against Iraq will be in conformity with international law, the humanitarian element of which is significant.

The Secretary of State has said that he would prefer a second UN resolution before any military action, but that he would not feel bound by the unreasonable use of the veto. If another country uses the veto—as is provided for within the rules of the UN—what does he think is within the UN charter that gives him, the Prime Minister or George Bush the right to decide that it is unreasonable and ignore it?

It is important that we allow the process set out in resolution 1441 to unfold without anticipating what might or might not happen in the future.

The Secretary of State's gracious tribute to the late Lord Younger will be widely appreciated, not least by his son James, who happens to be a constituent of mine. Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that studied inactivity is not an option; that appeasement, whatever the intentions of those who advocate it, is invariably disastrous; and that, if we do not take the steps and show the moral courage necessary to act, if it is unavoidable so to do, future generations will not forget the fact and will not forgive it, either?

It is clear that the policy of containment, if it has not actually failed, is certainly failing. Therefore, it is incumbent on the international community—as the unanimous vote of the Security Council in November recognised—to take action to deal with the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Certainly we do not have the choice of doing nothing. Saddam Hussein has a choice: he can choose to disarm, or, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made clear, the international community will have to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow) made clear, the Government can count on possibly stronger support from the Conservative Opposition than from many of the Secretary of State's own colleagues if the taskforce goes into action. If it does, is it not the case that it must be adequately defended? Is he content that, out of our three aircraft carriers, only one is available? Is he content that that one has been converted to the role of a commando and helicopter carrier largely because of the paying-off of Fearless before Albion became available? Is he also content that the most experienced pilots of Sea Harriers will not be deployed? Is he not worried that some will feel that that may have less to do with the availability of alternative land-based aircraft and more to do with the fact that if the Sea Harriers and their pilots distinguish themselves in any conflict, it will show how unwise it will be to phase out the Sea Harriers—

Order. The Secretary of State only has to answer one question.

I suppose that I should congratulate the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) on his obsessions, but he should not allow them to get in the way of sound military planning.

He has a doctorate in it.

We have sound military advice from those responsible as to how best to configure the force that is being planned to take military action in Iraq, should that be required. [Interruption.] I am getting some helpful advice from Conservative Front Benchers that the hon. Member for New Forest, East has a doctorate in obsessions. I thought it better to suggest that he had a doctorate in armchair generalship.

What assistance his Department is giving to conflict prevention in Africa.[93180]

The Ministry of Defence contributes to the Government's conflict prevention efforts in Africa in close co-operation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development through the interdepartmental conflict prevention pool. Together, we are also working with our partners in the G8 and Africa to increase the impact and effectiveness of existing and emerging conflict reduction efforts.

In view of the important contribution that British military advisers have made to the search for a durable peace in southern Sudan, will my right hon. Friend look at the prospects for building a ceasefire between the Ugandan Government forces and the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda? Will he especially take advice from our high commissioner in Kampala on the views of members of the Ugandan Parliament who come from northern Uganda as to whether it might be possible to broker a ceasefire there as well as in southern Sudan?

My hon. Friend is a specialist on all matters relating to Africa and raises a most important issue: how we take forward conflict prevention. At all times, we must examine the whole range of practical options that can be delivered. I shall certainly take account of the views that he has expressed and ensure that they are actively considered.